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THE UK ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE
The UK Energy Research Centre is the focal point for UK research on sustainable
energy. It takes a whole systems approach to energy research, drawing on
engineering, economics and the physical, environmental and social sciences.
The Centre's role is to promote cohesion within the overall UK energy research
effort. It acts as a bridge between the UK energy research community and the
wider world, including business, policymakers and the international energy
research community and is the centrepiece of the Research Councils’ Energy
Programme.
The partner institutions in UKERC are: Cardiff University, Centre for Ecology and
Hydrology, University of Edinburgh, University of Exeter, Imperial College London,
King’s College London, University of Manchester, University of Oxford, Policy
Studies Institute, Rutherford Appleton Laboratory
www.ukerc.ac.uk
THE UKERC ENERGY 2050 PROJECT
Since 2006, researchers at UKERC have been working together on an ambitious
project assessing how the UK can move to a resilient (‘secure’) and low-carbon
energy system over the period to 2050. This report synthesises the project
findings. A more extended account of the project will be published in book form in
early 2010.
The Energy 2050 project brought together a wide range of researchers coming
from several disciplines to address a common problem, exploring all dimensions of
the possible development of the UK energy system through to 2050. A common
set of scenarios was used, making it possible to relate the different elements of
the project to each other. While the project relied heavily on scenarios and
modelling, it also placed great emphasis on the underlying policy and research
questions and the conclusions and implications for action. This report focuses on
these aspects of the work, in order to make it more relevant to policy makers and
a wider readership. Technical detail is kept to a minimum but is available in the full
Research Reports that were produced by the various work streams of the project.
These are being made available on the UKERC website.
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This report takes a whole systems approach to the development of the UK energy system
over the next 40 years
Understanding the energy system and its relationship with society, the economy and the
environment is a complex multi-faceted challenge. The UK Energy Research Centre
(UKERC) has been charged by the Research Councils with taking a ‘whole systems’
approach to the development of UK energy. This means thinking about all the dimensions
of change and drawing on a range of disciplines and expertise. We bring together a
unique team of engineers, natural, environmental and social scientists, and economists all
of whom have worked on this report.
Achieving a resilient low-carbon energy system is technically and economically feasible at
an affordable cost
Extensive modelling and analysis of the UK energy system through to 2050 shows that
the UK’s target of reducing CO2 emissions by 80% below 1990 levels by 2050 is
achievable and that the aggregate costs are small in relation to GDP. By 2050, the
electricity system must be effectively de-carbonised whatever pathway is followed.
Nuclear, renewables and fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage (CCS) are all likely to
have an important role to play. Reducing demand in the residential sector and, later, in
the transport sector will also be required. Early action and a readiness to invest in
infrastructure and more capital intensive solutions could lead to lower costs in the long-
term. A resilient energy system which provides adequate energy security is also
achievable and can be realised on a much faster timescale.
There are multiple potential pathways to a low-carbon economy. A key trade-off across
the energy system is the speed of reduction in energy demand versus decarbonisation of
energy supply. There is also a number of more specific trade-offs and uncertainties, such
as the degree to which biomass, as opposed to electricity and perhaps hydrogen, is used
in transport and other sectors.
Although electricity decarbonisation is essential in the long term in all scenarios, there are
choices to be made about the balance to be struck between it and the more aggressive
pursuit of energy efficiency and demand reduction. If supply side decarbonisation is
emphasised, electricity will be substantially decarbonised by 2030. However, under a
scenario where energy demand is reduced more quickly, electricity sector decarbonisation
could take place around a decade later. Given the many uncertainties and risks involved,
there are strong arguments for pursuing both demand and supply side solutions in
parallel: should there be any delay in commercialising key technologies such as CCS,
demand side measures may be necessary to keep us on the path to an 80% emissions
reduction. Bioenergy provides additional flexibility: it could play a variety of roles in the
power, heat and transport sectors depending on how sustainably it can be developed, and
how quickly alternatives such as electric or perhaps hydrogen fuel cell vehicles come to
the market.
Executive Summary
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Deploying new and improved technologies on the supply side will require substantially
increased commitment to RD&D, the strengthening of financial incentives and the
dismantling of regulatory and market barriers. A major increase in efforts to accelerate
the development of emerging low-carbon energy supply technologies promises significant
reward, in terms of more affordable decarbonisation pathways, in the long term.
Investing in research, development and demonstration (RD&D) could substantially reduce
the cost of meeting long-term CO2 targets. The pay-off from such an investment has
grown considerably since the UK moved from a 60% to an 80% CO2 reduction target, with
much greater potential contribution from advanced low-carbon supply technologies. There
is a case for a substantial expansion of expenditure on energy R&D but careful thought
needs to be given to the relative contributions of the public and private sectors, the
balance between early-stage R&D and later-stage demonstration and deployment, and the
UK’s role in wider EU and global efforts. The deployment of new and improved
technologies needs to be encouraged by a reliable carbon price. In most scenarios an
80% carbon reduction is achieved with a market signal of less than £200/tonne CO2 by
2050, but this is increased to £300-350/tonne CO2 by delayed action or a more stringent
carbon target. In the shorter-term, barriers to the deployment of renewable energy
include the planning regime and market rules in the electricity sector.  The aggressive
pursuit of energy efficiency may need the development of new policy delivery and
business models.
Increasing the uptake of existing and cost-effective energy efficiency and conservation
technologies will reduce the welfare costs associated with demand reduction.
Reducing energy demand plays a key role in any secure, low-carbon future. It contributes
to CO2 reduction, reduces import dependence and exposure to volatile global energy
markets, and reduces other environmental pressures. If demand reduction takes place
simply as a response to higher prices, the welfare costs could be high in sectors where
there are many barriers to action. The residential sector is a notable example. Policy
needs to find a way of increasing the uptake of energy efficiency through increased
awareness and environmental commitment, and a shift in lifestyles and social values. 
A resilient energy system needs a range of measures, but reducing energy demand is
key. This will reduce our exposure to energy price shocks and could help us to ride out
major disruptions to infrastructure.
Building a resilient energy system requires action to reduce energy demand, promote
diversity of supply and ensure that market and regulatory arrangements encourage
adequate investment in capacity and infrastructure. The case for energy efficiency is clear.
Our work has shown that a smaller energy supply system is better able to ride out the
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loss of critical infrastructure. There needs to be an informed debate about investment in
infrastructure, particularly in the gas network, and whether strategic investment, for
example in storage, is needed to supplement market investments. 
Changes will be needed to market design and regulation to facilitate the move to a
resilient low-carbon energy system 
Changes to current market and regulatory arrangements are needed to ensure that the
significant expansion of renewable energy does not reduce the reliability of the electricity
system. The UK’s target of 15% renewable energy by 2020 under a new EU Directive
implies a huge expansion in the renewable heat, transport and electricity sectors. A
renewable share of at least 30% will be required in the electricity sector if the target is to
be met. Changes to regulatory arrangements are needed to ensure a more strategic
approach to grid connection which obviates delays and does not allow the securing of
planning permission to become an obstacle. It is not clear that current market
arrangements give sufficient incentives for capacity to back-up intermittent renewable
generation. A range of options needs to be considered.
Lifestyle changes that reduce energy demand would enhance energy system resilience
and reduce the costs of CO2 reduction. Further work is needed to assess how such
changes might be induced and the role that policy could play.
There is little existing evidence of how to bring about comprehensive changes in people’s
lifestyle and behaviour that will lead to reduced energy demand and CO2 emissions. We
explored a scenario in which people were more prepared to invest in energy efficiency
measures, were prepared to change their approach to thermal comfort levels in the home,
and were willing to travel less while using less energy-intensive travel modes. The
scenarios foresaw energy demand falling by roughly half by 2050 in both the residential
and transport sectors. Research is needed to understand the conditions under which
people would voluntarily take on lifestyles embodying these types of behaviour.
If public concern about specific technologies prevents their deployment, the cost of
meeting CO2 targets will significantly increase, and a greater burden will be imposed on
demand side responses. 
We explore a number of scenarios in which the development of certain types of
technologies and fuels was constrained by public concerns about their development. The
scenarios reflected different attitudes and values towards the natural environment. All the
scenarios pushed up the cost of reaching CO2 targets and resulted in greater emphasis on
demand side measures. The more low-carbon options are constrained by such concerns,
the more difficult it will be to meet CO2 reduction targets, or conversely the greater the
chance that they will not be met. 
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Reducing CO2 will broadly lead to improvements in other environmental areas, but
regulatory attention may be needed in some areas (air quality, water stress) where there
are potentially adverse effects. 
The way the energy system develops will have direct environmental impacts other than
those resulting from climate change. Broadly speaking, measures to reduce CO2 emissions
will bring down emissions of pollutants such as sulphur dioxide, though some pollutant
levels, e.g. carbon monoxide, will be unchanged. Radioactive releases could go up slightly
under a low-carbon scenario. It is very clear that emphasising energy demand reduction
as part of an overall energy strategy will bring the biggest environmental benefits.
Emissions of many pollutants – e.g. sulphur, particulates, nitrous oxide and carbon
monoxide – will be half of what they otherwise would be by 2050 if energy efficiency is
emphasised.
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ATD accelerated technology development
bcm billion cubic metres
BERR Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
BETTA British Electricity Transmission and Trading Arrangements
BEV Battery Electric Vehicles 
BIEE British Institute of Energy Economics
BWEA British Wind Energy Association
CCC Committee on Climate Change
CCGT combined cycle gas turbine
CCS carbon capture and storage
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CEC Commission of the European Communities
CEGB Central Electricity Generating Board
CERT Carbon Emission Reduction Target
CFL compact fluorescent lamp
CGEN Combined Gas and Electricity Networks (as in CGEN model)
CH4 methane
CHP combined heat and power
CLG Communities and Local Government
CO carbon monoxide
CO2 carbon dioxide
CRC Carbon Reduction Commitment
CSA Chief Scientific Adviser
DECC Department of Energy and Climate Change
DEFRA Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs
DfT Department for Transport
DIUS Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills
DNO District Network Operator
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
DUKES Digest of UK Energy Statistics
EEC Energy Efficiency Commitment
ENA Energy Networks Association
ESD energy service demand
List of Acronyms
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EST Energy Saving Trust
ETI Energy Technologies Institute
ETSAP Energy Technology and Systems Analysis Program
EU ETS EU Emissions Trading Scheme
EU European Union
EUA EU allowance unit
EWP Energy White Paper
FGD flue gas desulphurisation
GDP gross domestic product
GHG greenhouse gas
GW gigawatts
GWh gigawatt hour
HEV hybrid electric vehicle
HFC hydrogen fuel cell
HGV heavy goods vehicle
HPR heat to power ratio
IAEA International Atomic Energy Authority
ICT information and communication technology
IEA International Energy Agency
LCBP Low-carbon Buildings Programme 
LED light emitting diode
LGV light goods vehicle
LNG liquefied natural gas
LOLE loss-of-load expectation
LOLP loss-of-load probability
MARKAL MARKet Allocation (as in MARKAL model)
mcm million cubic metres
MEA Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
MW megawatts
MWh megawatt hours
N2O nitrous oxide
NOX nitrogen oxides
OFGEM Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets
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PEM polymer electrolyte membrane (fuel cell)
PHEV plug-in hybrid electric vehicle
PJ petajoules
PM particulate matter
PSA Public Service Agreement
PTE Passenger Transport Executive
PV photovoltaics
RCEP Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution
Research Councils’ Energy Programme
RD&D research, development and demonstration
REC Regional Electricity Company
RO Renewables Obligation
ROC Renewables Obligation Certificate
RTFO Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation
SAP Standard Assessment Procedure
SMMT Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders
SO2 sulphur dioxide
TNO Transmission Network Operator
TRL technology readiness level
TSB Technology Strategy Board
TWh terawatt hour
UKDCM UK Domestic Carbon Model
UKERC UK Energy Research Centre
UKTCM UK Transport Carbon Model
UNEP UN Environment Programme
UNFCCC UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
VAT Value Added Tax
VOLL value of lost load
WASP Wien Automatic System Planning (as in WASP model)
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Summary of UKERC Energy 2050 Scenarios
Scenario Scenario name Notes
CORE SCENARIOS (Chapters 1, 3, 7 and 8)
REF Reference Includes ‘firm and funded’ policies at the time of the 2007
Energy White Paper
LC Low-carbon 80% CO2 reduction by 2050 and 26% by 2020 from a 1990
baseline. Known as CAM under Carbon Reduction and LC
Core 80% under Accelerated Technology Development
LC RCEP Low-carbon 60% CO2 reduction by 2050. Known as CLC under Carbon
Reduction and LC Core 60% under Accelerated Technology
Development
R Resilient Reference scenario with constraints on final energy demand
and supply diversity
LCR Low-carbon Resilient Combines the constraints in LC and R
CARBON REDUCTION (Chapters 2 and 8)
CFH Faint-heart 40% CO2 reduction by 2050
CLC Low-carbon Equivalent to the LC Core Scenario (60% reduction)
CAM Low-carbon Equivalent to the LC Core Scenario (80% reduction)
CSAM Super ambition 90% CO2 reduction by 2050
CEA Early action 80% CO2 reduction by 2050, 32% by 2020
CCP Least-cost path Optimised carbon pathway using the 2010-2050 budget
from CEA
CCSP Socially optimal Optimised carbon pathway using the 2010-2050 budget from
least-cost path CEA and a social discount rate
ACCELERATED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT (Chapters 4 and 8)
LC Core 60% LC Core 60% Equivalent to the LC RCEP Core Scenario (60% CO2
reduction)
LC Core 80% LC Core 80% Equivalent to the LC Core Scenario (80% CO2 reduction)
LC Renew LC Renew All four renewable technologies accelerated (60 and 80%
variants)
LC Acctech LC Acctech All seven technologies accelerated (60 and 80% variants)
ATD XXX ATD XXX Several scenarios assuming acceleration of a single
technology and a 60% CO2 reduction. XXX can stand for
nuclear, wind etc.
ENVIRONMENTAL SENSITIVITIES (Chapter 5 and 8)
LC Low-carbon Core scenario with 80% CO2 reduction
DREAD DREAD LC with unfamiliar technologies constrained
ECO ECO LC with technologies that impinge on ecosystem services
constrained
NIMBY NIMBY LC with technologies with high local impact constrained
ENERGY LIFESTYLES (Chapter 6 and 8)
REF Reference Core scenario REF
LC Low-carbon Core scenario LC (80% CO2 reduction)
LS REF Reference lifestyle REF core scenario with lifestyle change
LS LC Low-carbon lifestyle LC core scenario with lifestyle change
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Key Messages
■ The UK has a mature energy economy.
Primary energy demand has not risen
significantly in the last few decades
and has started to decline. Within this,
there have been major structural
changes to energy use, with a halving
of industrial energy demand and a
doubling of transport energy demand
since 1970
■ The UK is not on course to meet its
ambitious CO2 reduction targets and is
becoming increasingly reliant on
imported energy
■ The strategic dimensions of energy
policy – climate change and energy
security - have come to the fore and
there is a re-appraisal under way of the
respective roles of the state and the
market
■ Current market and regulatory
arrangements sit uneasily with the
transformational change required to
achieve our strategic goals 
■ ’Energy system resilience’ is a complex
concept and we propose a definition
and  a basket of indicators to help
capture it
■ Future policies will need to take into
account a range of issues: the timing
and pathways for CO2 reductions; the
selection of measures that build in
resilience; support for R&D and
innovation; opportunities for behaviour
and lifestyle change; the impact of our
choices on environmental systems and
ecosystem services; and the impact of
early action on later action, in terms of
‘path dependencies’
Overview
This report examines how the UK energy
system could evolve through to 2050 while
addressing the primary energy policy goals
– radical reductions in carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions from energy use, and the
resilient provision of affordable energy
services (such as heat, light, power and
mobility). The shape of the UK energy
system is not predestined. It will be
determined both by the choices we make
over the coming decades and by
developments over which we have weak, or
even no, control. We have the capacity to
plan, at least partially, our future, but we
also need to anticipate contingencies which
we can foresee perhaps only dimly.
We do not therefore consider a single
future for the UK energy system. This
report explores systematically the
uncertain future against which we need to
plan, the choices we need to make and the
trade-offs we need to consider.
The uncertainties include:
■ The evolution of global markets for
energy and carbon
■ Political developments at the global
level which affect energy prices and
availability
■ The degree to which new and improved
technologies, which may depend on
R&D investments made elsewhere, can
contribute to the UK energy system
The key questions about choices include:
■ How do we prioritise climate change
goals vis-à-vis improving the resilience
of the UK energy system?
1. Introduction
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■ How much should the UK invest in
energy innovation? 
■ Are we prepared to make lifestyle
changes that will help us to reach our
energy policy goals? How much can
these contribute?
■ Are there energy supply options which
we, as a society, are not prepared to
accept because we consider the
environmental impacts to be
unacceptable?
■ How much are we prepared to invest to
protect ourselves against improbable
events that could have devastating
impacts?
■ Will we rely on markets to deliver our
policy goals or is a more directed
approach needed?
What do we Mean by an ‘Energy
System’?
The UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) is
charged with taking a whole systems
approach to energy. Our approach brings
together many perspectives and is truly
interdisciplinary. Our working definition of
the energy system is correspondingly all-
encompassing:
“the set of technologies, physical
infrastructure, institutions, policies
and practices located in and
associated with the UK which
enable energy services to be
delivered to UK consumers”.
All of these dimensions are explored in this
report. 
An energy system that addresses the
needs and challenges of today cannot be
built from scratch. The current UK energy
system has been created in response to
the energy resources available to us and
the evolution of global markets. It reflects
decades of investment in physical
infrastructure and the creation of
institutional arrangements that reflect
political and economic priorities of the
recent past. Though some physical
infrastructure (e.g. houses, major
electricity generation plants) will still be
with us in 40 years time, it is possible to
imagine a radically altered energy system
in 2050. But in the short to medium-term,
the scope for action and our ability to
make rapid progress towards long-term
goals is very much determined by the
structures that we have inherited and our
willingness to change them.
In this chapter we take stock of the UK
energy system, starting with energy
markets and moving on to institutional
arrangements. From this analysis the
rationale for current priorities for the UK’s
energy strategy become apparent.
UK Energy Markets
The UK exhibits all the characteristics of a
mature, almost post-industrial economy.
Primary energy demand (Figure 1.1)
peaked in 2001 and is still only 10% higher
than it was in 1970 (BERR, 2008a, see Box
1.1. for an explanation of the energy units
used in this report). Over the same period,
gross domestic product (GDP) grew by
150%: it took only half as much energy to
produce a unit of GDP in 2007 as it did in
1970. 
16 Making the transition to a secure and low-carbon energy system     UKERC ENERGY 2050 PROJECT
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Figure 1.1 also shows that the energy mix
has changed significantly. In 1970, coal
and oil dominated the picture, while today
natural gas has the largest market share
and non-fossil energy sources (nuclear and
renewables) are playing an increasingly
important role. Coal use has fallen by
about 60% with most of the coal-gas shift
taking place during the 1990s. 
This is explained by the rapid emergence of
natural gas as the fuel of choice for
electricity generation (Figure 1.2). The
‘dash for gas’ followed the privatisation of
the electricity sector in 1990. At the same
time, nuclear output has started to fall as
older stations have started to close without
being replaced. Wind, other renewables
(mainly biomass) and waste have started
to play a larger role. However, renewables
still account for only 4.9% of electricity
generation and 1.8% of inland energy
consumption overall. 
Final energy demand (ignoring energy
transformed in power stations and
refineries) has also grown little (Figure 1.3)
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Figure 1.1: Primary energy demand by
source 
Figure 1.2: Electricity fuel mix 
Box 1.1: Energy units used in this report
n The main unit used is the petajoule (PJ). Energy is often expressed in terms of tonnes of
oil equivalent. One million tonnes of oil is equivalent to 41.868 PJ. As in the Digest of UK
Energy Statistics (BERR, 2008a) we use the gross (higher) calorific value of fuels. 
n 1 PJ = 1,000 TJ = 1,000,000 GJ = 1,000,000,000 MJ
n Electricity trading is generally conducted in terms of megawatt hours (MWh). In sections of
the report referring only to electricity, we may use MWh or similar units. One MWh equals
3,6000 MJ
n 1 TWh = 1,000 GWh = 1,000,000 MWh
n Gas trading is generally conducted in terms of cubic metres (cm).  In sections of the report
referring only to gas, we may use million cubic metres (mcm) or similar units.
n 1 billion cubic metres (bcm) = 39.4 PJ
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and is only 6% higher than in 1970. The
key feature has been the reduction of
industrial energy demand (now about half
its 1970 level) coupled with the doubling of
transport energy demand. Household
energy use is about 20% higher than in
1970 while consumption by ’other users‘
(mainly the service and public sectors) is
much the same. In terms of energy
sources (Figure 1.4), coal’s contribution to
final energy demand has virtually
disappeared. Oil use fell back by about 15-
20% of its peak level during the 1980s but
has since recovered to its 1970 level as the
result of growing transport demand. Gas
use grew rapidly in the 1970s and early
1980s, making progress in all sectors other
than transport. Its use peaked in 2001
though consumption is still 150% higher
than in 1970. The final striking feature of
final energy demand is the growth in the
electricity share. It accounted for only 11%
of final energy demand in 1970 but now
has a 19% market share. This reflects the
growth of markets such as IT and
communications technology where there is
no substitute for electricity. 
Since the Kyoto Protocol was signed in
1997 the reduction of greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions has become a key priority
for UK energy policy. CO2 accounts for 85%
of the UK’s GHG emissions (DECC, 2009)
almost all of which arises from energy
production, transformation and use. Total
GHG emissions have fallen steadily since
1990 (Figure 1.5) and the UK will meet its
Kyoto commitment to reduce emissions by
12% compared to 1990 in the period 2008-
2012 by a considerable margin. Non-CO2
gases have contributed disproportionately
to this reduction, with reductions in
methane and nitrous oxide. Progress in
reducing CO2 emissions has stopped from
the late 1990s onwards. Previous
reductions were largely associated with the
switch to gas in electricity generation
during the 1990s. Emissions have
stabilised since that process essentially
came to an end. The UK will not meet its
domestic target of reducing CO2 emissions
by 20% by 2010 starting from a 1990
baseline.
Looking forward, the Climate Change Act
2008 sets a target for an 80% reduction in
-
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Figure 1.4 Final energy demand by fuel
Source: BERR, 2008a
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GHG emissions in 2050 compared to 1990
levels. In December 2008, the Committee
on Climate Change (CCC) (Committee on
Climate Change, 2008) recommended
three carbon budgets for the periods 2008-
12, 2013-17 and 2018-2022. These were
proposed in two parts. The more ambitious
‘intended’ budgets would apply when
international agreement on a post-Kyoto
climate change regime is agreed. An
‘interim’ budget would be applied
unilaterally pending international
agreement. The two sets of budgets, along
with the 2050 target, are also shown in
Figure 1.5. Meeting either the interim or
intended target and budgets will require a
major turn-round in the development of
the UK energy system. As we will show in
this report, incremental change is not an
option – a transformation of the energy
system is required.
The other significant development in recent
years has been the UK’s status as a major
energy producer. Both oil and gas
production from the North Sea peaked in
1999-2000. The UK was never more than
self-sufficient in natural gas (Figure 1.6)
and a rapid fall in production has translated
rapidly into a significant degree of import
dependence. In 2007, almost 30% of the
UK’s supplies were imported and this
dependency on imports will grow rapidly. In
2007, 70% of UK gas imports came from
Norway, 24% from the Netherlands and
5% - which will also grow rapidly - from
liquid natural gas (LNG). The UK sold gas
equivalent to 16% of imports on to the
Republic of Ireland. The UK can also export
through the interconnector to mainland
Europe. So far, the UK has been little
exposed to the possibility of supply
interruptions in Eastern Europe, but this
exposure will rise over time. 
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The UK had been a net exporter of
petroleum since 1980 (Figure 1.7) but, in
2006, production fell below consumption if
allowance is made for stocks and
international bunker fuels. The UK had
been heading towards becoming a net oil
importer around 1990 following a period of
low oil prices and falling production.
However, production rose again in the
1990s and there was a second ‘peak’ in the
UK’s production profile in 1999.
The UK imports 75% of its coal
requirements, the highest import
dependency for all the fossil fuels.
However, international coal supplies are
diverse and there is little perceived risk of
supply interruption.
Expenditure on energy is a key indicator of
the UK’s exposure to disruptions in
international energy markets. Figure 1.8
shows that, between 1985 and 2002-03,
total UK expenditure on energy (in real
terms) fell steadily. Energy expenditure as
a proportion of GDP fell from 11.6% in
1981 to 5.7% in 2003. With rising energy
prices, this trend has since reversed and
energy expenditure as a proportion of GDP
had risen to 7.5% by 2006.
The messages from this overview are clear.
Climate change policy is calling for
transformational change in the energy
sector. Secondly, the UK’s declining role as
an energy producer, coupled with higher
energy prices, means that the UK economy
is more exposed to volatility and instability
than at any point since the oil crises of the
1970s. This sets clear priorities for UK
energy strategy over the coming decades.
We now turn to the established policies and
institutional frameworks which provide the
starting point for UK responses to these
imperatives.
Policy Framework and Regulation
The UK energy sector, and its relationship
with government through policy and
regulation, has gone through deep changes
in the last twenty years. In 1990, just as the
climate change problem was starting to be
taken seriously, the electricity industry was
privatised, marking the end of over forty
years of public ownership. The gas industry
had been privatised in 1986. The three main
themes running through energy policy over
this period have been: privatisation and
increasing market liberalisation throughout
the 1990s; increased prioritisation of social
and environmental issues since the 1997
General Election; and, very recently, a re-
focusing on strategic energy issues led by
heightened concern about climate change
and the loss of self-sufficiency in oil and gas.
Privatisation and liberalisation
Electricity privatisation in 1990 brought
about radical changes. The old nationalised
monopolies were broken up. In electricity
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generation, the large successor companies
were first challenged by the Regional
Electricity Companies (RECs) and merchant
generators during the ‘dash for gas’. The
market has subsequently consolidated and
is now dominated by a small number of
vertically integrated groups, only one of
which is UK-owned. Utilities have become
suppliers of both gas and electricity. 
The residual monopolies in gas and
electricity transmission and distribution are
regulated through a system of five-yearly
price reviews conducted by OFGEM. These
were originally based on the simple ‘RPI-x’
formula to squeeze costs out of the
industry in the absence of competitive
markets. They have become increasingly
sophisticated over time, separating out
capital and operating expenditure and
allowing ex-post adjustments. There is now
a concern that the transmission regime has
been holding up required investment in
new capacity, especially renewables,
because of the requirement for operators
to pay for grid reinforcement up front. 
The third element of the post-1990 regime
has been the development of retail
competition for electricity and gas. This
process took place gradually with full
competition, where householders could
choose their gas and electricity suppliers
and the end of price regulation, arriving
only in 1998.
The regulatory regime has evolved
considerably since 1990. The early focus
on cost reduction in the monopoly parts of
the business has been followed by an
increasing recognition of the need for
regulation that actively promotes
competition in the generation markets
(Helm, 2003). This eventually resulted in
BETTA (British Electricity Transmission and
Trading Arrangements) which has covered
the entire mainland of Great Britain since
2005.
Social and environmental issues
The Labour manifesto for the 1997 General
Election included a commitment to reduce
CO2 emissions by 20% by 2010 below
1990 levels. This set in train a number of
policy measures which targeted mainly the
electricity and business sectors. Following
the Marshall report on economic
instruments and the business use of
energy (Lord Marshall, 1998), these
included the Climate Change Levy package
and the introduction of emission trading,
but not a carbon tax which business had
been keen to avoid. At the same time, the
government’s concern with fuel poverty
inhibited price rises for residential
consumers and brought new measures,
such as the Energy Efficiency Commitment
for utilities and ‘Warm Front’ to encourage
more efficient energy use in the home,
especially for vulnerable consumers. In
spite of these efforts, CO2 emissions are
not now significantly lower than they were
in 1997.  
The re-emergence of energy strategy
After a long gap, there have been two
White Papers on energy policy since the
year 2000. In the 2003 White Paper (DTI,
2003), the Government accepted the Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution‘s
proposal that the UK should reduce its CO2
emissions by 60% by 2050 and established
four goals for energy policy: 
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■ to put ourselves on a path to cut the
UK’s CO2 emissions by some 60% by
2050, with real progress by 2020
■ to maintain the reliability of energy
supplies
■ to promote competitive markets in the
UK and beyond
■ to ensure that every home is
adequately and affordably heated
However, the White Paper did not focus
heavily on security of supply. Subsequently,
the Government has taken strenuous
efforts to create the conditions under which
private companies would undertake nuclear
new build in the UK to reduce export
dependence and reduce CO2 emissions.
The 2007 White Paper (BERR, 2007)
underlined this new approach and set out a
number of ambitious new measures to
drive down CO2 emissions. The Climate
Change Act 2008 and the establishment of
the new Department of Energy and Climate
Change (DECC) in 2008 underlined the
increasing importance being attached to
strategic energy and climate policies.  A
speech by the Secretary of State (Miliband,
2008) sought to re-position the respective
roles of the market and state guidance in
taking forward energy strategy.
Key Bodies and Institutions
Currently, three central government
departments have the main responsibilities
for UK energy policy. DECC has the lead
while the Department of Communities and
Local Government (CLG) and the
Department of Transport (DfT) cover
energy use in buildings and transport
respectively. The establishment of DECC in
October 2008 brought together the Energy
Group from the Department of Business,
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR),
which had overall responsibility for energy
strategy, energy supply and energy sector
regulation, together with the energy
efficiency, climate change mitigation and
international climate policy functions
previously in the Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA). In addition, the Department of
Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS)
has responsibilities for energy research and
development (R&D) while DEFRA’s broader
environmental responsibilities also impinge
on the energy sector. 
There were many structural changes in
government between 1997 and 2008 which
affected energy both on the supply and on
the demand side. The establishment of
DECC virtually restores the situation before
the Department of Energy was abolished in
1992 following the completion of gas and
electricity privatisation. The crucial
difference is that climate change has now
been added to the Department’s
responsibilities.
Since 1998, the responsibilities of specific
departments have been set through a
framework of Public Service Agreements
(PSAs) which set out the key priority
outcomes the Government wants to
achieve. Table 1.1 shows current PSAs
relevant to the energy sector. DECC’s
leading role covers the energy sector’s
contribution to sustainable growth and
prosperity, to be achieved through
competitively priced energy markets and
better regulation. Climate change has a
PSA to itself with six different indicators,
five of which fall within DECC’s remit.  The
focus on competitive markets, security of
supply and climate change is very evident.
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PSA Theme Public Service Indicator Lead 
Agreement Government
Department
Sustainable growth Promote world • Business research and DIUS
and prosperity class science and development (R&D)
innovation in the expenditure – the average
UK UK R&D intensity in the six
most R&D intensive
industries, relative to the
US, Japan, France and 
Germany
Deliver reliable and • Average benefit cost ratio DfT
efficient transport of investments approved 
networks that over the CSR07 period
support economic
growth
Deliver the conditions • Maintenance of competitively DECC, BERR
for business success priced energy markets
in the UK • Deliver better regulation
that works for everyone
Stronger Increase long term • Average Energy Efficiency CLG
communities and a housing supply and Rating for new homes (SAP)
better quality of life affordability
A more secure, fair Lead the global effort • Global CO2 emissions to 2050 DECC
and environmentally to avoid dangerous • Size of the global carbon
sustainable world climate change market 
• Total UK greenhouse gas and
CO2 emissions
• Greenhouse gas and CO2
intensity of the UK economy 
• Proportion of emissions
reductions from new policies
below the Shadow Price of
Carbon
Secure a healthy • Water quality DEFRA
natural environment • Biodiversity
for today and the • Air quality
future • Marine health
• Land management 
Table 1.1: Public service agreements relevant to energy
Source: HM Treasury, 2007
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Two independent regulatory bodies have a
considerable influence on the energy
sector. The Office of the Gas and Electricity
Markets’ (OFGEM’s) primary responsibility
is to protect consumers, which it does by
promoting competition and regulating the
monopoly companies which run the gas
and electricity networks. It also helps to
protect vulnerable customers and
contributes to climate change and
sustainable development policies by
helping environmental improvements to be
achieved efficiently. The Environment
Agency (which operates in England and
Wales) regulates business and administers
some of the policies and measures
described below.
Two further bodies have a role in
promoting CO2 reduction and energy
efficiency. The Carbon Trust works with
business and other organisations to reduce
carbon emissions and develop commercial
low-carbon technologies.  The Energy
Saving Trust works with private consumers,
focusing on energy conservation in the
home, energy-efficient products, energy-
saving behaviour and renewable energy.  
Following devolution to Scotland and
Wales, and changes in Northern Ireland,
energy policy remains a reserved area of
policy for the Westminster government.
However, the devolved administrations
have important powers and responsibilities.
The Scottish Government has responsibility
for giving consent for new energy
developments such as power stations and
power lines. The fact that the Scottish
Government will not currently allow new
nuclear development is therefore
significant. The promotion of energy
efficiency and renewables are devolved
responsibilities. Scotland also supports
innovation and business development
through, for example, a Wave and Tidal
Energy Support Scheme. The Welsh
Assembly Government’s powers are more
limited but it also promotes energy
efficiency and supports innovation and
energy business development.
Policies and Measures for the Energy
Sector
Market regulation
OFGEM has successfully driven down costs
in the monopoly transmission and
distribution sectors through its price control
reviews and established competitive
markets in electricity generation. However,
it, and its predecessors, did so against a
background of surplus electricity generation
capacity and falling CO2 emissions as a
result of the ‘dash for gas’.  It has been
argued forcefully in some quarters that
OFGEM’s primary focus on competition and
market regulation is in tension with other
goals, particularly those relating to climate
policy (Sustainable Development
Commission, 2007).
There is now anxiety about an ‘energy gap’
emerging beyond 2015 when a number of
coal-fired stations may close as a result of
the EU Large Combustion Plant Directive.
At the same time, there are ambitious
targets for renewable energy (see below)
which will require back-up capacity to
maintain reliable supplies. The growth of
renewable electricity aspirations has raised
some profound questions about the
regulatory regime. Since 1990, developers
were asked to finance the full cost of
network expansion associated with new
renewable (known as ‘deep’ connection
charging). This can hold back renewable
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expansion in two ways. First, the grid
operator, National Grid, has not been
guaranteed a regulated return on the
capital it invests until all the other hurdles
to development, especially planning
consent, have been jumped. As a result,
the network cannot be reinforced in
anticipation of new generation coming
online. Second, the grid rules have
required network investment to provide for
intermittent generation at its maximum
output. In practice, intermittent generators
can ‘share’ network capacity at lower cost.
Fundamental questions about future
regulation and market arrangements are
now being asked (OFGEM, 2009). 
Climate policy
Most policies and measures other than
those directed at market operation fall
within the scope of the UK’s Climate
Change Programme. The Climate Change
Act 2008 set an emissions reduction target
for greenhouse gases of 80% below 1990
levels by 2050, and also established the
independent Committee on Climate Change
(CCC), whose main duties are to
recommend the UK’s legally binding five-
year ‘carbon budgets’ 15 years ahead, to
monitor government’s progress in
achieving the budgets and to provide
advice to the UK government and the
devolved administrations. In its first report,
the CCC recommended two sets of three
five-year budgets for the period 2008-
2022. The more ambitious ‘intended’
budgets would come into play in the event
of post-Kyoto global deal under the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). The ‘interim’ budgets would be
in effect prior to a global deal. The budget
recommendations are summarised in Table
1.2 and will be set formally in June 2009
following consideration by the Government
and Parliament.  
The carbon budget system can be seen as
providing the framework within which more
specific policies and measures will be
developed and implemented. Table 1.3
summarises the main measures currently
Table 1.2: Committee on climate change budget recommendations
Interim Intended
GHG budget 2008-2012 2537 kt 2537 kt
GHG budget 2013-2017 2349 kt 2210 kt
GHG budget 2018-2022 2114 kt 1789 kt
GHG reductions 1990-2020 34% 42%
CO2 reductions 1990-2020 29% 40%
CO2 reduction 2005-2020 24% 36%
-  EU ETS1 excluding aviation 29% 44%
-  Non-traded sector 19% 27%
Source: Committee on Climate Change (CCC), 2008
1The European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme
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in place or under development which
impact on the energy sector, along with
estimates of their contribution to CO2
reduction in 2020. The table distinguishes
between policies in place prior to the 2007
Energy White Paper and those under
development subsequently. The strong
reliance on market-based instruments,
reflecting the strong policy attachment to
competitively priced energy markets, is
striking. 
In energy supply, the main mechanism is
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).
Under this, the total emissions of power
generators and energy intensive industry is
capped. Phase II of the ETS runs from
2008-2012 and an EU Directive agreed in
December 2008 establishes a Phase III
running from 2013-20. National allocations
for Phase III were determined by the
European Commission rather than being
proposed by Member States, and represent
a considerable tightening on Phase II.
Allowances for the electricity sector will be
auctioned instead of being allocated. UK
operators can trade EU allowances (EUAs)
with others in the scheme and can
purchase a limited number of overseas
credits through, for example, the Clean
Development mechanism (CDM). UK
electricity companies have been among the
most active purchasers of overseas credits.
The Renewables Obligation (RO) currently
requires that 15.4% of electricity should
come from renewable sources by 2015.
Recently, it has been decided to ‘band’ the
RO to give greater incentives to
technologies, such as wave and tidal, that
are further from commercialisation. Under
the EU Renewables directive agreed in
December 2008, the UK is obliged to meet
15% of its final energy consumption from
renewable sources. In practice, this would
require at least 30% of electricity to come
from renewable sources.
Other than the EU ETS, the Climate
Change Levy package introduced in 2001 is
having the largest impact on energy-
intensive industry. The Climate Change
Agreements, under which business gets
exemptions if agreements to reduce energy
use are struck, is having a larger impact
than the levy itself. For non energy-
intensive industry, building regulations
have had the largest impact so far.
However, the Carbon Reduction
Commitment (CRC) will establish caps on
emissions from most businesses not
covered by the Climate Change
Agreements or the EU ETS. CRC allowances
will be tradable. 
In the transport sector, the most important
measures have been the EU voluntary
agreements to reduce CO2 emissions from
passenger cars coupled with fiscal
measures that include vehicle excise duty
according to CO2 emissions and
adjustments to company car taxation.
Average CO2 emissions from new cars fell
from 190 g/km in 1997 to 165 g/km in
2007 (SMMT, 2008). The fuel duty
escalator, whereby the duty paid on petrol
and diesel rose automatically each year,
has also had a significant impact. The
Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation
(RTFO) will also have achieved material
reduction in emissions by 2020.
In the residential sector, building regulations
have had the biggest impact so far. The
Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) and its
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successor, the Carbon Emission Reduction
Target (CERT) have also had a major impact
on emissions. These obliged electricity and
gas suppliers to invest in energy efficiency
measures on behalf of their customers. The
successor to CERT which will operate from
2012, currently known only as the ‘Supplier
Obligation’ is expected to massively expand
CO2 and energy savings in the residential
sector. ‘Zero-carbon’ homes, applying only to
new build, will have a more modest impact. 
Support for R&D and innovation
To reach ambitious targets for 2050 will
require improvements to existing
technology and the deployment of
Sector Measure CO2 Savings
2020 (mt)
Energy Supply EU ETS Second phase 29.3
Tightening of EU ETS cap 11.0
Renewables obligation 14.0
Business (existing policies) Climate change agreements 10.6
Climate change levy 4.0
Building regulations 5.9
Carbon Trust 4.0
Other 2.3
Business (EWP 2007 policies) Products policy 3.3
Carbon reduction commitment 2.9
Other 1.8
Transport (existing policies) Voluntary agreements /fiscal measures 13.2
Fuel duty escalator 7.0
RTFO 5.9
Other 4.0
Transport (EWP 2007 policies) Further improvements in vehicle efficiency 6.2
Domestic aviation in EU ETS 1.1
Residential (existing policies) Building regulations 12.1
CERT (2008-11) 4.0
EEC (2002-05) 2.9
Other 5.2
Residential (EWP 2007 policies) Supplier obligation 12.8
Zero-carbon homes 4.4
Product policy 3.3
Other 2.3
Public Sector (existing policies) 2.2
Public Sector (EWP 2007 policies) 3.3
Table 1.3: Main climate policies and measures affecting energy 
Source: DECC (2008); Climate Change Committee (2008)
Note: Impact of measures may not be additive
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technologies that are not yet available on
the market. Figure 1.9 shows that public
support for energy R&D in the UK plunged
during the 1980s and 1990s. This reflects
the fact that R&D conducted by the
nationalised industries was not continued
by the privatised electricity and gas
companies as well as the decline of the
national energy laboratories. In the 1970s
and 1980s, nuclear fission accounted for
the majority of R&D spend and this has
now been greatly reduced. However, there
were also significant declines in R&D on
energy efficiency, oil and gas, and
renewables.  
Since a report by the Chief Scientific
Adviser (CSA’s Energy Research Review
Group, 2002), energy R&D spend has
started to recover and, according to IEA
statistics is now around £100m pa
compared to a low of £35m. Energy R&D is
now supported by a range of public bodies
operating at various points along the
innovation chain, characterised by different
stages of the so-called ‘Technology
Readiness Level’ (TRL) (Figure 1.10). The
Research Councils are responsible for early
stage energy research, with applied R&D
and early demonstration falling to the
Technology Strategy Board (TSB), the
Energy Technologies Institute (ETI) and the
Carbon Trust. 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is only
partly supported within this framework.
Large-scale demonstration is so expensive
that separate arrangements are being
made. These include a competition to
demonstrate post-combustion capture
being operated by DECC and the use, at
the EU level, of reserved EU ETS
allowances to support demonstration. Here,
the UK will compete with other Member
States for the opportunity to take forward
one or more out of a total of around twelve
demonstration projects.
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The UKERC Energy 2050 Approach
This report explores a diverse range of
uncertainties and choices facing the UK
energy system. We have used a set of
scenarios to integrate the work of different
UKERC research teams from different
disciplines addressing different facets of
the energy system. To give equal weight to
all the factors we consider would give rise
to an unmanageable and confusing
proliferation of scenarios. Following the
market/policy analysis set out above, we
therefore identify the two primary goals of
UK energy strategy as contributing to the
mitigation of climate change and the
achievement of a ‘resilient’ energy system
that addresses security needs. 
Progress in reducing the energy sector’s
impact on the climate can be measured
through a single metric, tonnes of CO2
equivalent emitted. In contrast, the energy
security agenda responds to anxieties and
insecurities about a range of diverse
contingencies which are often not well
defined and differentiated. These include
adequacy of investment in electricity
generation capacity, loss of critical
infrastructure whether through deliberate
action or by accident, and interruptions to
supply in global markets.
Our approach to resilience started by
adopting a working definition of the
concept as: 
“The capacity of an energy system
to tolerate disturbance and to
continue to deliver affordable
energy services to consumers. A
resilient energy system can
speedily recover from shocks and
can provide alternative means of
satisfying energy service needs in
the event of changed external
circumstances.” 
To make this definition operational we have
then defined a set of resilience indicators,
which is set out in detail in Chapter 3. But,
briefly here, resilience involves: reducing
final energy demand below the levels it
would otherwise have reached; promoting
diversity of supply; and ensuring adequate
investment in infrastructure and capacity. 
The emphasis on CO2 reduction and
resilience leads us to focus on a set of four
Core ‘scenarios’ (Figure 1.11) which form
the starting point from which other issues,
such as technology acceleration or lifestyle
change, may be explored. Testing variants
on the four Core scenarios enables the
relevant issues to be explored coherently,
enabling comparisons to be made across
different topics. 
Figure 1.10: Support for energy
technologies in the UK
Source: BERR, 2008b
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None of the scenarios predicts a most likely
future. Neither do they represent a
consensus view of what a desirable future
would look like - though the scenarios may
have aspects which some people consider
desirable, views will differ on what may be
desirable. 
Rather, the scenarios explore visions of the
future which are internally consistent in
their treatment of both policy drivers and
external drivers, thereby exploring the
choices that are available and their
implications for achieving long-term goals.
Most of the scenarios are ‘back-casting’ in
that outcomes are specified and the social,
economic and technological changes that
might bring about these outcomes are
tested. 
The “Reference” (REF) Core scenario
assumes that ‘firm and funded’ policies and
measures in place at the time of the 2007
Energy White Paper continue into the
future but that no additional measures are
introduced. It does not include measures
that may be required to achieve the 80%
carbon reduction goal, nor the five-year
carbon budgets proposed by the CCC in
December 2008. The Reference scenario is
neither a prediction nor a preferred future:
its sole purpose is to provide a baseline
from which to assess the actions and costs
associated with achieving policy goals. 
The “Low-Carbon” (LC) Core scenario
assumes the introduction of a range of
policies leading to an 80% reduction in UK
carbon emissions by 2050 relative to 1990
and a suitable trajectory towards that goal.
Broadly, the policies assumed are those
which will result, on the basis of the
modelling assumptions employed, in the
goal being achieved at the lowest possible
welfare cost. 
The “Resilience” (R) Core scenario takes no
account of the carbon reduction goal but
assumes additional investment in
infrastructure, demand reduction and
supply diversity with a view to making the
energy system more resilient to external
shocks. 
The “Low-Carbon Resilient” (LCR) Core
scenario combines the carbon and
resilience goals. 
When UKERC started the work, the UK’s
CO2 reduction goal for 2050 was 60%.
Some of the early work described in this
report, particularly on technology
acceleration, was based on the assumption
that the Low-Carbon Core scenario would
entail a 60% reduction. This policy goal
was based on a recommendation from the
Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution’s 2000 report on energy and
climate change (RCEP, 2000). The
nomenclature to describe the Low-Carbon
core scenario in different chapters is set
out in Chapter 2, as well as the Summary
of Scenarios above, where a range of
different carbon reduction scenarios is
considered. 
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Figure 1.11: Core scenario structure
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Five cross-cutting factors are held constant
across the four Core scenarios (but
changed in the variants reported in later
chapters of this report): 
■ the international context
■ the trajectory of technological change
■ the way energy investment decisions
are made
■ the evolution of people’s lifestyles 
■ energy consumers’ preferences, in the
sense that we assume that consumers
respond to price and other incentives
as they have done in the past
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 summarise the key
common assumptions of the Core
scenarios.
The factors that change across the Core
scenarios are: 
■ final energy use resulting from changes
in energy service demands (ESDs) and
the take up of conservation and
efficiency technologies in response to
price signals and other policy incentives
(but not from other kinds of behaviour
changes, which is examined in later
scenarios)
■ actual investment in energy supply,
infrastructure and technologies
■ the technologies through which energy
service demands are met
■ the policy framework for post 2007
initiatives
GDP growth 2% per annum 
World energy prices See Table 1.5. The assumed prices are translated into
global supply curves. Some domestic energy may be
available at a lower cost
Discount rates 10% real 
‘Hurdle’ rates Higher discount rates are applied in sectors with high
transaction costs and consumer inertia 
Technology performance and cost Based on detailed stakeholder consultations
Table 1.4: Key assumptions in the core scenarios
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Crude Oil 2005$/bbl 31.38 50.62 57.50 55.00 55.00 60.00 70.00 70.00
Gas 2005$/MMBTU 4.85 7.46 6.75 6.75 7.00 7.64 8.91 8.91
Coal 2005$/tonne 36.54 61.14 55.00 55.00 55.00 60.00 65.00 65.00
Crude Oil 2005£/GJ 3.39 4.56 4.49 4.40 4.51 4.92 5.74 5.74
Gas 2005£/GJ 3.20 4.10 3.21 3.29 3.50 3.82 4.45 4.45
Coal 2005£/GJ 0.90 1.25 0.98 1.00 1.03 1.120 1.21 1.21
Table 1.5: World energy price assumptions
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■ resulting primary and final energy,
emissions, and economic indicators
The next chapter of the report, Carbon
Reduction Scenarios explores the
implications of two key variables: different
levels of carbon reduction by 20501; and
the timing of carbon reductions, specifically
‘late’ versus ‘early’ action. This set of
scenarios includes the Reference and Low-
Carbon Core scenarios as well as a number
of variants which look at lesser and greater
levels of ambition than the 80% reduction
in the Low-Carbon Core scenario (40%,
60% and 90% CO2 reductions by 2050)
and also the implications of early or late
action, keeping cumulative carbon
emissions constant, and of taking a short
or long-term perspective, expressed
through varying the discount rate, and the
types of measures consequently taken up.
The subject of Chapter 3 is A Resilient
Energy System. In this chapter, the two
remaining Core scenarios, Resilient and
Low-Carbon Resilient, are defined in terms
of energy demand levels, supply diversity,
and infrastructure and capacity criteria.
Comparing these two scenarios with
Reference and Low-Carbon, it is apparent
that there are a number of synergies, but
also differences, between the low-carbon
and energy security agendas. The four Core
scenarios are then tested against a number
of hypothesised ‘events’ to assess the costs
and benefits of investing in additional
resilience. This chapter also considers the
impact of a steep fossil fuel price increase
on the resilient, compared with the
Reference and Low-Carbon, Core senarios.
Many different technologies may have a
role to play in decarbonising the UK energy
system. Which come to play an important
role will depend to some extent on how the
technologies develop. Chapter 4 on
Technology Acceleration explores a range
of technological possibilities of
decarbonisation, in relation to different
renewables technologies, hydrogen fuel
cells, nuclear power and carbon capture
and storage (CCS). It assesses the size of
the potential long-term pay-off from
investing in research, development and
demonstration (RD&D) projects and how
the size of this pay-off depends on the
level of ambition for carbon reductions.
All provision and use of energy, including
low-carbon energy forms, has some
impacts on the natural environment and
there are likely to be societal responses.
Chapter 5 on Environmental Sensitivities
examines both the consequences of the
Core scenarios, in terms of environmental
impacts, other than those associated with
climate change; and the implications for
the overall UK energy system should it be
impossible or very difficult to deploy
important low-carbon technologies (e.g.
onshore wind or nuclear power). This may
be because of societal concern over their
non-climate environmental impacts, such
as other atmospheric emissions, water use
and land use.
Chapter 6 explores the implications of
different Energy Lifestyles. Different
lifestyles lead to very different levels of
energy use, and how this is distributed
across different energy services such as
1This report only explores the implications of reducing emissions of the main greenhouse gas (GHG), carbon dioxide (CO2), and
not of other GHGs.
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power, transport and heating. At least part
of the increase in energy consumption in
recent decades is the result of relatively
energy-intensive ways of living having
become embedded in, and accepted as
necessary parts of, modern lifestyles. This
chapter projects a number of key changes
in behaviour relating to, for example,
mobility or the acceptability of indoor
temperatures, and discusses what changes
in lifestyles might lead to reduced carbon
emissions, how such lower-carbon lifestyles
might be promoted, and what their impact
would be on the Reference and Low-Carbon
Core scenarios in this report.
An important aspect of changing energy
lifestyles may be greater household
responsibility for energy generation as well
as consumption, called Microgeneration.
The current UK electricity is based on
relatively few large-scale power plants and
a transmission and distribution grid to carry
their power across the country to
consumers. This is not the only way to
organise an electricity system, and a
decentralised electricity system,
incorporating microgeneration technologies
at the household level, might offer
advantages in terms of both
decarbonisation and resilience. Chapter 7
explores this possibility by assessing the
suitability of various types of
microgeneration technologies for application
in dwellings, the potential CO2 emissions
savings, efficiency improvements, techno-
economics and practical considerations, and
the behavioural, regulatory and policy
issues associated with the introduction of
micro-generation technologies. Taking
account of the varying levels of
decarbonisation of grid electricity in the
various scenarios, it assesses under what
circumstances microgeneration is able to
play a significant role.
Finally, the concluding Chapter 8, Prospects
and Policies for a Secure and Low-Carbon
Energy System, presents a synthesis of the
discussion from the earlier chapters. It
emphasises two aspects. Firstly, it presents
an overview of the scenarios and scenario
variants identifying overall patterns and
highlighting some fundamental differences,
in terms of energy sector development,
between them. Secondly, it assesses policy
choices, alternative institutional structures,
especially in respect of energy markets and
regulations, and implications for
consumers, energy companies and others.
It will seek to answer the question, on the
basis of the evidence from the Energy
2050 project: How can the transition to a
secure and low-carbon UK energy system
be achieved over time, and how can
opportunities over short and long
timescales, and between different parts of
the system (production and consumption,
technology and behaviour) be best brought
together and barriers overcome?
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Key Messages
■ Without major policy intervention,
climate goals will not be met
■ Putting the emphasis on climate
change mitigation will prioritise de-
carbonisation of energy supply and
transformation 
■ Progressively more ambitious carbon
targets require first electricity de-
carbonisation, then greater energy
efficiency in the built environment, and
finally, at higher levels of ambition, the
adoption of more radical options in the
transport sector
■ Early action on carbon reduction
implies taking a longer-term view of
investment in a low-carbon energy
system and being prepared to invest
more in infrastructure and capital-
intensive solutions
■ Early action is unlikely to be achieved
by measures that simply set boundary
conditions on the market and leave
private investors to choose the mix of
technologies
■ Higher target levels produce a deeper
array of mitigation options, albeit
probably with more uncertainty
■ Early action produces greater
mitigation in different sectors (e.g.
transport) and technology chains (e.g.
wind, hydrogen) than later
decarbonisation
■ There is a very wide range of economic
impacts, which rise steeply as targets
become more stringent (again probably
with more uncertainty). CO2 marginal
costs in 2050 range from £20-
300/tCO2, and rise to £360/tCO2 for
the most extreme CO2 reductions.
Welfare costs in 2050 range from £5 -
£52 billion, and in moving from a 60%
to an 80% reduction scenario this
alsmost doubles welfare costs.
Introduction
This report describes a range of low-carbon
scenarios underpinned by energy systems
and modelling analysis. Such modelling is
designed to develop insights on a range of
scenarios of future energy system
evolution and the resultant technology
pathways, sectoral trade-off and economic
implications. Long-term energy scenario-
modelling analysis is characterised by deep
uncertainty over a range of drivers
including resources, technology
development, behavioural change and
policy mechanisms. This underlines the
importance of the broad scope of
sensitivity analysis described in later
chapters of this report, to investigate
different scenarios of energy system
evolution, with different drivers of the UK’s
energy supply and demand, and the
importance of different parameters to the
scenario results. 
Heavily influenced by the strengthening
scientific consensus on the costs and
benefits of mitigation actions to respond to
global climate change, over the last decade
a series of UK policy papers have been
commissioned on long-term
decarbonisation targets and strategies. This
has culminated in the inclusion of the 80%
carbon reduction target in the Climate
Change Act of 2008. Energy system
modelling (using variants of the UK
MARKAL model) has played a key
underpinning role in assessing the costs,
trade-offs and pathways related to
achieving such long-term targets.
2. Carbon Reduction Scenarios
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The UK MARKAL Model
MARKAL (acronym for MARKet ALlocation)
is a widely applied bottom-up, dynamic,
linear programming (LP) optimisation
model (Loulou et al., 2004), supported by
the International Energy Agency (IEA) via
the Energy Technology and Systems
Analysis Program (ETSAP). MARKAL
portrays the entire energy system from
imports and domestic production of fuel
resources through to fuel processing and
supply, explicit representation of
infrastructures, conversion of fuels to
secondary energy carriers (including
electricity, heat and hydrogen (H2)), end-
use technologies and energy service
demands of the entire economy. As a
perfect foresight partial equilibrium
optimisation model, MARKAL minimises
discounted total energy system cost by
considering the investment and operation
levels of all the interconnected system
elements. The inclusion of a range of
policies and physical constraints, the
implementation of all taxes and subsidies
and calibration of the model to base-year
capital stocks and flows of energy enables
the evolution of the energy system under
different scenarios to be plausibly
represented. 
A comprehensive description of the UK
model, its applications and core insights
can be found in Strachan et al. (2008a),
and the model documentation (Kannan et
al., 2007). Further peer reviewed papers
focusing on specific variants and/or
applications of the UK MARKAL model
include Strachan and Kannan (2008),
Strachan et al. (2009a), Kannan and
Strachan (2008), Strachan et al. (2008b)
and Strachan et al. (2009b). 
The key enhancement to the MARKAL
model for this project was the development
of the elastic demand version (MED)
described in more detail below. Other
model developments for this Energy 2050
project include updated fossil resource
costs; expanded categorisation of UK
carbon capture and storage (CCS) and
wind resources; expanded biomass chains
to all end-use sectors; new hydrogen (H2)
infrastructures, improved treatment of
electricity intermittency; non-price
representation of residential demands and
technology assumptions via the UK
Domestic Carbon Model (UKDCM),
developed and operated by Oxford
University’s Environmental Change
Institute; a range of updated electricity
technology assumptions; buildings
technology updates (including micro-CHP
and heat pumps); transport technology
updates (including plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles); updated energy service demand
assumptions; and incorporation of all UK
policy measures through to 2007 (including
an assumption of an average EU ETS price
of €20/tCO2).
The MED model was fully recalibrated to
standard UK energy statistics. A range of
peer reviewed publications and the publicly
available model documentation are detailed
in Anandarajah et al. 2008. An important
point to stress is that MARKAL is not a
forecasting model and does not predict the
future UK energy system over the next 50
years. Instead it offers a systematic tool to
explore the trade-offs and tipping points
between alternative energy system
pathways, and the cost, energy supply and
emissions implications of these alternative
pathways.
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System Costs and Social Welfare in the
MED Model
The version of the MARKAL model with
elastic demand (MED) accounts for the
response of energy service demands
(ESDs) to prices (increasing energy prices,
here in response to carbon constraints,
reduce consumer demands for energy
services). When different scenarios are
run, MED reports two key results related to
cost and benefits: energy system cost and
social welfare. The energy system cost we
report here is the undiscounted1 sum of all
the investments (plus capital, fixed and
variable costs, and taxes/subsidies) made
in the energy system over the period under
consideration. Generally the higher the
energy use, the larger and more expensive
the energy system needed to deliver it.
This means that energy system cost can be
reduced by decreasing the demand for
energy services, which provides the
rationale for the other measure of cost,
social welfare. Technically, this is computed
as the sum of consumer and producer
surplus, which in economics is generally
considered a valid metric of social welfare.
Consuming energy services will tend to
increase social welfare, as well as energy
system cost. Reducing energy service
demands may reduce energy system costs,
but it will also tend to reduce social
welfare. The scenarios in this and
subsequent chapters have many examples
of the interplay between these two
cost/benefit variables.
Another cost-relevant factor that is
important in understanding the results is
the discount rate that MARKAL uses in
optimising future energy system
investments. The standard real discount
rate (taking account of inflation), broadly
in line with market considerations, is 10%.
This can be increased when it is perceived
that markets are not functioning properly,
and there are non-financial barriers to the
take up of some technologies (for example,
energy conservation technologies in
buildings such as cavity wall and loft
insulation). Individuals may implicitly apply
higher discount rates. Discount rates that
have been increased in this way are called
‘hurdle rates’. Alternatively, it will be
appropriate to apply a lower discount rate
if a societal perspective is taken, with
current and future costs being balanced
more evenly. Discount rates that have been
reduced for this reason are called ‘social
discount rates’. The Government applies
social discount rates to assess public
investments. One of the carbon reduction
scenarios in this chapter has a social
discount rate which significantly changes
the model results, as will be seen.
When a constraint on carbon emissions is
applied, MARKAL implements this by
computing the ‘shadow’ price for carbon
required to meet the specified carbon
target. This has the effect of increasing the
cost of consuming carbon-based fuels. This
makes technologies using these fuels
effectively more expensive, and stimulates
the uptake of low-carbon technologies,
which were not used without the carbon
price because they cost more than the
carbon-intensive alternatives. In MED, this
increased cost of energy reduces the
1As stated above, MARKAL minimises the discounted energy system cost, but we report the undiscounted cost, so that runs with
different discount rates can be compared with each other
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demand for energy services and social
welfare. However, as discussed above, it
may increase or reduce the energy system
cost, because the higher average cost of
meeting energy service demands may be
offset by the fact that a smaller energy
system is required to meet the reduced
level of those demands.
Because of their implications for energy
system and welfare costs, it is necessary to
be clear about the model’s treatment of
energy conservation measures (such as
insulation) in the residential sector, and the
assumptions made about them. These
measures have the effect of reducing the
energy that is required to meet a given
level of demand for energy services. It is
widely perceived that such measures in the
residential sector are available at low cost,
but that consumers do not take them up
for various reasons (e.g. lack of awareness
and interest, hassle factors). To reflect this,
the model makes these measures in the
residential sector effectively more
expensive through the use of ‘hurdle rates’
(see Table 1.4). Businesses are perceived
to be more responsive to prices and price
changes.
This leads to the issue of how households
react when energy prices increase. In
response, consumers may be expected
both to increase their take up of
conservation measures, and reduce their
demand for energy services. Energy price
elasticities in MARKAL capture both factors,
but there is little information about the
individual effect of each factor.
Conservation measures are low cost, while
the loss of consumer welfare through
forced reductions in the demand for energy
services is more costly.
In all of the Core scenarios and most of the
variants to be reported here, it was
assumed that all of the response came
through households reducing their demand
for energy services. This results in high
estimated welfare costs. To the extent that
households were instead to respond by
taking up conservation measures (and they
would assuredly do some of this), the
welfare costs would be lower and,
depending on various assumptions, could
even fall to zero. 
The welfare costs reported in the Core
scenarios and most variants are therefore
very much an upper bound for the model.
The only set of variants in which this
treatment differs is the lifestyle scenarios
reported in Chapter 6, where it is assumed
that households take up conservation
measures as part of the lifestyle change,
rather than in response to higher energy
prices. As will be seen, this reduces the
associated welfare costs substantially.
The Low-Carbon Scenarios
A first set of scenarios (CFH, CLC, CAM,
CSAM) focuses on levels of CO2 reductions
(in 2050) ranging from 40% to 90%
reductions (from the 1990 base year).
These runs also have intermediate targets
from the same base year of 15% to 32%
reductions by 2020. These scenarios
investigate increasingly stringent targets
and the ordering of technologies,
behavioural change and policy measures to
meet them. A second set of scenario runs
(CEA, CCP, CCSP) undertakes sensitivity
analysis around 80% CO2 reductions,
focusing on early action, cumulative CO2
emissions targets, and different discount
rates. These scenarios investigate dynamic
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trade-offs and path dependency in
decarbonisation pathways. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, it was initially
intended that the Low-Carbon Core
scenario would have a carbon emissions
reduction (from 1990 level) of 60%,
following the recommendation in 2000 of
the Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution. However, after the modelling of
these ‘carbon ambition’ scenarios had been
completed, the Climate Change Committee
recommended, and the Government
accepted, that the target should be 80%.
This was incorporated in the Climate
Change Act. The Energy 2050 project then
decided that the 80% carbon reduction
scenario called CAM (because of the extra
ambition involved) should be the Low-
Carbon Core scenario, and throughout
subsequent chapters this Low-Carbon Core
scenario is given the acronym LC.
Table 2.1 gives the names and acronyms of
the various decarbonisation scenarios,
indicating the different usage in this
chapter. The Core scenarios referred to in
Chapter 1 are shown in bold.  
Table 2.1: Carbon pathway scenarios
Scenario Scenario Carbon Cumulative Cumulative 2050
name reduction targets targets emissions emissions
(from 1990 level) GTCO2 MTCO2
(2000-2050)
REF Reference - - 30.03 583.5
CFH Faint-heart 15% by 2020 - 25.67 355.4
40% by 2050
CLC= Low-carbon 26% by 2020 - 22.46 236.9
LC-RCEP 60% by 2050 -
CAM= LC1 Ambition 26% by 2020 - 20.39 118.5
(Low-Carbon 80% by 2050
Core)
CSAM Super ambition 32% by 2020 - 17.98 59.2
90% by 2050
CEA Early action 32% by 2020 - 19.24 118.5
80% by 2050
CCP Least-cost path - Budget (2010- 19.24 67.1
2050) similar
to CEA
CCSP Socially optimal 80% post 2050 Budget (2010- 19.24 178.6
least- cost path 2050) similar
to CEA
Note:
1This scenario is called CAM in this chapter, and LC in other chapters.
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Table 2.1 shows that, in the Reference
(REF) Core scenario, existing (as of 2007)
policies and technologies would result in
CO2 emissions in 2050 of 584 MtCO2, only
1% lower than 1990 levels. In 2020 (not
shown in Table 2.1), if no new
policies/measures are taken, emissions
would be about 500 MtCO2 - a 15%
reduction. However this would be
considerably higher than the Government
target range in the Climate Change Act of
at least a 26% reduction by 2020. In the
absence of a strong carbon price signal,
the electricity sector is the largest
contributor to CO2 emissions driven by
conventional coal fired power plants, with
substantial contributions from the transport
and residential sectors. Figure 2.1 shows
the carbon pathways to 2050 of many of
the carbon reduction runs. 
Overall, the runs with greater CO2
reductions follow similar routes, with
additional technologies and measures being
required as targets become more stringent
and costs rapidly increase (as seen below).
However, a cumulative constraint with a
lowered (social) discount rate (CCSP) gives
more weight to later costs and hence
decarbonises earlier - with CO2 reductions
of 39% in 2020 and only 70% in 2050.
Similar to the early action case (CEA), this
CCSP focus on early action gives radically
different technology and behavioural
solutions. In particular, as will be seen,
effort is placed on different sectors
(transport instead of power, because some
low-carbon power technologies are not
available before 2020), different
technologies (choosing wind in preference
to early nuclear technologies), and
increased near-term demand reductions,
which are lower cost than later low-carbon
supply options.
Figure 2.2 shows sectoral emissions for the
Reference scenario, i.e. with no emission
constraints. Figure 2.3, with results
summarised for 2035 and 2050, shows the
dramatic changes when the carbon
constraints are applied. 
Under decarbonisation pathways, the
power sector is key where decarbonisation
begins with the deployment of CCS for coal
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Figure 2.1: CO2 emissions under scenarios
with different annual carbon constraints
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Figure 2.2: Sectoral CO2 emissions during
2000-2050 in the Reference scenario
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plants in 2020-2025 in all mitigation
scenarios. However, it is worth stressing
that the close marginal costs of CCS,
nuclear and wind, and future uncertainties
about their development, mean that any or
all of these technologies may turn out to
be the cost-effective technologies in the
future and play a substantial role in
decarbonising the power sector. 
When the target is increased, nuclear plus
wind is selected alongside CCS. Note that
in the most ambitious scenarios (especially
90% reductions), nuclear, in one sense a
‘zero-carbon’ source, gains at the expense
of CCS (a ‘low-carbon’ source). Since the
contribution of increasing levels of (off-
shore) wind to peak load is limited, the
balanced low-carbon portfolio of plants
requires large amounts (20GW) of gas
plants (combined cycle gas turbine - CCGT)
as reserve capacity. Under stringent CO2
reduction scenarios, zero carbon electricity
is rounded out by imported electricity,
waste generation (landfill and sewage gas
plants), and marine sources.
Electricity decarbonisation via CCS can
provide the bulk of a 40% reduction in CO2
by 2050 (CFH). To get deeper cuts in
emissions requires three things: a) deeper
de-carbonisation of the electricity sector
with progressively larger deployments of
low-carbon sources; b) increased energy
efficiency and demand reductions
particularly in the industrial and residential
sectors; c) changing transport technologies
to zero carbon fuel and more efficient
vintages. For example, by 2050, to meet
the 80% target in CAM, the power sector
emissions are reduced by 93% compared
to the Reference. The reduction figures for
the residential, transport, services and
industrial sectors are 92%, 78%, 47% and
26% respectively. Hence remaining CO2
emissions are concentrated in selected
industrial sectors, and in transport modes
(especially aviation).
Figure 2.4 shows both the decline in final
energy demand and the increasing role of
electricity in satisfying that demand, for
the scenarios with different 2050 targets.
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It can be seen that by 2050, electricity
generation increases in line with the
successively tougher targets. This is
because the electricity sector has highly
important interactions with transport (plug-
in vehicles) and buildings (boilers and heat
pumps), as these end-use sectors
contribute significantly to later period
decarbonisation. As a result, electricity
demand rises in all scenarios, and is
roughly 50% higher than the Reference in
2050 in most of the 80% reduction
scenarios.
The shift to electricity use in the residential
sector (from gas), combines with
technology switching from boilers to heat
pumps for space heating and hot water
heating. The service sector is similarly
decarbonised by shifting to electricity
(along with biomass penetration in the
most stringent scenarios). Natural gas,
although increasing in efficiency, is still
used in residential and service sectors for
space heating and is a contributor to
remaining emissions. 
The transport sector is decarbonised via a
range of technology options by mode, but
principally first by electricity (hybrid plug-
in), and later by bio-fuel vehicles in more
stringent scenarios (CAM, CSAM). There is
a trade-off between options to reduce
energy service demands, efficiency to
further reduce final energy, and use of
zero-carbon transport fuels. For example,
bio-fuels in stringent reduction scenarios
do not reduce energy demand as their
efficiency is similar to petrol and diesel
vehicles. Different modes adopt alternate
technology solutions depending on the
characteristics of the model. Cars (the
dominant mode - consuming 2/3 of the
transport energy) utilize plug-in vehicles
and then ethanol (E85). Buses switch to
battery options. Goods vehicles (HGV and
LGV) switch to bio-diesel then hydrogen
(only for HGV).
Figure 2.5 shows the final energy demand
by fuel for the three scenarios with equal
cumulative carbon emissions to 2050, CEA,
CCP and CCSP, with the Low-Carbon Core
scenario (CAM) for comparison.
In the early/later action scenarios of CCSP
and CCP, which culminate respectively in a
70% and 90% reduction in CO2 emissions
by 2050 (see Figure 2.1), the differing time
paths of abatement not only result in
different marginal carbon and welfare
costs, as seen below, they also give a
completely different final energy demand
pattern and mix of mitigation technologies.
CCP demands more final energy than CEA
(the ‘early action’ scenario) in 2035, as the
yearly emission reduction in 2035 is lower.
Conversely, CCSP demands less final
energy than CEA in 2050 as well as 2035
despite the fact that its annual CO2
mitigation level in 2035 is similar to CEA.
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Early action in CCSP also drives early and
greater use of wind electric generation, and
due to lower hurdle rates the greater
decarbonisation of transport and use of
hydrogen in more modes. The dynamic
change thus introduces some path
dependency even in a perfect foresight
model.
The reason for the low final energy
demand in the medium term in CCSP is the
relatively low energy demand in the
transport sector as the sector is
decarbonised by shifting to electricity
(hybrid plug in) and hydrogen vehicles
(with H2 generated from electrolysis), with
bio-fuel options not being commercialised
in mid-periods. High capital cost hydrogen
vehicles become relatively cheaper in
CCSP. The annualised cost is lower due to
the technology specific social hurdle rates.
As hydrogen and electric vehicles dominate
the transport mix by 2050, this has
resultant impacts on the power sector with
vehicles being recharged during low
demand (night time). Note that the
selection of these highly efficient but high
capital cost vehicles is strongly dependent
on the lowered discount rates in CCSP. By
2050, bio-fuels are not directly used for
transport modes in CCSP, in marked
contrast to the other scenarios.
Natural gas is mainly used in the industrial
sector followed by the residential and
service sectors. The residential and service
sectors use a very low amount of natural
gas in CCP in 2050. The natural gas is
replaced by biomass in the service sector
and by electricity in the residential sector.
Since the natural gas is replaced by
biomass in the service sector, some
available inexpensive gas is used for power
generation gas-CCS in 2050 under CCP. In
the CCSP, a large amount of gas goes to
boilers for heating.
Figure 2.6 illustrates the electricity
generation mix for the different carbon
reduction scenarios, showing how a change
in the target can result in different levels of
the various technologies being chosen by
the model.
Total electricity generation would increase
or decrease in the mitigation scenarios
compared to that in REF depending on the
electricity demand. In 2035, electricity
generation decreases in line with the
successive targets CFH, CLC and CAM (not
in CSAM). Conversely in 2050, electricity
generation increases in line with the
successive targets including CSAM.
Decarbonisation by means of efficiency
improvement and demand reduction of
end-use sectors at lower mitigation targets
early and in the middle of the period is the
reason for having a decreasing trend for
electricity generation in line with the
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mitigation target. As decarbonisation
efforts tighten through to 2050, end-use
sectors shifting to electricity leads to
relatively high demand for electricity, which
has to be generated from low-carbon
sources. Hence there is a trade off between
the decarbonisation of end-use sectors by
shifting to electricity, and both efficiency
improvements and demand reductions
affect the overall demand for electricity.
As carbon reduction requirements increase
in the power sector (almost complete
decarbonisation in 2050 in CSAM) the role
of coal CCS is assisted and eventually
supplanted by nuclear and wind as
available CCS capacity is used for hydrogen
production and as residual CCS emissions
are squeezed out. A large amount of
electricity (more than one third) is
generated from wind (with capacity
balancing) in CSAM in 2050.
Figure 2.7 presents the electricity
generation mix in CEA, CCP and CCSP.
There is no big difference in overall levels
of electricity generation in 2050 among the
scenarios. But in 2035, early action CCSP
requires a larger amount of electricity as it
reduces CO2 emissions by 60%, including
the use of plug-in electric vehicles and
electric heat boilers. Electricity demand
under CCSP in 2050 is met by a large wind
expansion (as an early commercialised zero
carbon technology) that necessitates a
very large expansion in overall electricity
capacity for peak constraints. Wind
expansion is mainly offshore as all cost
effective onshore wind is already selected
in REF itself. The contribution of
intermittent renewables such as wind,
marine and solar to peak load is limited.
Therefore, the selection of renewables
(wind power plants) to meet the carbon
target needs a large amount of reserve
capacity from gas plants, as shown in
Figure 2.8, which gives the differences in
installed capacity in those scenarios under
which carbon abatement takes place earlier
(CCSP) or later (CCP).
The higher target levels (CFH to CLC to
CAM to CSAM) of carbon reductions
produce a deeper array of mitigation
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options (likely with more uncertainty), and
result in increasing marginal costs of CO2,
as shown in Figure 2.9. In fact the CO2
marginal costs in 2035 range from £13 -
£133t/tCO2 and in 2050 from £20 -
£300/tCO2. This convexity in costs as
targets tighten illustrates the difficulty in
meeting more stringent carbon reduction
targets. 
Giving the model freedom to choose timing
of reductions under a cumulative carbon
constraint illustrates inter-temporal trade-
offs in decarbonisation pathways. CEA, with
early action, has a relatively low 2050
carbon price (comparable to the optimal
CAM, which has the same 2050 target).
Under a cumulative constraint (CCP) the
model chooses to delay mitigation options,
compared with both CEA and, even more,
with CCSP, with this later action requiring
CO2 reduction of 89% in 2050. This results
in very high marginal CO2 costs in 2050, at
£360/tCO2 - higher even than in the
conventional 90% reduction case. The
CCSP carbon price is not strictly
comparable with the others because it
reflects the lower discount rate that has
been applied.
Besides stimulating efficiency and fuel
switching (and technology shifting), the
increasing price of carbon-based energy
also plays a major role in reducing CO2
emissions by reducing energy service
demand (5% - 25% by scenario and by
ESD). Agriculture, industry, residential and
international shipping have higher demand
reductions than the air, car and HGV
(heavy good vehicles) transport sectors, as
shown in Figure 2.10. This is driven both
by the elasticities in these sectors but
crucially by the lack of alternative (cost
effective) technological substitution options.
The CCP scenario with an emphasis on
later action sees its greatest demand
reductions in later periods. In the CCSP
case demand reductions in 2050 are much
lower in most sectors as the model places
more weight on (and therefore avoids) the
late-period welfare losses in CCP from
reductions in ESDs due to the very high
carbon price. The exception is in residential
electricity where demands are sharply
reduced as an alternative to (relatively
expensive) power sector decarbonisation.
The reduction in energy service demands is
computed by the model as welfare costs
(reduction in the sum of consumer and
producer surpluses), which in 2050
between CFH and CSAM range from £5 -
£52 billion (see Figure 2.11). In particular
moving from a 60% to an 80% reduction
scenario almost doubles welfare costs
(from £20 - £39 billion). The attribution of
the welfare loss components to either
producers or consumers depends on the
shape of the supply and demand curves,
and crucially on the ability of producers to
pass through costs onto consumers. This is
not computed by MARKAL. Note that
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welfare losses cannot be compared to a
GDP cost as wider investment, trade and
Government spending impacts are not
accounted for.
Figure 2.12 provides an explicit comparison
between energy system costs and welfare
costs in the different scenarios (but note
that the bars are in no sense additive). At
the 2035 date, the energy system costs
may be positive or negative (see CLC and
CAM in 2035), because the more expensive
technologies will tend to increase the costs.
However, the downward pressure this puts
on energy demand will tend to reduce the
overall size (and therefore cost) of the
energy system. By 2050, the increased
cost of the technologies dominates, and
the energy system cost is always positive. 
Social welfare is always reduced by both
the increased technology cost and the
consequent downward pressure on energy
demand, which is why the red bars at all
dates and in all runs show a negative
change in (i.e. a loss of) welfare. 
The optimal abatement path in the CCP
case gives lower cumulative welfare costs
than the CEA scenario with equivalent
cumulative CO2 reductions (but constrained
early action). The fact that the CCSP run
produces the lowest costs is a reflection of
its calculation of the optimal solution under
social levels of discounting (and
correspondingly reduced technology-
specific hurdle rates). One interpretation of
this is that consumer preferences change
and/or Government works to remove
uncertainty, information gaps and other
non-price barriers. It should be noted,
however, that the reduced discount rates
mean that these social welfare costs are
not strictly comparable with those in other
scenarios.
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It must also be stressed again that both
these measures (energy system cost and
social welfare) are quite different from a
GDP cost, which is a metric often cited in
such studies. To compute this, a
macroeconomic model representation of
these runs would be required, which took
explicit account of, among other things, the
interactions between innovation,
investment, Government spending and
trade. The Energy 2050 project did not
include the use of such a model.
Conclusions for Low-Carbon Policy 
Any policy discussion of these insights
must recognise that these pathways and
energy-economic implications come from a
model with rational behaviour, competitive
markets and perfect foresight on future
policy and technological developments.
Even so the policy challenges in achieving
80% CO2 reductions in the UK are very
considerable. 
Current low-carbon policy mechanisms
have generally been applied in policy
packages and include market/incentive-
based instruments, classic regulation
instruments, voluntary/self-regulation
measures, and information/education-
based programmes. Three of the more
significant policies are the Renewables
Obligation (RO), the Carbon Emissions
Reduction Target (CERT), and the EU
emissions trading scheme (EU-ETS). While
these policy packages have signalled the
UK Government’s aim for accelerated
energy efficiency and low-carbon energy
supply, the instruments have not been of
the required stringency to meet the
Government’s near-term carbon reduction
targets for 2010.
Looking forward, it should be particularly
concerning to policy makers that these
least-cost optimal model scenarios do not
produce decarbonisation scenarios that are
anywhere near compatible with the EU’s
renewables directive, which requires at
least 15% of UK final energy demand to
come from renewables by 2020. Major
contributions of bio-fuels in transport and
offshore wind in electricity production only
occur in later periods in these model runs,
following tightening CO2 targets and
advanced technology learning. In none of
the runs is electricity generation from
renewables anywhere near the 30-35% of
final energy that the Government’s recent
Renewable Energy Strategy consultation
identifies as necessary to meet the EU
2020 target. Very significant policies will
need to be implemented to close this gap,
as discussed further below.
In the model runs, rising carbon reduction
targets (from 40-90% in CFH through to
CSAM) give a corresponding rising price of
carbon and the model ranges in 2050 from
£20-300/tCO2. In the runs with the same
cumulative emissions and discount rates
(CEA, CCP) the carbon prices in 2050 are
£173 and £360t/tCO2 respectively, with the
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latter illustrating the extra price incurred
by delaying decarbonisation. For
comparison, at current rates the Climate
Change Levy amounts to an implicit carbon
tax of £8.6/tCO2 for electricity and gas,
and £37.6/tCO2 for coal. Duty on road
fuels in 2008 was about 50p/l. If this is all
considered as an implicit carbon tax (i.e.
ignoring any other externality of road
travel), this amounts to about £208/tCO2.
This means that in the optimal market of
the MARKAL model, rates of fuel duty
would need to be about doubled in real
terms by 2050, while taxes would need to
have been imposed on other fuels at about
the current fuel duty rate by the same
date, in order for the targets to be met.
While these tax increases seem large, they
are actually a fairly modest annual tax
increase if they were imposed as an annual
escalator over forty years.
In addition to reduced energy service
demands from the price effect, MARKAL
delivers reduced final energy demand
through the increased uptake of
conservation and efficiency measures. The
relatively high uptake of the measures
across scenarios indicates their cost
effectiveness compared to other measures.
Such savings would require strong and
effective policy measures. It may be that
the Carbon Reduction Commitment, an
emission trading scheme for large business
and public sector organisations due to be
implemented in 2009, will provide the
necessary incentives for installing these
conservation measures.
One example of the uptake of efficiency
technologies in buildings is heat pumps,
which play a major role in all the 80% and
90% carbon reduction scenarios. At
present the level of installation, and of
consumer awareness, of heat pumps is
very low indeed, and their installation in
buildings is by no means straightforward.
To reach the levels of uptake projected in
these scenarios, policies for awareness-
raising and training for their installation
need to begin soon.
In the transport sector the model runs give
a detailed breakdown of the uptake of
different vehicle technologies, including
those with greater energy efficiency.
Energy service demands (in billion vehicle
km) in the transport sector in 2050 are
only moderately reduced as the carbon
targets become more stringent, but the
energy demand required to meet those
energy service demands falls by
considerably more, (from 2130 PJ in the
Reference to 1511 PJ in CAM). This results
from a more than doubling of the efficiency
of fuel use, combined with a range of
electric, bio-fuel and hydrogen zero carbon
fuels networks depending on scenario and
transport mode. The development of these
new vehicle types, and of more efficient
existing vehicle types, will be partly
incentivised by the carbon price. It is also
likely to require an intensification of energy
efficiency policies, such as the EU
requirements to improve vehicle efficiency,
and demonstration and technology support
policies to facilitate the penetration of the
new vehicle types and networks.
The model runs reported here reveal the
single most important policy priority to be
incentivising the effective decarbonisation
of the electricity system, because low-
carbon electricity can then assist with the
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decarbonisation of other sectors, especially
transport and household. In all scenarios,
major low-carbon electricity technologies
are coal CCS, nuclear and wind. All the
low-carbon model runs have substantial
quantities of each of these technologies by
2050, indicating that their costs are
broadly comparable and that each of them
is required for a low-carbon energy future
for the UK. The policy implications are
clear: all these technologies should be
developed.
The development of each of these
technologies to the required extent will be
far from easy. Most ambitious in terms of
the model projections is probably coal CCS,
which is taken up strongly from 2020 to
reach an installed capacity of 12 GW by
2035 in CSAM and 37 GW in 2035 in CLC
(the residual emissions from coal CCS are
a problem in the most stringent scenarios).
At present, even the feasibility of coal CCS
has not yet been demonstrated at a
commercial scale. There would seem to be
few greater low-carbon policy priorities
than to get such demonstrations on the
ground so that commercial CCS can be
deployed from 2020 (as the MARKAL model
currently assumes). However, the required
mechanism has yet to be agreed, the
demonstrations may reveal unexpected
technical problems, and although it is
hoped that the auctioning of EU-ETS
permits in Phase 3 of the scheme will
generate much of the very considerable
funds that will be required, the current
weakness of the carbon price makes such
funding uncertain. The timescale for near-
term CCS deployment is therefore
beginning to look extremely tight. The
availability and uptake of CCS as projected
by the model runs are therefore optimistic.
The UK Government believes that energy
companies should build new nuclear power
stations, and be able to with the measures
it has put in place to reduce regulatory and
planning risk. However, the underlying
investment costs, and expectations of
future electricity and carbon prices are all
matters of considerable uncertainty. The
scenarios envisage later deployment
(compared to CCS) of significant
investment in new nuclear plant (4 - 30
GW from 2035). The 2035 carbon prices in
these scenarios could provide the kind of
price required for these investments, but
the higher levels of deployment will require
that the new generation of nuclear plants
are economically and technically proven by
about 2015.
It is only in the third area of low-carbon
energy supply, renewables, that the UK
Government has firm targets for
deployment, in the form of the 15% of
final energy demand (probably requiring
around 35% of electricity) to come from
renewables by 2020 to comply with the
EU’s overall 20% target by that date. This
amounts to a ten-fold increase in the share
of renewables in UK final energy demand in
2006.
In the MARKAL scenarios, only 15% of
electricity is generated from renewable
sources by 2020, and this is if existing
policies (Renewables Obligation) are met
Current uptake is much lower than
required. Even with 15% renewable
electricity, the maximum share of
renewables in 2020 final energy demand
(also including transport and heat in
buildings), in the model runs is 5.77% (in
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CCSP) which is obviously well short of
15%. There is therefore a very great policy
challenge to increase the deployment of
renewables over the next ten years. It is
worth noting that the slow development of
UK renewables to date, has been due to
non-price issues, notably planning and grid
access problems. These ‘non-economic’
problems are not likely to be easy to
resolve.
The policy analysis here has focused on the
scenarios with increasing carbon targets. In
addition to changes in timing of
decarbonisation, the main areas in which a
cumulative constraint scenario (CEA, CCP,
CCSP) shows a marked difference in
technology choice are in respect of vehicle
technology and biomass use. CCSP in 2050
prefers electric hybrid, battery and
hydrogen vehicles, so that its use of bio-
fuels is very small. This is in contrast to
CCP, which makes very high use of bio-
fuels in transport modes and bio-pellets in
commercial buildings applications. The
policy message again is that there is a
wide range of developing vehicle
technologies, and technologies in other
sectors, which become preferred depending
on the carbon abatement pathway. It
should be the objective of policy at this
relatively early stage to give strong
encouragement to the full range of
technologies, to help to bring them to the
point where private companies will invest
the very substantial sums required to
achieve their commercial deployment. 
As stressed by Lord Stern in the Stern
Review, a robust, and rising, carbon price
is an absolutely essential requirement for
this technology development and
deployment. The MARKAL model generates
such a price as a necessary consequence of
the carbon constraint. The Government has
yet to find a way of doing so. Until it does,
these scenarios and their associated carbon
reductions are likely to remain beyond its
reach.
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Key Messages
■ A resilient energy system provides
energy security by being able to
recover from shocks and continue to
provide energy services to consumers 
■ Without policy intervention, resilience
and security goals will not be met
■ Creating resilience requires more focus
on reducing energy demand,
establishing diverse sources of supply
and reinforcing infrastructure, rather
than simply decarbonisation of energy
supply
■ Policies focusing on climate change will
help improve resilience but will not by
themselves achieve energy security.
Conversely, measures aimed at
enhancing resilience will lead to lower
CO2 emissions but will not by
themselves achieve current CO2
reduction targets
■ Electricity is key to the resilience of the
energy system overall because
alternative sources of supply are
available at broadly similar costs
making diversity cheap
■ Considerable new gas infrastructure
relating to storage and LNG imports
will be required to maintain reliability
of gas supplies in light of increasing
dependence on imported gas and
declining domestic supply
■ Major shocks impacting on gas supply,
going beyond traditional reliability
concerns but within the range of
historic events, could have impacts
measured in £billions, mainly through
lost supplies to industrial consumers
■ Shocks would also require re-
dispatching of electricity supply 
■ The main measures that would mitigate
the impacts of major shocks are further
connections to European and
international gas markets and
investment in storage
■ Such mitigation measures are unlikely
to be implemented purely through
market-driven investments
■ Whether government should act to
promote such mitigation measures
requires a careful consideration of the
costs (upfront and certain) versus
benefits (realised only in unusual
circumstances), and whether
interventions will discourage market-
driven investments
Introduction
This chapter assesses what constitutes
resilience in an energy system and how an
energy system with different degrees of
resilience can withstand various kinds of
‘shock’, focusing mainly on disruptions to
gas infrastructure. The chapter describes
how Resilient and Low-Carbon Resilient
energy system scenarios have been
constructed based on diversity of supply,
energy dependence and infrastructure
considerations. Through comparison with
the Reference and Low-Carbon Core
scenarios of Chapter 2, the benefits of
building resilience into the system in the
event of shocks are described and
quantified, through the simulation of
various price and supply shocks to the
energy system. We focus on the year
2025, just beyond the immediate concerns
3. A Resilient Energy System
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of policymakers but well within the lifetime
of current investments. Finally, policies for
realising energy system resilience in
practice are discussed. 
What is Resilience?
Anxieties about the vulnerability of the
energy system are generally framed in
terms of ‘energy security’ or more
restrictively ‘security of supply’. For
example, DECC (2008a) identifies three
elements of energy security: physical
security, price security and geopolitical
security. This focuses primarily on supply
security and resilience and specifically the
adequacy of capacity:
“Our analysis suggests that the
single most important influence on
expected energy unserved1 is the
overall balance, the margin,
between demand and physical
supply capacity”.
We have chosen to use the concept of
‘resilience’ to frame our analysis. The
advantage is that resilience can be seen as
an intrinsic characteristic of the energy
system itself. It does not require us to
think about the underlying causes of a
particular shock, for example a prolonged
interruption of gas supply. We only need to
know that a particular kind of shock is
possible. Our approach is more analogous
to that of the EU (CEC, 2008) whose
Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan
has five elements: 
■ Infrastructure needs and the
diversification of energy supplies
■ External energy relations
■ Oil and gas stocks and crisis response
mechanisms
■ Energy efficiency
■ Making the best use of the EU’s
indigenous energy resources
As discussed in the introduction, we
established a working definition of energy
system resilience which draws heavily on
the characterisation of resilience in other
fields, especially in the ecological sciences:
“Resilience is the capacity of an
energy system to tolerate
disturbance and to continue to
deliver affordable energy services
to consumers. A resilient energy
system can speedily recover from
shocks and can provide alternative
means of satisfying energy service
needs in the event of changed
external circumstances.” 
This definition identifies energy system
resilience as a multi-aspect concept, with
at least the following aspects:
■ Energy intensity: for resilience the
lower the intensity of energy use, the
less energy of any kind is required to
sustain economic activity
■ Diversity: this has three components
(Stirling, 2007): variety (the number of
energy sources contributing to the
system), balance (the share of the
various energy sources contributing to
the system) and disparity (the
difference between the various energy
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sources contributing to the system).
The desirability of diversity for energy
system resilience may be applied to
end-use technologies as well as energy
supply
■ Reliability: for resilience the equipment
installed in the energy system needs to
have a high and predictable probability
of functioning at its designed capacity.
Reliability also implies some element of
redundancy – for resilience the energy
system capacity needs to be somewhat
above the level of maximum expected
demand (the ‘capacity margin’), so that
there is the unused capacity to respond
to unexpected failure of energy system
components.
Constructing Scenarios for a Resilient
Energy System
There can be no single measure of the
resilience of an energy system. Instead we
have developed a set of indicators
reflecting the aspects above that point to
the capacity of an energy system to
tolerate disturbance (Table 3.1). The
criteria for selecting the indicators were:
relevance to the working definition of
resilience; pedigree in terms of past or
existing energy security strategies; and the
practicality of implementation in the
modelling tools available to UKERC. The
indicators were quantified and
implemented as constraints in our models.
Quantification took place with reference to
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Table 3.1: Resilience indicators
Indicator Quantified assumptions 
Macro indicators Final energy demand falls 3.2% pa relative to GDP from 2010
onwards.
No single energy source (e.g. gas) accounts for more than 40%
of the primary energy mix from 2015 onwards
No single type of electricity generation (e.g. gas, nuclear) accounts
for more than 40% of the mix from 2015 onwards
Reliability indicators: Value of lost load:
gas and electricity • £5/kWh (residential electricity)
• £40/kWh (industrial electricity) 
• £5/therm (industrial gas)
• Lost load not allowed (residential gas)
Loss-of-load expectation (LOLE): 
• 4 hours per year (0.05% of year)
Infrastructure enhancement Range of options:
• Natural gas storage
• Additional LNG import facilities
• Additional gas interconnector
• Storage of back-up distillate oil at combined cycle gas turbine
(CCGT) plant
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policy ambitions, current energy planning
practices and sensitivity testing of the
constraints. 
Reducing energy demand is a key element
of EU energy security strategy. It will
reduce vulnerability to all types of
insecurity – physical, price and geopolitical.
The 3.2% decoupling of final energy
demand from GDP (see Table 3.1) is
equivalent to an annual reduction of 1.2%
in absolute terms (assuming GDP growth of
2% p.a.). DECC’s most recent carbon and
energy projections (DECC 2008b) adopt
different assumptions about the impact of
policy measures set out in the 2007 Energy
White Paper through to 2020. Our
assumptions about constrained final energy
demand correspond roughly to the
assumption of the high impact of energy
efficiency measures up to 2020 and we
assume that the same pace of
improvement will continue thereafter. This
Resilient scenario can therefore be said to
be at the upper end of the plausible range
in terms of energy demand reduction.
However, it is less ambitious than the
’lifestyle’ scenarios developed in Chapter 6.
The diversity constraints were formulated
in terms of maximum market shares
because: a) this is a simple and intuitive
characterisation; and b) such constraints
are easily implemented in our models. The
quantification was intended to prevent any
single energy source from dominating the
market but it was subject to some
sensitivity testing in order to ensure that
the constraints acted in a meaningful way.
Generation mix was constrained because
the electricity sector was found to play a
key role in shifting the primary energy mix.
The availability of alternative generating
options at similar costs means that
diversity can be achieved at a relatively
low cost in the electricity sector. The
generation mix constraint helps guarantee
security of electricity supply and prevents
the electricity sector being used to
compensate for imbalances elsewhere in
the energy sector.
The reliability indicators are used to ensure
adequacy of capacity in the gas and
electricity sectors. This ties in closely with
DECC’s approach to energy security which
balances the value of energy unserved as a
result of statistically predictable
fluctuations in demand and plant
availability against the cost of providing
extra capacity. The capacity margin – the
amount by which installed capacity exceeds
peak demand – is often taken as an
indicator of reliability for electricity supply,
as is the loss-of-load probability (LOLP) –
the number of winters per century in which
demand will not be fully met. There are no
formal reliability requirements in the UK
privatised electricity markets but markets
are routinely monitored to assess
indicators such as capacity margin and
LOLP. Capacity margins and LOLP were
developed as ‘rules of thumb’ based on
more fundamental analyses using the
concept of ‘value of lost load’ (VOLL) at a
time when the electricity system was
dominated by large fossil and nuclear
plant. A capacity margin of around 20%
and a LOLP of nine winters per century
were the standards used by the former
Central Electricity Generating Board
(CEGB). 
If new types of plant, particularly
intermittent renewables, take a large share
of the electricity market then the old
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relationships between VOLL, LOLP and
capacity margin will break down. When
demand is not fully met, periods of
interruption may be longer and more load
may be lost. The MARKAL model uses a
capacity margin approach, but captures
some of the impacts of intermittency by
assigning a modest capacity credit (10% of
maximum rated capacity) to wind at times
of peak demand. Our more detailed
network models use the more sophisticated
loss-of-load expectation (LOLE) approach –
the number of hours per year in which
demand is expected not to be met – and
also work with predicted values of
unserved energy (lost load) to determine
capacity levels. Using the LOLE and VOLL
constraints increases the capacity needed
to meet reliability standards.
Finally, we explore the implications of large
‘abnormal’ events to which it is difficult to
attach statistical probabilities, focusing
entirely on disruptions to gas
infrastructure. Building up infrastructure
through diversity and redundancy and
storing more energy can help to mitigate
these events. We explore a number of
specific options in the following sections.
Modelling Approaches
The analysis has been undertaken by
linking a number of the UKERC energy
models as shown in Figure 3.1. The
sectoral models described in Chapter 6 are
used to establish energy service demands
that feed into the MARKAL-MED model
described in Chapter 2. The electricity
demands from MARKAL-MED are then fed
into a more detailed model of the
electricity system, WASP (the Wien
Automatic System Planning model),
described below. Finally, the national
generation mix from WASP, and
gas/electricity demands from MARKAL-
MED, then form inputs into CGEN (the
Combined Gas and Electricity Network
model). The resilience indicators are used
to constrain the models. Each
representation of the energy system at a
given point in time can be subjected to
‘shocks’ to assess the costs and benefits of
building in resilience.
The WASP Model
The WASP model (IAEA, 2006) is designed
to determine a medium to long-term
economically optimal expansion policy for a
power generation system within user-
specified constraints. The model minimises
total discounted costs within the specified
system reliability constraints. System
reliability is evaluated on the basis of three
indices: loss-of-load-
probability/expectation, unserved energy
and reserve margin. The cost of each
possible combination of power generating
units added to the system that meets the
constraints is evaluated. Costs include
capital investment, salvage value of
investment, fuel, fuel inventories, non-fuel
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operation and maintenance and the value
of energy not served.
System production costs and costs
associated with unserved energy are
assessed probabilistically. The model relies
on detailed assumptions about the load
duration curve, generating unit
characteristics (i.e. minimum and
maximum output levels, availability,
efficiency, reserve providing capability,
maintenance requirements), the loading
order of units and the output of energy
limited plants.  Linear programming is used
to determine an optimal dispatch policy
that satisfies constraints on emissions and
fuel availability. Dynamic programming is
then used to compare and optimise the
costs of alternative system expansion
policies that would serve the future
electricity demand given the required level
of system reliability.
The CGEN Model
CGEN is an optimisation tool for the gas
and electricity infrastructure.  It minimises
total discounted costs related to the
combined operation and expansion of the
gas and electricity networks whilst meeting
demand requirements over the planning
horizon. CGEN is a geographical model,
thus the connection of gas pipes and
electricity transmission wires in a network
is explicitly modelled. This geographical
element allows a realistic depiction of the
physical constraints present in both
networks. CGEN can be used in planning
mode – i.e. it determines new investments
so as to minimise the cost of meeting final
demand for gas and electricity subject to
operational constraints. It computes the
cost of energy unserved in a manner
similar to WASP. CGEN can also be used in
operational mode where the network and
generation assets are specified by the user.
We have used CGEN in planning mode to
model the Core scenarios and in
operational mode to assess the impact of
shocks and mitigating measures. 
The components covered by CGEN are
arranged into distinct categories as shown
in Figure 3.2. These include resource
supply, energy transportation (networks),
generation technologies and energy end
use. Resource supply includes bounds on
the availability of primary energy supplies
(gas, coal, oil etc) and electricity imports.
Detailed modelling of the gas network
includes facilities such as pipelines, gas
storage and compressor stations. Gas
import interconnectors are modelled as gas
pipes with maximum transport capacities.
The model carries out a DC load flow
analysis for the electricity network. The
interaction between the two networks is
through gas turbine generators connected
to both networks (Chaudry et al, 2008). 
Generation plans from the WASP model are
used as an input into the CGEN model.
CGEN locates new generation plants
around the electricity network in order to
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Figure 3.2: Structure of the CGEN Model
6134_20-50 Report:S3097_inner  20/04/2009  11:44  Page 58
minimise costs. Gas and electricity energy
demand is fed into CGEN from MARKAL-
MED. The demand is split into residential
and industrial/commercial components for
gas and electricity. Gas used for electricity
generation is determined endogenously
within CGEN.     
Resilience and CO2 Reduction
In this section we systematically compare
key macro-level indicators from the
Resilient and Low-Carbon Resilient
scenarios with the Reference and Low-
Carbon Core scenarios focusing on the year
2025. Table 3.2 sets out how the indicators
move between 2000 (the base year for the
model runs) and 2025 in each of the four
scenarios.
Although there are synergies between the
low-carbon/resilience agendas they are far
from being synonymous with each other.
The key theme in the Low-Carbon scenario
is de-carbonisation of electricity supply
with demand reduction making a modest
contribution. The key theme in the
Resilience scenario is demand reduction
with only a modest reduction in the carbon
intensity of electricity generation by 2025.
The Low-Carbon scenario contributes to
reduced energy dependence, but does not
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REFERENCE (REF)
Primary energy demand: -7%
Final energy demand: +2%
Electricity demand: +14%
Residential demand: +5%
Max primary share (gas): 38%
Max generation share (coal): 54%
CO2 emissions
1: -12%
CO2 intensity power: 513g/kWh
Energy system costs: £0bn
Welfare costs: £0bn
RESILIENT (R)
Primary energy demand: -20%
Final energy demand: -16%
Electricity demand: +1%
Residential demand: -23%
Max primary share (gas): 38%
Max generation share (coal): 40%
CO2 emissions
1: -19%
CO2 intensity power: 464g/kWh
Energy system costs: -£2bn
Welfare costs: -£19bn 
LOW-CARBON (LC)
Primary energy demand: -13%
Final energy demand: -2%
Electricity demand: +6%
Residential demand: 0%
Max primary share (gas): 41%
Max generation share (gas): 31%
CO2 emissions
1: -36%
CO2 intensity power: 188g/kWh
Energy system costs: +£2bn
Welfare costs: -£4bn
LOW-CARBON RESILIENT (LCR)
Primary energy demand: -20%
Final energy demand: -16%
Electricity demand: -8%
Residential demand: -20%
Max primary share (gas): 38%
Max generation share (coal): 40%
CO2 emissions
1: -36%
CO2 intensity power: 360g/kW
Energy system costs: -£2bn
Welfare costs: -£19bn
Table 3.2: Resilient energy systems: key macro indicators for 2025 with respect to a 2000
baseline
Note 1): CO2 emissions reductions are measured with respect to 1990
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go far enough to meet overall security
goals as defined in the Resilient scenario;
the Resilient scenario reduces CO2
emissions, but does not go far enough to
stay on the pathway to the 2050 80%
reduction goal. 
Figure 3.3 shows how the carbon intensity
of grid electricity moves through to 2050 in
each of the scenarios. In the Reference
(unconstrained) scenario, carbon intensity
increases due to a switch from gas and
nuclear to coal, partly compensated for by
increases in renewable generation. In the
Resilient scenario, carbon intensity declines
gradually because of investment in nuclear
and renewables which is, however, partly
compensated for by a switch from gas to
coal. 
The dramatic, and early, reduction in
carbon intensity in the Low-Carbon
scenario is the result of large-scale
investment in coal plant fitted with carbon
capture and storage (CCS), nuclear and
wind generation. Carbon intensity declines
significantly in the Low-Carbon Resilient
scenario but lags about a decade behind
the Low-Carbon scenario. Electricity
demand is lower in the Low-Carbon
Resilient scenario. Nuclear’s market share
is similar to that in Low-Carbon while there
is a significant switch from coal CCS to
renewables. 
The residential sector is critical to the
energy demand reductions that take place
in the two resilient scenarios. Residential
demand in the Resilient Scenario is almost
30% below that in the Reference scenario
by 2025 while demand in the Low-Carbon
Resilient scenario is 20% lower than in the
Low-Carbon scenario. 
The diversity constraints that we have
applied to primary energy share and
generation mix bite more strongly in the
Resilient scenario than they do in Low-
Carbon Resilient. In 2025, the Low-Carbon
scenario broadly delivers diversity goals.
Primary energy meets the diversity
constraint in the Reference scenario.
However, the large investment in coal
results in the generation mix constraint
being breached by a large margin. Coal
fired generation is constrained off in the
Resilient scenario. In the Low-Carbon
scenario the constraint on primary energy
mix bites mainly because of gas use in the
residential sector. Moving to the Low-
Carbon Resilient scenario reduces
residential energy demand significantly and
results in the primary energy mix
constraint ceasing to bite. However, coal
fired electricity generation, with a mixture
of CCS and unabated plant, is then
constrained off.
It appears from Table 3.2 that the costs, in
terms of welfare loss, associated with
building in resilience are much higher than
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those associated with pursuing the low-
carbon economy. This needs to be
interpreted carefully. The largest component
of the welfare loss in the two resilient
scenarios is associated with reduced energy
demand in the residential sector. As noted in
Chapter 2, demand reductions in the
residential sector are modelled entirely
through a price response (rather than, for
example, the implementation of
conservation measures), leading inevitably
to high estimates of welfare loss. To the
extent that demand reduction can be
secured through relatively low-cost
conservation measures, the welfare losses
would be reduced, so that those associated
with the LC and LCR scenarios in Table 3.2
are very much upper bounds.
Reliability of Electricity Supply
Applying the reliability indicators in Table
3.1 to the electricity system shows that the
conventional capacity margin approach will
lead to increasingly unreliable supply if
significant amounts of intermittent
renewable capacity comes on to the system.
Figure 3.4 shows how the required system
capacity margin (the fraction by which
installed capacity exceeds peak demand)
changes between 2005 and 2050 under the
Low-Carbon scenario if the more formal
reliability approach based on VOLL and LOLE
is applied. The difference relates mainly to
the degree of renewables on the system.
With growth in intermittent renewables, the
frequency of electricity shortage conditions
increases leading to higher levels of
unserved energy. However, the average
duration of such events generally remains
unaffected.
Figure 3.5 shows how, in the same Low-
Carbon scenario, the loss of load
expectation (LOLE) exceeds accepted
norms if the conventional capacity margin
approach is adopted. Accepted loss-of-load
expectations under current conventional
systems range between 2 and 8 hours per
year. With more intermittent renewables on
the system, the conventional approach
could lead to loss of load as high as 150
hours per year by 2040 under this
scenario. In the later part of the projection,
nuclear forms an increasing part of the mix
and LOLE falls off.
The additional capacity and electricity
system costs associated with the more
formal reliability approach is shown in
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Table 3.3. Beyond 2020, the additional
capacity required on the system to
maintain reliability is in the range 5-10 GW
depending on the scenario and the precise
point in the projection. The cost of
maintaining this capacity, which would be
seldom used, is largely associated with
capital costs and could run into several
hundreds of millions of pounds per year. As
an indicator, the £354m incurred in the
Low-Carbon Resilient scenario in 2020 is
equivalent to £1.03/MWh of all electricity
generated and £9.85/MWh of wind energy
generated. The modelling suggests just
over 12 GW of wind on the system at this
point.  
Reliability of Gas Supply
When the UK was self-sufficient in gas
supplies, the response to uncertainty in the
gas market largely came down to turning
the tap on and off. With the prospect of the
UK becoming largely dependent on
imports, other measures are required to
ensure reliability of gas supplies. These
include greater interconnection with
Europe, opening up to global LNG markets
and investing in storage.
We have operated the CGEN model using
the indicators from Table 3.1 to assess the
investments needed to ensure reliable gas
supply through to 2050 under each of the
four core scenarios. After taking account of
current and committed projects, the CGEN
model chooses between additional pipeline
interconnectors, LNG terminals and gas
storage facilities. Table 3.4 shows
investments selected under the four core
scenarios in addition to current and
committed capacity. New interconnectors
are not selected but there is considerable
investment in new LNG terminals to
compensate for declining domestic supply.
This is largely driven by assumptions about
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Table 3.3: Additional capacity and zystem costs to ensure reliability 
Additional System Capacity Additional System Cost
(GW) (£m pa)
2020 2035 2050 2020 2035 2050
Reference 1.3 5.5 5.5 67 274 277
Low-Carbon 3.7 11.5 4.4 187 575 219
Resilience 6.8 5.9 9.1 341 296 457
Low-Carbon Resilience 7.1 5.4 6.2 354 269 312
Table 3.4: Gas infrastructure investments 
Reference (REF) Low-Carbon (LC) Resilient (R) Low-Carbon
Resilient (LCR)
Interconnectors No additional No additional No additional No additional
LNG terminals 40 mcm/d 2015 40 mcm/d 2015
20 mcm/d 2020 20 mcm/d 2020 40 mcm/d 2020 40 mcm/d 2020
60 mcm/d 2025 60 mcm/d 2025 40 mcm/d 2025 40 mcm/d 2025
40 mcm/d 2030 40 mcm/d 2030 60 mcm/d 2030 60 mcm/d 2030
Storage 1000 mcm 2015 1000 mcm 2015 No additional No additional
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the relative cost of continental gas and gas
available through LNG markets. New,
additional storage is selected in the
Reference and Low-Carbon scenarios but
not in the resilient scenarios where final
gas demand is much lower. 
Figure 3.6 shows the gas market balance
out to 2030 under each of the four core
scenarios. This illustrates starkly the
degree to which the UK will become import
dependent. The broad pattern across all
scenarios is that LNG capacity substitutes
for UK domestic production and, in the
2020s, for Norwegian imports.  In the two
resilient scenarios, where gas demand is
lower, Norwegian imports are reduced
more quickly.
System Shocks 
We have hypothesised three possible
‘shocks’ to the UK energy system that
impact on gas supply facilities (Table 3.5).
We have assumed that the impact of each
shock is experienced over three different
durations - 5, 40 and 90 days. In each
case we have assumed that the shock
occurs in mid-winter, nominally 1 January
2025, during a period of ‘average cold
spell’ demand. These are deliberately
severe events. However, they are within
the range of recent experience. An
explosion at the Bravo rig in the Rough
field took the storage facility out of service
for two months in 2006. Gas supplies
through Easington were interrupted for five
days after it was struck by lightning in
1999. 
Table 3.6 shows the impact of the three
events against the background of each of
the core scenarios. The key messages are:
■ The loss of the largest terminal,
Bacton, which affects both imported
Making the transition to a secure and low-carbon energy system     UKERC ENERGY 2050 PROJECT 63
a) Reference
0
50
100
150
200
250
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Year
B
cm
b) Resilience
0
50
100
150
200
250
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Year
B
cm
c) Low Carbon
0
50
100
150
200
250
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Year
B
cm
d) Low Carbon Resilience
0
50
100
150
200
250
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Year
B
cm
Figure 3.6: Gas supply/demand balance in the four core scenarios
6134_20-50 Report:S3097_inner  20/04/2009  11:44  Page 63
and domestic gas supplies, has the
largest impact
■ The energy system can ‘ride through’
the loss of Easington or Milford Haven
under the Resilient and Low-Carbon
Resilient scenarios – and the impact of
losing Bacton is much diminished. This
is because these two scenarios are
characterised by lower levels of
residential gas demand which is
strongly seasonal. The system can cope
better when demand is less ‘peaky’.
Demand reduction demonstrably
contributes to energy system resilience
■ The imputed value of unserved energy
(in £bns) is an order of magnitude
larger than the changed system costs.
System costs generally rise as more
expensive gas is sourced and coal
substitutes for gas in electricity
generation. This however does not take
account of the response in energy spot
markets that would be expected
following such events, which would
tend to increase costs further
■ The patterns of response are complex
because the facilities play different
roles in the gas network. In none of
the scenarios is it necessary to curtail
electricity supplies. Response is taken
up entirely by exercising interruptible
gas contracts, re-dispatch of the
electricity system, use of distillate oil at
certain CCGTs and non-contracted
industrial gas interruptions
Table 3.7 assesses how different lengths of
interruption could affect outcomes. The
loss of Easington is taken as an example.
The clear message is that shorter periods
of interruption, of the order of days, can be
accommodated through system
adjustments with very little loss of load.
Beyond a certain threshold, the costs
increase rapidly, but they are less than
linearly related to the length of the
interruption.
Mitigating Shocks
The analysis above is based on the
assumption that investment takes place to
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Facility Description Size 
Easington gas terminal Connects the UK gas system to Can deliver 120 mcm/day
the Rough storage facility and (equivalent to 35% of UK annual
the Langeled pipeline from demand). Rough can store 3.3 bcm
Norway of gas, equivalent to 10 days
average winter demand
Bacton gas terminal Connects the UK to continental Can deliver 144 mcm/day
Europe via Zeebrugge and (equivalent to >40% of UK winter
Balgzand. Also links to some demand). Also used for export
domestic production
Milford Haven LNG Two terminals being commissioned Each can process 55 mcm/day of 
terminal in 2009 gas delivered by LNG tankers
(equivalent to 15% of winter
demand)
Table 3.5: Description of facilities
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meet the reliability standards set out
earlier. It is also possible to undertake
additional infrastructure investment that
would help to mitigate the impacts of
major shocks. This section investigates the
benefits that such investment might bring
in the event of such shocks and sets them
against the costs. Table 3.8 shows seven
alternative projects which would increase
the resilience of the gas supply network.
We focus on the loss of Bacton, the most
severe shock, for a 40-day period and
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Table 3.6: Impact of 40-day shocks in the four core scenarios
Energy Value of energy Change in system
unserved (mcm) unserved1 (£m) operating costs2 (£m)
Reference (REF)
- Bacton 1839 3404 -7
- Easington 1049 1942 +137
- Milford Haven 866 1604 +104
Low-Carbon (LC)
- Bacton 1718 3179 +29
- Easington 1155 2138 +144
- Milford Haven 1015 1878 +89
Resilient (R)
- Bacton 244 452 +203
- Easington - - -
- Milford Haven - - -
Low-Carbon Resilient (LCR)
- Bacton 704 1303 +135
- Easington - - -
- Milford Haven - - -
Notes: 1) using the values of lost load in residential and industry from Table 3.1; 2) this does not allow for the likely rise in spot
prices for gas
Table 3.7: Impact of the loss of Easington for different periods
Energy unserved (mcm) Value of energy Change in system
unserved (£m) operating costs (£m)
Reference
- 5 day 14 26 +29
- 40 day 1049 1942 +137
- 90 day 1857 3438 +294
Low-Carbon
- 5 day 12 23 +32
- 40 day 1155 2138 +144
- 90 day 2127 3937 +242
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assess the impact of these mitigating
investments for the Low-Carbon scenario.
The pattern of impacts is similar for other
shocks, periods and scenarios. Table 3.9
shows the degree to which each individual
mitigating investment would reduce the
volume of energy unserved. The biggest
impact comes from the expansion of import
facilities, be they new LNG terminals or a
new interconnector. Five days distillate
storage has little impact (as might be
expected for a 40 day outage) but
dedicated gas storage and 40 days
distillate storage have half to two thirds
the impact of more import facilities. 
The conclusion about the impact of gas
storage is critically dependent on how
much gas is assumed to be in store at the
time of the shock. For the major storage
facility we have considered two options: a)
that the facility is half full in mid-winter;
and b) that it is kept completely full for
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Table 3.9: Impact of mitigating investments: Bacton out for 40 days
10% investor 3.5% regulated
rate of return rate of return
Energy Reduction Additional Return Additional Return
unserved in cost of annual period annual period
(mcm) shock (£m) costs (£m) (years) costs (£m) (years)
No investment 1718 - - - - -
Storage facility1 1104 1093 52 21 17 63
Storage facility2 832 1598 52 31 17 93
Two storage facilities 1246 832 60 14 20 42
One LNG terminal 786 1572 44 36 15 108
Two LNG terminals 789 1569 45 35 15 105
Gas interconnector 790 1600 37 43 12 129
Distillate storage 1685 53 2 32 1 96
Major distillate storage 1246 767 24 32 8 96
Notes: 1) facility half full in mid-winter; 2) facility completely full
Table 3.8: Gas infrastructure projects
Project Capacity Cost (£m)
Storage facility similar to Rough 3000mcm delivering 40 mcm/d, located near
St Fergus 475
Two storage facilities Salt cavities each with a capacity of 500mcm
delivering 40 mcm/d 550
Expansion at one LNG terminal 40mcm/d at Teesside 400
Expansion at two LNG terminals 20 mcm/d at each of Teesside and Isle of Grain 405
New gas interconnector 40 mcm/d through Theddlethorpe 340
Backup distillate storage at CCGTs 5 days storage at 6GW plant 15
Major distillate storage at CCGTs 40 days storage at 6GW plant 215
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emergencies. This has a significant effect
on the conclusions. Note also that the
analysis does not take into account
changes in spot market process that might
be expected to take place.
Making a mitigating investment can be
regarded as taking out insurance against
the eventuality of adverse events. If the
event is expected to occur regularly, the
investment might make sense. If it were
extremely rare it might be better to forego
the insurance costs and accept the
consequences. The ‘return period’ in Table
3.9 refers to the frequency with which the
event would need to take place for each of
the mitigating investments to pay off in the
long run. If the investor requires a market
rate of return of 10% real, investing in two
new LNG terminals might be expected to
pay off in the long run if a 40-day outage
at Bacton were to occur more frequently
than once every 35 years. Given the
severity of the event, and the improbability
of its happening as frequently as this, it is
almost impossible to conceive of this as a
good investment in a market context. 
On the other hand, investment in these
mitigating measures could be regarded as
being in the public interest for strategic
reasons. At a rate of return on investment
of only 3.5% real, the investment might
still ‘pay off’ if the event were to occur as
infrequently as once in 100 years. There
might therefore be a case for the regulator
allowing the costs of such an investment to
be passed on to consumers, whereby
companies would be prepared to accept a
lower risk-free rate of return.  The difficulty
is that it is not possible to allow a risk-free
rate of return on only one such asset. If
this approach were adopted, there would
be no market-driven investments, because
infrastructure investments with guaranteed
returns would effectively drive out
investments that were exposed to normal
market risks.
Adding up the Costs of Resilience
Ultimately, deciding how much to invest in
and promote resilience in the energy
system is a political decision that must be
informed by evidence, albeit in the light of
deep uncertainty. In this section we draw
together evidence from the preceding
analysis to assess the overall economic
impact of investing in resilience. 
Table 3.10 summarises how system costs
and welfare costs change in moving from
the Reference and Low-Carbon scenarios to
the Resilient and Low-Carbon Resilient
scenarios respectively. The high-level goals
refer to the resilience constraints imposed
on final energy demand and the energy
mix. Electricity reliability costs refer to the
additional system costs of maintaining
capacity sufficient to meet reliability
criteria over and above maintaining a
conventional capacity margin. These costs
are essentially associated with the greater
use of intermittent renewables. Finally,
infrastructure costs are those associated
with mitigating the effects of major
disruptions to the gas system. 
Energy system costs change when the
high-level constraints are applied, but so
do welfare costs. It is important to note
that the very high loss of welfare
potentially associated with building in the
high-level resilience goals (£15-19bn in
2025 – see Table 3.10) is very much an
upper bound, and true welfare loss could
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be very much lower, or even non-existent.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the response of
residential consumers was modelled solely
through a demand elasticity that caused
them to reduce their demand for energy
services, and did not allow conservation
measures (which might be very low cost)
to be chosen endogenously.
To get some insights into the possible
effect of this assumption, we allowed
certain residential conservation measures
back into the model. As a result, a quarter
of the demand reduction was achieved
through conservation rather than a price-
driven demand response. This lowered
welfare losses by £2-3bn pa in 2025. If all
of the demand reduction could be achieved
through conservation then the welfare
losses could be eliminated entirely. 
The ‘lifestyles’ scenarios discussed in
Chapter 6 achieve demand reductions even
greater than those in the resilience
scenarios discussed in this chapter. They
are underpinned by both a greater
adoption of conservation measures and a
reduction of energy service demands, for
example through turning down of
thermostats in the home or reducing
travel. In 2025, the energy system cost is
£35bn pa lower in the LS LC (lifestyle
change, low-carbon) scenario than it is in
the Low-Carbon Scenario. This appears to
be a classic win-win-win situation where
energy conservation will bring economic,
environmental and security benefits.
However, the critical issue is whether
reduced energy service demands are
associated with welfare loss. If people are
forced into discomfort through high energy
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Table 3.10: Estimated costs associated with different aspects of resilience in 2025
Reference Low-Carbon
↓ ↓
Resilient Low-Carbon Resilient
High-level goals
- Change in annual system cost1 -£2.0bn -£4.6bn
- Loss of welfare2 Up to £19bn Up to £15bn
- Change in system cost through 25% conservation3 - £0.9bn
- Mitigation of welfare loss through 25% conservation3 £3.1bn £2.3bn
- Reduced system cost through lifestyle change4 £33bn £35bn
Electricity Reliability 
- Cost of additional capacity margin5 ~£300m ~£300m
Infrastructure 
- Enhanced gas import or storage capacity6 £45m £45m
Notes: 1) from MARKAL runs; 2) change in consumer and producer surplus from MARKAL assuming a price-induced response in
the residential sector; 3) mitigation of welfare loss when conservation measures (which deliver about 25% of residential demand
reduction) are allowed in MARKAL; 4) the reduced cost of the energy system when adding lifestyle change to the REF and LC
scenarios respectively); 5) the cost of additional capacity determined by WASP as opposed to MARKAL. These additional costs
vary considerably from one year to another;  6) annualised cost of two LNG terminals 
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prices the welfare loss is real. On the other
hand, if thermostats are turned down
though pro-active lifestyle choice then
welfare might arguably increase.
A key point from Table 3.10 is that high-
level resilience goals bring costs or benefits
that are an order of magnitude higher than
those associated with guaranteeing
reliability of supply or insuring against
infrastructure loss. The uncertainties
associated with the costs of the high-level
goals are equally large. However, as shown
above, if the high-level goals are pursued
then the case for infrastructure measures
is considerably reduced. 
Economic Vulnerability of Energy
Dependence
The international price of oil has proved
extremely volatile over the last few
decades. Gas and coal prices tend to follow
those of oil. This leaves any economy
heavily dependent on fossil fuel imports
economically vulnerable to price
movements. By 2025, the UK will be
importing most of the fossil fuels it uses,
and it will almost certainly be imports that
meet demand at the margin. Table 3.11
shows the level of primary demand for
fossil fuels in each of the four core
scenarios, illustrating that moving from the
Reference and Low-Carbon scenarios to the
Resilient and Low-Carbon Resilient
scenarios would reduce total fossil fuel
demand by 16% and 6% respectively. 
The Table also considers the annual cost
associated with oil prices rising by
$100/barrel and gas and coal prices
moving proportionately. Although building
in resilience makes a great deal of
difference to the level of fossil use
depending on whether the UK is on a low-
carbon pathway, it makes remarkably little
difference to the reduction in energy costs.
This is because change in demand is for
coal, the cheapest fossil fuel, while oil, the
most expensive, changes least. In both the
Reference and Low-Carbon scenarios,
building in resilience lowers the increased
energy costs by £5-6bn, or around 0.5% of
current GDP levels. Most of this would be
imported energy. The total impact of the
$100/barrel price increase would be around
£42bn, or almost 4% of GDP in both the
REF and LC scenarios, of which resilience
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Table 3.11: Fossil fuel dependence in 2025 (PJ) and impact of a $100/barrel oil price rise 
Oil Gas Coal TOTAL
REF 2299 3112 2161 7572
R 1933 2706 1655 6294
Reduction in R 366 406 506 1278
Reduced economic impact £3.0bn £2.6bn £0.9bn £6.5bn
LC 2280 3262 1262 6804
LCR 1933 2725 1706 6364
Reduction in LCR 347 537 -444 440
Reduced economic impact (£bn) £2.8bn £3.4bn -£0.8bn £5.4bn
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would save about 12%. This demonstrates
the economic benefits of building in
resilience.
Policies for Resilience
Resilience requires diversity of energy
supply and therefore investment in a range
of energy sources. It also requires
investment in electricity and gas
infrastructure over and above what might
be required for decarbonisation alone. It
also requires a greater emphasis on
demand reduction than purely low-carbon
scenarios, which tend to emphasise
decarbonisation of energy supply.
The demand reduction points will be picked
up in the final chapter of this report. Here
the emphasis will be on the issue of
investment, and the policies that are
required to ensure that it is delivered in
the quantity and form required for a
resilient energy system.
The presumption underlying UK energy
policy is that the first choice of delivery of
energy services is through competitive
energy markets (see, for example, DTI
2007, p.137: “We believe the UK’s energy
needs are best delivered by a liberalised
energy market. The Government’s role is to
set the overall market and regulatory
framework that enables companies to
make timely investments consistent with
the Government’s policy goals on climate
change and security of energy supplies.”)
However, it is also clear that where there
are market failures, Government
intervention may seek to rectify these.
Where the failures are in respect of
inadequate competition, the intervention is
likely to take the form of regulation. Where
they involve externalities or public goods,
public policy may seek to address them
through regulation, economic instruments
or some other intervention. To the extent
that energy system resilience, or security,
is a public good and Helm (2003, p.260),
for example has written with regard to the
electricity system: “Security of supply... is
a system property with important public-
goods characteristics.”, then public
intervention to provide it to the desired
extent is clearly justified. This statement
applies equally to the gas system.
However, there is clearly room for debate
over both the nature and extent of that
intervention, the outcome of which will
have a considerable influence on the
institutional structure of the energy system
and how public policy seeks to act through
it.
Resilience and the network industries
In the UK energy system, the supply of
energy-using equipment, from machinery
to vehicles to household appliances, has
long been left almost entirely to a market
regulated only in terms of health and
safety characteristics (though some
equipment is now environmentally
regulated too). The retail supply of energy
carriers (fossil fuels, biomass and
electricity) was the subject of privatisation
in the 1980s and these markets have been
progressively deregulated, so that there is
now no formal price regulation, although
energy prices can be subject to substantial
and overt political pressure. However,
energy supply is subject to regulatory
oversight by the gas and electricity
markets regulator, Ofgem. Ofgem has a
direct role in price regulation of the gas
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and electricity distribution and transmission
companies, for whom competition is either
very restricted or non-existent. 
Ofgem’s price regulation of gas and
electricity distribution and transmission has
important implications for energy system
resilience because this resilience requires
investment, on which the transmission and
distribution companies need to make a
return. This investment must be permitted
by Ofgem in the regular price reviews
relating to the companies, through which
the companies are allowed to adjust their
prices to generate the return. Ofgem
(2009) has just initiated a consultative
process to address fundamental questions
about the existing regulatory framework
and whether it provides enough
encouragement for network companies to
help deliver broader social and
environmental objectives.
In relation to policy for investment for
energy system resilience, there are three
possible models:
1. Government provides the appropriate
framework for the market to make the
investment (the model through which
electricity supply and gas storage and
international pipelines are supposed to
be provided)
2. The regulator permits the investment
through price reviews, but the
investment is provided by the
regulated companies (this is the model
for electricity and gas transmission and
distribution)
3. Government carries out the investment
itself (this was the principal model
before privatisation)
Internationally, recent events have
indicated two main challenges to energy
system resilience from events outside the
UK: physical supply disruption (as occurred
recently with Russian gas) and energy
price spikes (as occurred in 2007/08, and
are widely predicted to occur again as and
when energy demand picks up after the
economic downturn).
Government policy to address these
challenges to energy security (DTI 2007,
p.35) consists of “promoting open,
competitive energy markets” in the
European Union (EU) and other regions;
planning for unforeseen contingencies such
as major disruptions (perhaps, in the case
of gas, through ensuring that enough
storage is available; “driving investment” in
a diverse range of (low-carbon)
technologies (although from the above it is
clear that the investment itself will actually
take place through market decisions); and
“promoting policies to improve energy
efficiency”. The international approach is
therefore very similar to that being
pursued in the UK. This is the approach
which will therefore be focused on here.
As discussed above, the core resilience
issues of reliability and redundancy in the
electricity system (given the very limited
current electricity storage options) are
reflected in the capacity margin (the gap
between generating capacity and peak
power demand), which is an important
parameter in all the models used in the
analysis in this chapter. 
Current UK Government policy is to deliver
an adequate capacity margin by having a
licensing obligation on power companies to
meet energy demands, and then relying on
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markets, through price signals, to deliver
the capacity that may only be rarely used,
but will then command a high price for
power generated.  One alternative to this
approach is to make explicit capacity
payments for plant that may not be much
used. The desirability and efficiency of this
is still the subject of debate and involves
complex economic arguments related to the
functioning of markets that are outside the
scope of this paper (see Oren 2000 for
some of these). Another approach is to
allow the network companies to earn a
regulated rate of return on generation plant
that supports system stability. The current
capacity margin appears to be adequate,
but there are anxieties about the adequacy
of current market arrangements to provide
back-up capacity in the context of the
large-scale expansion of renewable energy.
With gas and oil, storage capacity is key to
resilience. As with the capacity margin, the
current approach of the UK Government is
to expect market signals to provide the
incentive to invest in such capacity. For
gas, the fossil fuel over which there is the
principal security of supply concern,
National Grid breaks down supply into UK
Continental Shelf (declining), imports
(increasing) and storage, while imports are
distinguished by supply type (Norway,
Continent and LNG) and import route (the
various pipelines to Norway and elsewhere
on the European mainland, and LNG), but
not, interestingly, by country of origin. The
market approach to the provision of supply
infrastructure has had some success over
the past few years, with new pipelines to
Norway (Langeled) and The Netherlands
(Balgzand-Bacton) opening in 2006, and
two large LNG facilities at Milford Haven
expected to open in 2009. While storage
has been slower to increase, there is
expected to be very substantial
construction over 2010-14, such that by
2018 there will be storage space for some
10% of UK projected annual demand
(DECC 2008a, p.72).
Efficiency and diversity
In contrast to gas storage and the capacity
margin, which have long been a policy
focus, the role of diversity and energy
efficiency/productivity in promoting energy
system resilience has been given less
attention. These are the areas which have
therefore been given particular attention in
the analysis above. In particular it has
been specified that a resilient energy
system requires diversity in primary
energy, diversity in the power sector,
diversity in end-use technologies and lower
energy intensity. Focusing here on supply,
in a centrally-driven energy system it
would be relatively easy in principle to
ensure energy system diversity by building
capacity of different types of plant. In a
market-driven context, such as that
currently in place in the UK, such an
outcome may be more difficult to ensure.
The key question is therefore how policy
can ensure that the private sector comes
forward with the required investment in
diverse supply sources, which will also
need to be low-carbon if they are to be
consistent with carbon reduction targets.
Chapter 2 made clear that there is a range
of (low-carbon) options for energy and
electricity supply. Primary energy sources
include the fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural
gas), uranium, various renewables (of which
onshore and offshore wind, biomass and
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possibly large tidal seem likely to play the
largest role, although microgeneration
technologies may also make a contribution).
In transport, oil is dominant, but for the
future it is possible that electricity will have
a major role, either directly or through the
production of hydrogen by electrolysis. For
heat, natural gas plays the largest role
(although biomass could substitute for this
to some extent), so that the substantial use
of natural gas also for power generation
may present issues of diversity and security
of supply. Electricity may be generated by
any of the above primary energy sources,
although in a low-carbon world the use of
fossil fuels for this will require effective
carbon capture and storage (CCS)
technology to be deployed as well. As is
seen in the next chapter, a carbon constraint
in the absence of CCS very substantially
reduces the electricity options available. This
could lead to significant diversity issues.
There are therefore three broad policy
priorities if the supply side of a resilient
(and low-carbon) energy system is to be
realised. The first is to prove the required
technologies technically at a commercial
scale. There is still work to be done here
on all the large-scale centralised low-
carbon electricity options that are closest
to deployment (offshore wind, new nuclear
and CCS), as well as much more to be
done on less developed renewables such as
marine technologies. There is a critically
important role here for research,
development and demonstration (RD&D)
policy. Energy research funding in the UK
collapsed in the 1990s, and has only
recently been somewhat increased from
very low levels. It is very important that it
is not reduced again, but continues to
increase, in the times of public spending
constraint that seem likely to ensue
because of current fiscal deficits.
The second priority is to ensure that the
required financial incentives are in place for
the private sector to make large-scale
investments in technologies which are not
yet competitive with fossil fuels. The
carbon price established through the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is
currently far from robust enough to provide
the required incentive. Clearly, with regard
to renewable electricity, the Renewables
Obligation did not do so either, and may or
may not do so with the banding of the
Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROCs)
that is now being introduced. The success
or otherwise of this must be very closely
monitored, so that the incentive can be
swiftly adjusted if it becomes clear that it
is not sufficient, for example, for the very
large and fast deployment of offshore wind
turbines that will be necessary to meet the
EU renewables target for 2020.
The third priority is to ensure that there
are no non-financial constraints to the
deployment of the different desired
capacity options. Such constraints are
neither easy to identify nor easy to
remove, as is clear from the analysis of the
UK’s experience with onshore wind energy
in IEA 2008 (p.17). Despite having among
the highest remuneration levels for
onshore wind in Europe, the UK has among
the lowest deployment levels, and this is
put down to non-financial constraints. 
The policy conclusions on the supply and
infrastructure aspects of energy system
resilience are therefore broadly as follows.
The current policy approach seems able to
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bring forward adequate investment for the
private sector to build enough capacity and
infrastructure to meet overall levels of UK
energy demand, but is clearly struggling to
ensure adequate diversity and adequate
low-carbon sources in this new capacity –
left to itself proposals for new electricity
plant capacity could easily be dominated by
coal and gas. The major delivery issues
around the low-carbon technologies that
are also required for energy system
resilience are ensuring technical readiness
for large-scale commercial deployment,
adequate financial incentives for the
private sector for that commercial
deployment to take place, and the timely
removal of non-financial barriers to that
deployment so that it is not delayed or
prevented. Resolving these delivery issues
surrounding the major low-carbon sources
of energy supply are the core policy
imperatives for a low-carbon energy
system, as was seen in Chapter 2. They
turn out to be no less important for energy
system resilience as well.
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Key Messages
■ This chapter analyses the prospects for
accelerated development of a range of
emerging low-carbon energy supply
technologies – and the possible impact
of this on UK energy system
decarbonisation 
■ The results suggest that technology
acceleration could have a major
influence on decarbonisation, by
introducing new decarbonisation
pathways with significantly increased
contributions from renewables and
hydrogen fuel cells in the longer-term 
■ The overall impacts of accelerated
technology development are complex,
changing over time as different low-
carbon supply options are made
available, and as overall
decarbonisation ambitions increase.
Raising the decarbonisation ambition
from 60% to 80% does not mean
doing ‘more of the same’ – it
introduces new technology preferences
and research priorities
■ The ‘learning potential’ of emerging
technologies over long timescales
implies that short-term targets for
technology deployment may be
inconsistent with the most economically
desirable long-term decarbonisation
pathways
■ Although it carries shorter-term
implications for system planning and
innovation support, supply side
technology acceleration only has major
impacts on deployment over the
longer-term, especially after 2030. In
the shorter-term, decarbonisation will
require other responses, such as
demand reduction, improved energy
efficiency, and making best use of
more mature supply technologies
■ The analysis suggests that technology
acceleration could substantially reduce
the overall cost of decarbonisation,
especially for achieving 80%
decarbonisation. Over the forty years
2010-2050, accelerated development is
associated with a total saving in the
‘welfare costs’ of achieving 80%
decarbonisation of £36bn. Most of this
benefit accrues in the longer-term,
after 2030 
■ The overall benefits to the UK of
accelerated development appear to
considerably outweigh the investment
costs, suggesting that the UK should
participate fully in global efforts at low-
carbon technology innovation 
■ The results suggest that greatly
expanded levels of spending on low-
carbon energy supply RD&D (Research,
Development and Demonstration) in
the UK is justified, as part of wider
international efforts.  The suggested
savings associated with technology
acceleration could be translated into an
annual budget for additional UK RD&D
investment  of around £1bn – an order
of magnitude greater than current
public spending levels – although much
of this would need to be committed
well before significant ‘returns’ start
appearing after 2030
4. Technology Acceleration
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Introduction: Innovation and
Decarbonisation
This chapter focuses on the prospects for
accelerated development of a range of
emerging low-carbon energy supply
technologies – and the possible impact of
this acceleration on decarbonising the UK
energy system. The technologies analysed
here include a number of renewables (wind
power, marine energy, solar PV and
bioenergy) and other emerging low-carbon
technologies (advanced designs of nuclear
power, carbon capture and storage (CCS)
and hydrogen/fuel cells). 
The research has involved bringing
together detailed understandings of specific
energy supply technologies, and insights
on energy system change provided by
system modelling and innovation studies.
More specifically, the research has involved
devising accelerated technology
development scenarios of UK energy
system decarbonisation (which assume
high levels of technological progress over
time), and then comparing these with non-
accelerated equivalent scenarios. 
Any comprehensive response to the
decarbonisation challenge must consider
how to best support the development of
emerging low-carbon energy supply
technologies. For many countries, however,
these capacities have been eroded over
recent history. As outlined in Chapter 1,
levels of funding for energy RD&D and
support for national research facilities
declined sharply after the mid-1980s,
associated with a collapse in oil and gas
prices and the liberalisation of the energy
sector. 
More recently, growing concerns about
climate change and energy security have
prompted increased spending on energy
RD&D, and global investment in
sustainable energy technologies rose by
over 50% in 2007 (UNEP, 2008). Although
this upward trend is being affected by oil
and gas price fluctuations and the general
economic downturn, the challenge of
climate change provides a long-term
imperative for investment in low-carbon
technology development. 
Already, the recent resurgence in energy-
related innovation activity globally has
encouraged the emergence of a large
number of prospective low-carbon energy
supply technologies, supported by
particular policy initiatives, investment
programmes, developer firms and research
institutions. There are many difficulties in
systematically assessing this activity, and
technologies which are routinely compared
in debates on energy futures may be at
different stages of development, depend on
varied natural resources, and have
different implications for power storage and
distribution.
Energy systems tend to inertia and path
dependency. This means that without
major political, institutional or economic
interventions, the UK energy system will
‘lock-in’ around existing technologies and
fuels. Energy production in the UK has
historically been highly dependent on fossil
fuels, and this remains the case today.
While coal use has declined steadily since
1970, gas and electricity consumption have
substantially increased, and petroleum has
been the single most significant end-use
fuel throughout the past 30-40 years. In
the electricity sector, coal-fired generation
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made up two-thirds of electricity produced
in the UK as recently as 1990 (BERR,
2008). Since then, natural gas has also
become an important fuel for electricity
production, although conventional coal-
fired generation remains significant,
despite high levels of associated CO2
emissions. Renewable energy technologies
have only ever been a very minor
contributor to energy production in the UK.
The Accelerated Technology
Development Scenarios
The research summarised here has
involved devising accelerated technology
development (ATD) scenarios of UK energy
system decarbonisation (which assume
high levels of technological progress over
time), and comparing these with non-
accelerated equivalent scenarios. Given the
uncertainties involved in the rate and
direction of technological change, the
results should be seen as illustrating the
possible impact of supply side technology
progress, rather than a detailed mapping
out of system change over the next decade
or beyond. The ATD scenario set is listed in
Table 4.1 showing the specific technologies
addressed, and the percentage CO2
reductions involved, relative to 1990
emissions. A more detailed account of the
ATD scenarios is provided in a UKERC
research report (Winskel et al., 2009).
For each technology, the prospects for
accelerated development were considered
by devising narratives of technology
development, highlighting potential trends
and breakthroughs in availability,
performance and cost from now to 2050.
These narratives were developed by
technology specialists using research
landscape and roadmap reports produced
for the UKERC Research Atlas1, and other
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Table 4.1: Accelerated technology development (ATD) scenario set2
Non-accelerated Baseline Scenarios (60% and 80%):
• LC Core 60, LC Core 80
Single Technology ATD Scenarios (all 60%):
Renewables
• ATD Wind
• ATD Marine
• ATD Solar PV
• ATD Bioenergy
Other Low-Carbon Supply Technologies
• ATD Nuclear Power (Fission and Fusion)
• ATD Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)
• ATD Hydrogen and Fuel Cells
Aggregated ATD Scenarios (60% and 80%):
• LC Renew (all four renewable technologies accelerated)
• LC Acctech (all seven low-carbon technologies accelerated
1The UKERC Research Atlas is available at http://ukerc.rl.ac.uk/ERA001.html
2This chapter uses variations on the core scenario names used in the rest of this report in order to distinguish between different
accelerated development scenarios: LC-RCEP is called LC Core 60 and LC is called LC Core 80.
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expert views and reports. For each
narrative, a corresponding set of data was
then devised to enable representation of
technology acceleration in Markal energy
system modelling, in terms, for example,
of reduced capital or operating costs,
improved efficiency, or earlier availability of
advanced designs. The differences in input
data between non-accelerated and
accelerated modelling scenarios are
discussed in detail in a UKERC 2050
research report (Winskel et al., 2009).
For each accelerated technology,
assumptions were made about how
accelerated progress in research and
development might result in improved
performance, lower costs, or earlier
availability of more advanced designs. For
example, Figure 4.1 shows how accelerated
technology development was assumed to
affect the capital costs for solar
photovoltaics over time.
Impact of Accelerated Development on
Deployment
Accelerated development opens up
alternative pathways for achieving UK
energy system decarbonisation, especially
over the longer-term. The pace of
technology development means that, in the
short term (to 2020), accelerated
development has only minor impacts on
the UK energy mix. Over the medium
term, to 2035, more diverse supply
portfolios emerge in accelerated scenarios,
and in the longer-term, to 2050,
accelerated technology development makes
a very significant impact, with some
accelerated technologies playing a much
greater role. In attempting to map out
desirable decarbonisation pathways for the
UK, it is important that the potential for
accelerated technology development be
taken into account.
Different technologies contribute at
different times in the ATD scenarios. Coal-
fired generation using carbon capture and
storage (CCS) plays a major part in the UK
energy supply mix after 2020 in both
accelerated and non-accelerated scenarios.
Other technologies only show high levels of
deployment in accelerated scenarios:
bioenergy technologies have an important
role across power, heating and transport in
the medium and longer terms, after 2020.
Offshore wind and marine renewables are
also deployed to a much greater extent in
accelerated development scenarios,
although this impacts mostly after 2030
(and after 2040 for solar PV). Accelerated
hydrogen fuel cells development has a key
long-term impact on transport sector
decarbonisation after 2030. Accelerated
development of nuclear power allows for a
more sustained nuclear contribution over
time than in non-accelerated scenarios
(Table 4.2). It is important to note that
these results reflect, in-part, assumed
progress incorporated in the non-
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Table 4.2: Summary of technology specific impacts of acceleration
Overall Role in Accelerated Technology Specific Technologies Involved
Development (ATD) Scenarios
Wind power acceleration has major long-term Offshore wind has a significant medium and
impact (and moderate medium term impact) major long-term role in ATD scenarios.
in single technology and Acctech 80 scenarios. Shorter-term deployment is relatively modest.
Marine energy (wave and tidal flow) acceleration Initial deployment led by tidal flow, with wave
has major long-term impact (and moderate energy becoming dominant after 2030.
medium term impact) in single technology Longer-term deployment of both wave and
and Acctech 80 scenarios. First deployment tidal flow is constrained by resource
much earlier than in non-accelerated scenarios. assumptions.
Solar PV acceleration has major long-term Third generation organic solar cells have a
impact in single technology scenario; moderate significant long-term role. Earlier
impact in aggregated scenarios.  deployments of first and second generation
solar cells are not represented in the ATD
scenarios, but may be anticipated in practice.
Nuclear power acceleration has moderate Generation III Fission reactors have
medium and long-term impact in single significant medium and long-term role. Later
technology scenarios; ATD assumptions are generations of fission reactors (III+ and IV)
relatively modest, and long-term deployment not represented in ATD scenarios, but their
reduces in aggregated accelerated scenarios deployment may be anticipated over the
compared to non-accelerated equivalent longer-term.
scenarios; much greater role if is CCS excluded. Fusion ATD assumptions are relatively
modest; projected fusion deployment is 
post-2050.
Coal CCS has major medium and long-term role The ATD modelling assumptions do not 
with or without acceleration. Core scenario explicitly distinguish between different forms
assumptions are relatively aggressive, and were of CCS technology. Long-term impact is
left essentially unchanged for ATD scenario. sensitive to assumed capture rate. 
Hydrogen fuel cells acceleration has a major ATD modelling assumptions for transport fuel
long-term impact on transport sector cells relate primarily to polymer electrolyte 
decarbonisation. Fuel cell power generation membrane (PEM) hydrogen fuel cells (HFCs),
has minor role with or without acceleration. although other types are also included in the
analysis. 
Bioenergy acceleration has major medium and Significant medium and long-term impact,
long-term impacts. Biomass resources are limited arising from bioengineering improvements to
and their preferred uses are sensitive to overall energy crops and improved gasification
decarbonisation ambition, and the evolving technology; second generation ligno-
availability of other low-carbon supply cellulosic ethanol technology is also deployed 
technologies over time. in ATD scenarios.
For example, preferred use of bioenergy
resources in 2050:
- in LC Acctech 80 (without fuel cells): transport
- in LC Acctech 80 (with fuel cells): heat and
transport.
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accelerated Core scenarios. For example,
there are relatively aggressive assumptions
about the pace of CCS development in the
core scenarios. (Additional scenarios were
therefore produced to illustrate
decarbonisation pathways in the absence of
CCS, or delayed availability of CCS).
The impact of accelerated development
varies for the different technologies
analysed here. For example, in the non-
accelerated LC scenario wind power
deployment levels remain modest, with
under 20GW deployed by 2050. In the LC-
Acctech 80 case, however, there is a
dramatic rise in wind power installed in the
longer-term, with c.70GW installed by
2050, providing just over one third of all
power supplied in 2050 (Figure 4.2).
Similarly, much greater (and earlier) levels
of deployment of marine energy are seen
in the ATD Marine and Acctech scenarios
(Figure 4.3). (Note that assumed resource
constraints on marine energy mean that
there is no increase in deployment as the
overall decarbonisation ambition increases
from 60% to 80%.)
Wider Impacts of Accelerated
Development on Energy System
Decarbonisation
The overall impacts of accelerated
technology development are complex,
changing over time as different low-carbon
supply options are made available, and as
overall decarbonisation ambitions increase.
For example, accelerated development of
fuel cells changes the relative
attractiveness of decarbonising different
energy services, and the supply
technologies (and associated research
needs) involved. The most attractive
supply technologies, and associated
research priorities, are also sensitive to the
overall level of decarbonisation ambition.
Raising the decarbonisation ambition from
60% to 80% does not simply mean doing
‘more of the same’ – it introduces new
technology preferences and research
priorities. For example, the preferred use
of bioenergy resources switches between
electricity, heating and transport, according
to the overall level of decarbonisation
ambition and the availability of alternative
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ways of decarbonising particular energy
services. 
In terms of decarbonisation by sector, the
electricity supply sector decarbonises first
and most thoroughly, and is substantially
decarbonised by 2030 in all 80% scenarios,
with or without accelerated technology
development. Other carbon-intensive
energy services (especially transport, but
also residential demand) decarbonise in the
medium and longer terms. Accelerated
development makes some difference to this
broad pattern. For example, the
introduction of fuel cells acceleration is
associated with greater decarbonisation of
transport (and reduced decarbonisation of
the residential sector) over the longer-
term.
The same broad pattern of declining overall
energy demand over time, as the energy
system decarbonises, is followed with or
without accelerated technology
development (although primary energy
demand in 2050 remains slightly higher in
accelerated development scenarios). Within
this, renewable electricity provides a much
greater proportion of primary energy
demand by 2050 in accelerated scenarios:
almost 20% in LC Acctech 80, compared to
under 5% in LC. Gas and coal remain
important primary fuels in 2050 with or
without acceleration, although gas has
much reduced demand over time, and oil is
almost absent from the energy mix by
2050.
Final energy demand declines substantially
after 2030 in both accelerated and non-
accelerated scenarios, but by 2050, final
energy demand by fuel has changed
significantly in accelerated development
scenarios, with higher demand for
hydrogen, biomass and natural gas (the
latter used in sectors which decarbonise
least, such as industry and services), and
lower final demand for electricity, petrol,
ethanol/methanol and biodiesel.
Accelerated fuel cells development has a
major influence on these changes,
increasing demand for hydrogen and
reducing final demand for electricity and
biodiesel in transport.
In terms of final energy demand by sector,
accelerated technology development again
makes a significant difference over the long
term. In the non-accelerated LC scenario,
residential energy demand almost halves
between 2035 and 2050 – a key
contributor to long-term system
decarbonisation. In LC Acctech 80,
however, residential energy demand
declines much less steeply – only by
around 20% between 2035 and 2050. The
difference between accelerated and non-
accelerated scenarios in terms of fuel mix
is most pronounced in the transport sector.
By 2050, the introduction of accelerated
fuels cells development means that
hydrogen has become the dominant
transport fuel in the accelerated scenario
(Figure 4.4).3
Costs and Benefits of Acceleration
The modelling results offer some indication
of the overall advantages of supply side
technology acceleration in energy system
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decarbonisation. These advantages accrue
mostly in the long term, as accelerated
development enables more affordable ways
to achieve deeper decarbonisation. Two
parameters – the marginal cost of CO2
abatement, and the overall ‘welfare cost’ of
decarbonisation – provide some
quantification of this benefit. Given the
high levels of uncertainty embedded in the
scenarios, especially over the longer-term,
these figures can only offer a broad
illustration of the possible benefits of
accelerated development, for selected
technologies under assumptions of high
levels of progress. 
The marginal cost of carbon abatement
increases over the longer-term as
progressively more expensive carbon
abatement options are deployed. In the
accelerated development scenarios,
however, this increase is considerably less
than in non-accelerated equivalent
scenarios – by 2050, the marginal cost of
CO2 abatement is around £130/tonne in
accelerated development scenarios,
compared to £170/tonne in the non-
accelerated scenario.
The results suggest that technology
acceleration may also substantially reduce
the overall societal cost of decarbonisation,
especially for 80% scenarios (see Figure
4.5). Over the forty years 2010-2050,
accelerated development is associated with
a total saving in the ‘welfare costs’ of
achieving 80% decarbonisation of £36bn.
Most of this benefit accrues in the longer-
term, after 2030. This ‘saving’ should be
benchmarked against the added
investment costs of accelerated
development, in terms of additional spend
on RD&D to realise accelerated
performance improvements and cost
reductions. 
In practice, this comparison is far from
straightforward, given that the investments
associated with technology acceleration will
be made internationally. However, research
by the International Energy Agency on the
international costs of accelerated
technology development suggests that the
overall benefits to the UK of accelerated
development considerably outweigh the
investment costs (IEA, 2008). From a
purely UK perspective, the suggested
savings associated with low-carbon
technology acceleration could be translated
into an annual budget for additional UK
RD&D investment in low-carbon technology
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development of around £1bn per annum
(an order of magnitude greater than
current annual public spending levels) –
although much of this investment would
need to be committed well before
significant ‘returns’ start appearing after
2030. 
Electricity Supply Sector
For all 80% scenarios, the electricity supply
sector undergoes near complete
decarbonisation over the period 2010-
2030. After 2030, low-carbon electricity is
used to enable decarbonisation of transport
and residential sectors. Accelerated
technology development introduces
alternative pathways for decarbonising the
UK power system in the longer-term, and
is associated with significantly increased
contributions from renewable technologies
such as marine, solar PV and especially
offshore wind power (Figure 4.6). 
The results also suggest that achieving
80% decarbonisation ambition may involve
the development a much larger UK power
supply industry over the long term. While
this expansion is seen with or without
accelerated development, it is much more
pronounced in accelerated development
scenarios, with installed capacity doubling
in the long term between 2030 and 2050.
This growth is associated with the much
greater deployment of renewables
(especially offshore wind power) and
hydrogen/fuel cells technologies under
accelerated development assumptions.
Given relatively aggressive assumptions
about the cost and availability of CCS in
the core scenarios, additional scenarios
were generated to allow for delayed or
non-availability of this still emergent
technology. Because low-carbon electricity
may be an important enabler of system-
wide decarbonisation in the ATD scenarios,
the absence of an important potential
source of low-carbon power, such as CCS,
has significant effects across the energy
system. The overall pattern of energy
service demands and associated carbon
emission reductions are significantly
altered if CCS is assumed to be
unavailable. Decarbonisation scenarios
without CCS feature less overall demand
for electricity, reduced take-up of hydrogen
fuel cells, and a switching of bioenergy
resources from residential heating to
transport. The power sector technology mix
also changes significantly in the absence of
CCS, with nuclear power and renewables
assuming significantly expanded roles in
power system decarbonisation (Figure 4.7).
Delayed commercialisation of CCS (to after
2030) reduces its long-term market share
as decarbonisation ambitions increase (and
residual emissions from CCS become
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significant) and also as other low-carbon
supply technologies mature.
Summary and Conclusions
The scenarios summarised here allow a
structured exploration and illustration of the
potential of emerging supply technologies
to contribute to UK energy system
decarbonisation. The results suggest that
accelerated development of emerging
technologies could allow for more affordable
and diverse decarbonisation, especially over
the longer-term. In attempting to map out
desirable decarbonisation pathways for the
UK, it is important to take this potential
into account.
Although it carries shorter-term
implications for system planning and
innovation support, supply side technology
acceleration only changes deployment
patterns over the longer-term. This future
promise does not imply delaying action to
combat climate change until more
affordable and better performing supply
side options become available: investing in
longer-term supply options should be seen
as a complement rather than replacement
for shorter-term actions. Indeed, the
results suggest that shorter-term
decarbonisation and low-carbon technology
deployment, over the next decade, require
responses from other system drivers and
opportunities, such as demand reduction,
improved energy efficiency, greater focus
on renewable heat, and making best use of
more mature supply technologies (by
investing in supply chain and installation
capacity, and institutional reforms
regarding planning and regulation
procedures). 
The results from the scenarios come
nowhere near achieving the policy targets
for renewables deployment, especially in
the short term to 2020. In particular,
realising the very high levels of renewables
deployment by 2020 mandated by the EC
renewables directive (CEC, 2008) will
require policy support measures and
market interventions that go well beyond
those embedded in the scenarios presented
here. At the same time, the ‘learning
potential’ of emerging technologies over
longer timescales, explored here, imply
that short-term targets for technology
deployment may be inconsistent with the
most economically desirable long-term
decarbonisation pathways, but may direct
the energy system into less attractive
pathways, from a longer-term perspective. 
Managing possible trade-offs between short
and long-term policy ambitions involves
many uncertainties, including the
interaction between technology
development (to drive learning-by-
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research) and technology deployment (to
drive learning-by-experience). Large-scale
deployment of more mature low-carbon
supply technologies over the next decade
offers significant improvement in their cost
and performance. However, more mature
technologies typically offer less scope for
major cost reductions or performance
improvements than more emergent
technologies. 
For policy, this suggests the need for
parallel support of both deployment
(market-pull) and development
(technology-push), but with a much
greater levels of spending on RD&D than at
present. Expanded long term international
support for low-carbon innovation should
support diversity both across emerging
technology fields (e.g. different types of
renewables or low-carbon fossil fuels) and
within technology fields (such as different
types of PV cells or fuel cells). This
investment promises substantial long term
benefit to society in addressing the
challenge of decarbonisation. For the UK,
the results suggest than an order of
magnitude increase on annual spending on
energy RD&D (from £100m to £1bn) may
be justified.
In the accelerated development scenarios,
expanded and sustained international
investment in RD&D has major long-term
effects on the cost and performance of
renewables and other low-carbon supply
options, so that their longer-term
deployment becomes much less dependent
on market subsidies. As well as the specific
investment needs associated with the
technologies analysed here, there is a need
for parallel support for enabling
technologies and techniques not analysed
here, such as innovative types of power
storage, network management, distributed
generation and demand side management.
In summary, accelerating the development
of emerging low-carbon energy supply
technologies promises significant long-term
reward, in enabling alternative and more
affordable decarbonisation. It may well also
offer wider benefits in terms of diversity,
security and sustainability. Realising this
potential will require the UK to participate
fully in global efforts at low-carbon
technology innovation – this investment
promises a substantial return in the longer-
term. Given the uncertainties involved
here, there are no simple messages in
terms of ‘picking winners’: most of the
technologies analysed here – and many
others not included – have a significant
potential role. The need is for greatly
expanded and sustained international
support of a broad range of emerging low-
carbon technologies, with the UK playing a
committed role as a developer and
deployer in the wider international context. 
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attention on demand reduction 
policies
■ The implications of a scenario where
technologies are constrained if they are
seen to harm ecosystem services could
be particularly costly. A range of
technologies and fuels (fossil, bio-
energy, tidal barrages) would be
affected. Globally, fossil fuel prices
could rise as a result of certain
extraction options being excluded
Environmental Impacts of Low-Carbon
and Resilient Energy Scenarios
Energy systems, along with other human
activities, interact with the environment in
a number of well documented ways
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).
The interactions vary according to spatial
and temporal scales and are dependent on
both the magnitude of the driver and the
ecosystem or organism being impacted.
Within the first phase of UKERC a
pragmatic approach was taken to make an
initial examination of the environmental
pressures generated by different energy
scenarios. 
The analysis summarised below aggregates
the operational emissions of eight
dominant pollutants (CO2, CH4, CO, N2O,
NOx, SO2, PM10 and radioactivity) from
energy systems expected to be in
operation between 2000 and 2050.
Changes in pollutant emissions are
described for each of the MARKAL Energy
2050 Core scenarios (Reference (REF),
Low-Carbon (LC), Resilient (R) and Low-
Carbon Resilient (LCR)). The total load for
each pollutant was estimated by
Key Messages
■ Reducing CO2 emissions leads, for the
most part, to reductions in other
emissions and pressures on the
environment. The exceptions are
radioactive releases, stress on water
and land, and some aspects of air
quality
■ The development of bio-energy has a
number of environmental implications,
relating to air emissions, water
availability and land use
■ This is not a rationale for inaction on
achieving a low-carbon economy, but
signals areas in which further
regulatory attention will be required
■ Release of some pollutants, notably
sulphur dioxide, will fall substantially
■ A low-carbon strategy which
emphasises energy efficiency and
demand reduction will lead to
considerably lower environmental
impacts. Emissions of some pollutants
could be halved in comparison to a
supply-led strategy
■ People’s concerns about the
environmental impacts of energy
development can take several forms.
They include concern about local
impacts, fear of unfamiliar
technological solutions, or concern
about impacts on the natural
environment and ecosystem services
■ If people’s concerns inhibit the
development of certain technologies,
then the costs of meeting CO2 targets
will increase. It will focus more
5. Environmental Sensitivities
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Pollutant Emissions Under Different
Energy Scenarios
Overall, emissions of the eight pollutants
considered in this analysis decrease
between 2000-2020 with little variation
between the four Core scenarios. After
2020, the LCR scenario leads to
significantly lower total pollution emissions,
compared with the other Core scenarios.
This demonstrates that the combination of
a low-carbon pathway combined with a
more resilient energy system has wider
environmental and energy security
benefits.  The R scenario results in similar
pollutant emissions to LCR for seven of the
pollutants, but does not achieve the 80%
CO2 reduction target.  
When the pollutants are considered
individually it is also clear that there are
key areas where LCR outperforms LC in
reducing emissions.  CO, N2O, NOx and
PM10 emissions are significantly lower in
the LCR scenario post 2020, mainly due to
changes in the transport and residential
sectors.  The main differences between LC
and LCR are that LCR has greater demand
reduction particularly in the residential
sector, and greater penetration of hybrid
and electric cars. In contrast, LC has lower
demand reduction in all sectors; greater
biomass use for heating in the residential
and service sectors (increasing PM10, CH4
and CO); and greater use of transport
biofuels, as opposed to hybrid/electric cars
in the LCR scenario. The analysis detailed
below investigates these trends for each of
the pollutants studied.
aggregating the contributions from each of
the energy generating technologies and
uses for all sectors1. An important
assumption is that emissions factors for
each source and their associated
abatement technologies perform as they do
today, with a few exceptions relating to
known emissions reduction policies such as
the Large Combustion Plant Directive. As
technology improvements are likely to lead
to lower levels of emissions, the results
may show a ‘worst case’ interpretation.
Emissions from non-fuel sources and
components not included in MARKAL were
not considered here.  In addition, a
preliminary assessment of the altered
water demand and land take and upstream
carbon emissions for each scenario was
conducted. 
As the method adopted uses a
comprehensive matching of specific
technologies and activities to their
emissions, the results can be used to
compare changes in the environmental
pressures associated with different energy
generation and use strategies. This
comparison reveals that there are some
common trends across scenarios, but there
are also divergences between values.  With
care, these can be interpreted as the
implications of different energy decisions.
Although changes in the magnitude of the
pressures have been calculated, the impacts
of the pollutants can only be described in
general terms as the model has no spatial
component and employs a coarse temporal
representation (five-year time steps).
Consequently, the analysis should be viewed
as indicative rather than definitive.
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by 2025-30, resulting in a steady decline in
emissions. However, it is important to
recognise that only 2% of Britain’s
methane emissions are represented in
MARKAL (NAEI, 2006), with 80% of
existing emissions from waste
decomposition and livestock. There are
also other energy related methane sources
not represented in this assessment,
including gas leakage and methane from
coal mining. 
Most particulate (PM10) emissions are from
the transport and residential sectors;
within transport, diesel vehicles are the
main source of emissions. In LC, R and
LCR scenarios, total PM10 emissions halve
by 2050, in part through reduced diesel
consumption (Figure 5.2). However, in all
scenarios future technology developments
may decrease particulate emissions further.  
In the residential sector PM10 emissions fall
in all scenarios, by approximately 95%
between 2000-2030, due to the phasing
out of coal, oil and wood for heating.
However, in the LC scenario increased use
of biomass fuel in the residential sector
causes total emissions to rise by around
15% between 2030 and 2035 (Figure 5.2).
The combustion of coal releases sulphur
dioxide (SO2) and methane (CH4).
Consequently, SO2 emissions are
dominated by conventional coal-fired power
stations; other sources include coal used in
industry, and fuel oil and petroleum coke
use in oil refineries. Coal power stations
with carbon capture and storage (CCS)
release very little SO2 as it has to be
removed to prevent it impeding the
capture process. Consequently, emissions
fall sharply in the LC and LCR scenarios
(Figure 5.1) as coal CCS is introduced and
becomes a dominant technology between
2020-2035. They fall, but to a lesser
extent, in the REF and R scenarios, due to
continued use of conventional coal-fired
power stations. However, the requirement
(from the EU Large Combustion Plant
Directive) for flue gas desulphurisation
(FGD) in conventional power stations after
2015, does reduce emissions by about
85%.
Initially in MARKAL, CH4 emissions are
dominated by the residential sector’s use of
coal and solid smokeless fuel for heating.
In all four scenarios this use is phased out
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Figure 5.1: Total emissions of sulphur
dioxide (SO2) over time in the Core
scenarios
PM10
0
20
40
60
80
100
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
T
o
ta
l 
PM
1
0
 e
m
is
si
o
n
s 
(k
t)
REF LC R LCR
Figure 5.2: Total emissions of particulates
(PM10) in the Core scenarios
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and service sectors in 2035-2050. The
lowest CO emissions are found in the two
resilient scenarios (R, LCR), due to the
introduction of hybrid and plug-in cars, and
transport sector demand reductions.
Nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions increase
initially by the uptake of catalytic
converters in cars, the inverse of the effect
seen with CO (Figures 5.3, 5.4). Demand
reduction and the use of hybrid and plug-in
cars reduces emissions in the R and LCR
scenarios by 2025. The same factors
produce a later and smaller fall in
emissions in the LC scenario through the
increased use of hybrid and plug-in cars;
the REF scenario shows a continuing rise.
However, energy (as represented in
MARKAL) is only responsible for 20% of the
UK’s N2O emissions (NAEI, 2006), with
over half of UK emissions derived from
agricultural fertilisers.
Emissions of the other oxides of nitrogen
(NOx) are also dominated by the transport
sector (~50% of emissions), particularly
cars and HGVs. In all cases the emissions
show a decline, down to approximately
65% of 2000 emissions in LCR scenario by
The extent of this rise will depend on the
specific technologies used to reduce health
impacts in modern biomass boilers or
stoves. 
Energy use in transport generates a
number of different pollutant emissions and
is the dominant anthropogenic source of
carbon monoxide (CO) and the oxides of
nitrogen (nitrous oxide (N2O) and NOx).
However, each transport mode and fuel
type has its own distinct footprint, so for
example CO is mostly from petrol cars
whilst NOx splits more evenly between all
liquid fuel cars and HGVs. The increasing
use of catalytic converters in petrol cars
caused an initial decrease in CO emissions
in 2000-05 in all scenarios. The trend
continues through the addition of
bioethanol to the petrol fuel mix (Figure
5.3).
The residential sector provides another
source of CO emissions (approx 20% in
2000). Phasing out coal and solid
smokeless fuel use between 2000 and
2025-30 reduces CO emissions in all the
Core scenarios (Figure 5.3). Only the LC
scenario shows any reversal in the trend
due to the use of wood in the residential
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Figure 5.4: Total emissions of nitrous oxide
(N2O) in the Core scenarios
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Figure 5.3: Total emissions of carbon
monoxide (CO) in the Core scenarios 
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The need for such assessments will depend
upon where these increased discharges are
occurring and the extent to which
protected Natura 2000 sites are potentially
impacted. 
Relationship Between Pollutant
Emissions and Energy Demand
If there is a strong and robust relationship
between individual pollutant emissions and
total energy demand, then a simple rule of
thumb could be applied to describe
changes in environmental pressures from
different energy strategies. Although there
are strong positive correlations between all
of the pollutants and energy use, i.e.
greater demand creates more pollution;
the precise form of the relationship varies
between pollutants and scenarios.
To investigate this relationship, total annual
energy demand was plotted against
estimated pollutant emissions, with each
year represented as a point on the graph.
Values for CH4 (Figure 5.6) show a
generally tight curvilinear fit across all
scenarios, indicating that CH4 emissions
are strongly related to energy demand,
regardless of the scenario. In contrast, for
CO2 (Figure 5.7), there is a strong
correlation between energy demand and
emissions within individual scenarios, but
the trends of scenarios are significantly
different from each other. In the LC
scenario, technologies are selected with the
aim of minimising CO2 emissions, so on the
graph this scenario has the steepest slope,
due to large reductions in CO2 emissions
over time, despite little change in energy
demand.  In the R and LCR scenarios there
is a greater reduction in energy demand
over time, which means that less
2050 and a smaller reduction of 20% in
the REF scenario. Energy technologies and
uses (in MARKAL) are responsible for 80%
of our current NOx emissions. Emissions
not included in MARKAL are predominantly
from international aviation and shipping.
Radioactive releases considered are from
nuclear power stations, coal-fired power
stations and other sources such as oil and
gas platforms. Radioactive releases decline
in the REF scenario, as nuclear power
stations coming to the end of their life are
not replaced (Figure 5.5). In the other
scenarios, nuclear power stations are built
so emissions rise to varying extents after a
time lag due to the long planning and
construction time required. The highest
estimated discharge occurs in the LC
scenario resulting in a nearly three-fold
increase in discharges by 2050, matching
its tripling of power generation. All new
discharges would need to be assessed for
exposure to both humans and the
environment. Such increases may require
quite detailed assessments, where
appropriate, on the potential risk to
wildlife, with a focus on reducing current
uncertainties in the habitat assessments.
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Figure 5.5: Total radioactive releases in the
Core scenarios
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Wider Environmental Pressures
Further environmental pressures relate to
changing demand for water and land where
resource depletion and change in condition
are issues. Water is a power source (hydro
investment is required in low-carbon
technologies. Therefore, in these scenarios,
each PJ of energy used will produce higher
CO2 emissions than a PJ of energy used in
the LC scenario. 
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Figure 5.6: Relationship between emissions and energy demand between 2000 and 2050
for methane (CH4) in the Core scenarios 
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Figure 5.7: Relationship between emissions and energy demand between 2000 and 2050
for carbon dioxide (CO2) in the Core scenarios.  Arrows indicate the direction of change in
demand over time.
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be significantly deployed in the LC and LCR
scenarios, both rise to eventually use about
8% of the British land area – around a
third of our current arable land or more
than 10% of our total agricultural area
(including semi-natural extensive grazing
area). The impact of this change will be
dependent upon the location, condition and
habitat history of the land replaced.
Energy Scenarios with Socio-
Environmental Constraints
The environment is central to all future
energy scenarios; it supplies the resources
and receives the impacts of energy capture
and use. However, the environment has
another more subtle but equally powerful
influence over future energy systems;
public and stakeholder perceptions and
evaluation of the socio-environmental risks
and benefits of activities provide powerful
constraints and drivers of change. The
UKERC Energy 2050 Core scenarios
demonstrate how low-carbon and or
resilient energy systems can develop in the
UK to meet specific targets, but these
scenarios will require public buy-in and
acceptance if they are to become
established. In this study, three variant
scenarios were developed, in which some
aspect of this public buy-in is missing,
imposing an extra constraint on the
evolution of the energy system. The
variant scenarios (DREAD, ECO and NIMBY)
use the 80% Low-Carbon Core scenario
(LC) as a baseline. Thus, like LC all the
socio-environmental scenarios are
constrained to deliver an 80% reduction in
carbon emissions by 2050.
In the most extreme scenario, DREAD, the
deployment of certain technologies is
and pumped storage), and is used for
cooling in power stations and for
agricultural and forestry production of
energy crops and biofuels. A preliminary
analysis suggests that the LC scenario will
result in the largest increase in water
demand, driven by increased electricity
generation from coal CCS and nuclear
power, as well as the extensive production
of biofuels and energy crops. Water
demand for the agricultural production of
energy crops also increases in the LCR
scenario, while the REF and R scenarios
show the smallest increases in water
demand. 
The current perception of energy
generation systems is of a limited number
of power stations, refineries and mines
which only cause local environmental
impacts. New technologies can be far more
demanding in terms of area in which to
operate. Some technologies, such as wind
power, are capable of operating with other
land uses in a multi-functional way, whilst
others, such as bioenergy, can become
monocultures. The land take for bioenergy
in the Core scenarios is shown in Figure
5.8.  The scenarios show similar trends
through to 2030 where bioenergy starts to
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Figure 5.8: Land take for bioenergy in the
Core scenarios 
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public is unconvinced about the
sustainability merits of overseas
production and thus rejects it in an
attempt to protect rainforest and
threatened habitats. Further, in response
to ecological concerns about land use
change, the growth of crops is heavily
constrained to only 11% of the total
capacity considered to be available in the
LC scenario. There is also a 25%
constraint on wind power (onshore and
offshore) and wave and tidal power due to
concerns about the environmental impact
of those technologies in certain areas. In
addition, a tidal barrage is not allowed at
all in this scenario due to concerns about
potential damage to the environment.
NIMBY, or Not In My Back Yard, is the third
variant scenario. In this scenario the public
objective is to preserve the local
environment, lifestyle and systems. The
public rejects new developments when they
have a high visual impact, while existing
facilities are allowed to continue at their
current levels because they are already
accepted aspects of the landscape.
Consequently, nuclear power is allowed,
but no new nuclear sites are permitted,
there can only be redevelopment at
existing commercial reactor sites. Coal CCS
is a less familiar technology with no
existing plants. However, a limited number
of CCS plants are allowed in certain
locations where existing power plants and
infrastructure can be modified without
major aesthetic impacts. Onshore wind is
only permitted where windfarms are
already established or planning consent
has been awarded. Offshore wind is only
permitted where it has minimal visual
impact. Therefore, in the NIMBY scenario,
halted by public fears about how those
technologies could pose unknown but
potentially catastrophic dangers which
could threaten human life. In part
reinforced by the prospect of catastrophic
climate change, there is a general mistrust
of Government, regulatory bodies, the
scientific community and big business,
rooted in the assumption that all of these
have some cynical or self-interested
motive. Within this scenario novel and
‘threatening’ technologies are not
deployed, so there is no new nuclear build,
no CCS and no use of hydrogen for power
or transport. 
The second scenario variant, called ECO,
represents considerable public concern for
the conservation of ecosystem goods and
services with a consequence that there is
a financial cost for a sustainable lifestyle.
Peoples’ acceptance of energy systems is
built around a wider perception of
environmental costs of operation, including
imported feedstocks. In the ECO scenario,
fossil fuel prices are increased due to
concerns about the ecological impact of
certain types of fossil fuel extraction. For
instance, in this scenario, oil is not taken
from oil sands or other ecologically
sensitive areas. This leads to increased
global prices. Domestically, open-cast coal
mining is deemed to be too
environmentally damaging and is thus not
allowed after 2010. Bioenergy is only seen
as an option where the ecological impacts
can be minimised. Therefore, liquid bio-
fuel for transport is not allowed in the UK,
as it is considered to be inefficient and
requires intensive agricultural
management to deliver. Imported biomass
and biofuel are also banned because the
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Implications of the Socio-Environmental
Constraints 
The energy systems developed within the
three socio-environmental scenarios offer
different strategies to meet the 80%
decarbonisation target and address their
additional wider concerns. While all
scenarios initially decarbonise the power
system they employ different supply side
technologies which carry wider implications
across the entire energy system. As a
consequence of the additional socio-
environmental constraints, each scenario
then takes its own approach to
decarbonisation of different sectors. The
strategies employed are predominantly
reducing demand and making alternative
technology selections. The difference in
demand reduction strategies can be seen in
their electricity generation (Figure 5.9). 
offshore wind farms are only allowed to be
built beyond a 12 nautical mile coastal
buffer zone. Bioenergy production is
accepted so long as it maintains the
appearance of the existing landscape.
Consequently, energy crops such as
Miscanthus and short rotation coppice are
not allowed because they are unfamiliar
and would alter the character of the
landscape. The production of traditional
crops such as wheat and oil seed rape for
biofuel is constrained to 37% of the
potential production available in the LC
scenario due to the public’s resistance to
changing non-agricultural land to produce
more crops. Tidal barrages are not allowed
because of the way that they would change
the character and visual aesthetics of an
area. 
These environmental constraints are
summarised in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Summary of the additional constraints over those set in the LC scenario on the
energy sources for the socio-environmental scenarios. Empty cells indicate no additional
constraint
DREAD ECO NIMBY
Nuclear None allowed Only existing sites allowed
Fossil fuel price Increased cost
Coal CCS None allowed Limited sites
Hydrogen None allowed
Renewables
Wind Limited onshore Only far offshore allowed;
& offshore No new onshore planning
consent given
Bioenergy No imported biomass No energy crops allowed;
allowed; No biofuels allowed; Limited crop production
Limited crop production
Marine No tidal barrage allowed; No tidal barrage allowed
Limited tidal stream and wave
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power generating sources, but also bring
about reductions in demand. The most
stringent constraints were applied in the
DREAD variant and that shows the greatest
demand reduction. Primary energy demand
is reduced by 19% of the LC scenario,
As a result of the different pathways to
decarbonisation, the sectoral emissions of
CO2 show dramatic differences by 2050
with the ECO and DREAD scenarios
showing greatest divergence from both one
another and LC (Figure 5.10). For instance,
within ECO, the limits on transport set by
increased costs of fossil fuel and lack of
biofuel availability, counter-intuitively
forces the continuation of use of diesel and
petrol which produces higher transport
sector emissions and pushes other sectors
to reduce their emissions more than in the
other scenarios.
DREAD Scenario
To achieve the 80% reduction in carbon
emissions, each of the variants shows the
same general strategy employed in the LC
scenario of decarbonising the electricity
sector and then targeting transport and the
residential sector. The additional
constraints produce novel mixtures of
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A power supply system that is dominated
by a single generating source such as is
the case in DREAD is less likely to be
resilient. In this case the system is built
around high levels of wind power. Although
the operation is predominantly under UK
control, it risks both periods of still air and
threats of altered resource due to changes
in climate. Storage sounds to be an
attractive solution, but within this variant
less storage is employed than in the low-
carbon Core scenario (LC). Initially both
DREAD and the Core scenario use the
same quantity and type (storage heaters
and a little pumped hydro) but then after
2035, the level of plug-in hybrid vehicles in
DREAD is only about 60% of the total used
in the LC scenario. Here we have to
question the capability of the model
adequately to capture the opportunities of
supporting intermittent power sources; the
decrease in plug-in hybrid storage is
probably because electricity becomes so
expensive that there are better options for
transport.
To deliver the power needed, the model
employs two approaches: using power
more effectively (by getting better returns
for the energy used) and using less (by
reducing demand). The DREAD scenario
has a rapid increase in electricity
generation after 2040 yet this increase is
of a much lower magnitude than the
increase in the LC scenario after 2035.
Agriculture and industry maintain similar
levels of electricity demand in both
scenarios, but demand from the
residential, service and transport sectors all
fall. By 2050 in the DREAD scenario, a
quarter less electricity is used than in the
LC scenario.
nearly to the level in the low-carbon
resilient (LCR) Core scenario.
Not surprisingly, power generation under
the constraints imposed by DREAD is very
different than the LC Core scenario. The
power sector is not very diverse in the
DREAD scenario and is dominated by wind
power (offshore, onshore and
microgeneration); 84% of electricity is
generated by wind in 2050 with the bulk of
it offshore (Figure 5.11). As a
consequence, the system has a very low
base load (less than 10%) which is
balanced with back-up gas capacity. By
2050 over 60% of the installed capacity is
wind. This installed capacity of wind is
three times the size of gas capacity which
is installed as back-up. Achieving this type
of power sector would pose a substantial
challenge to society and would necessitate
advances in storage technology and smart
grids. This scenario therefore illustrates
that if a number of energy supply
technologies were constrained it could
become much more difficult to achieve the
UK’s 80% decarbonisation target.
Making the transition to a secure and low-carbon energy system     UKERC ENERGY 2050 PROJECT 97
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
20
20
25
20
30
20
35
20
40
20
45
20
50
P
J
Coal
Coal CCS
Gas
Gas CCS
Nuclear
Oil
Hydro
Wind
Biowaste & others
Imports
Marine
Solar PV
Storage
Total
Figure 5.11: Changes in the electricity
generating mix 2000-2050 in the DREAD
scenario variant
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uptake of coal CCS is significantly lower
than in the LC scenario; in 2050 there is
less than a third of the coal CCS seen in
the LC scenario. This reduction in the use
of coal CCS for decarbonisation in the ECO
scenario reflects the reduced availability of
domestic coal resources and the increased
global price for imported coal which make
coal CCS less cost effective than it was in
the LC scenario. This is just one example
of how public attitudes towards energy
technologies could have a significant
impact on the deployment of certain
technologies and the overall energy system
mix.
In the ECO variant, there is a rapid rise in
electricity demand following 2040, with
industry and hydrogen production taking
the lion’s share of the increase. Up until
that point the industrial sector had shown
a decline similar to that in the Core
scenario. Both the residential and transport
sectors in both ECO and LC also have
increasing electricity demand, yet the
increases start earlier in the ECO variant
and are relatively more gradual in these
sectors.
Transport fuel demand is similar between
DREAD and the LC scenario until 2035,
after which both show a decline as diesel
and petrol use drop. The total transport
fuel demand decrease is greater in LC as
DREAD uses bio-diesel to deliver more of
its transport needs. The greater uptake of
biofuels is divided between the heavy and
light goods vehicles and the introduction of
bio-kerosene into the aviation sector after
2040. The strategy is, in part, targeted at
reducing electricity demand while
maintaining a low-carbon performance. The
additional increase in biofuels is
predominantly sourced within the UK and
diverges from the LC scenario after 2035.
ECO Scenario
The ECO scenario illustrates a very
different energy system to the LC or
DREAD scenario. Primary energy demand
in the ECO scenario is lower than the LC
scenario; it is only around 80% of the LC
primary energy demand in 2050. The ECO
scenario has a very high level of electricity
generation compared to the LC scenario
and the other socio-environmental
scenarios. Electricity production in the ECO
scenario is primarily from nuclear power,
which is the dominant source of electricity,
coal with CCS and wind power, the latter
rapidly increasing in the 2040s (Figure
5.12). 
The removal of domestic open-cast coal
and the increased global costs of fossil
fuels have a noticeable impact on the
development of the electricity mix over the
50 year period. Existing coal generation
continues at a moderate level for slightly
longer in the ECO scenario than in the LC
scenario. However, in the ECO scenario, the
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Figure 5.12: Changes in the electricity
generating mix 2000-2050 in the ECO
scenario variant
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18% of that in the LC scenario, the
primary demand breakdown by fuel type
and sector remain close to the LC baseline.
NIMBY remains the most similar to the LC
scenario, with the only major divergence
being in the selection of dominant
electricity sources in the electricity mix. In
primary energy, the major difference is a
reduced use of coal, by 2050 being less
than a third of LC scenario. Although
biomass and waste also show a lower
demand, other energy sources, namely
nuclear and renewables show earlier
uptake; nuclear levels off at its capacity
limit by 2030.
The electricity demand in NIMBY matches
that of the LC, but the generation mix has
nuclear growing rapidly through the 2020s,
to replace the role that coal with CCS has
in the LC (Figure 5.13). The selection of
power sources, with the exceptions of
nuclear and coal CCS, show similar trends
in both NIMBY and LC, through to the
2040s, when NIMBY shows a dash for
wind; surprisingly, there is only marginally
more gas installed to balance the
The installed capacity of the power sector
in the ECO scenario rises to almost 180
GW by 2050 compared with 120 GW in the
LC scenario. The increased installed
capacity in the ECO scenario is largely due
to the installation of wind capacity in the
last 5-year time step; high levels of wind
must be installed to meet the demand for
electricity and further, when more wind
capacity is built it has to be balanced by
additional gas generating capacity. 
The total constraint on all transport
biofuels in the ECO scenario leads to
increased difficulties in decarbonising the
transport sector. Whereas the Core
scenario partly decarbonises the transport
sector by utilising bioethanol, biodiesel,
hydrogen and electricity as transport fuels,
the ECO scenario cannot use either of the
biofuels. The scenario continues to use
some electricity for transport but it does
not dramatically increase from the LC
scenario, most likely because there are
other more cost-effective measures to
decarbonise the energy system. Hydrogen
fuels are introduced 5 years earlier in the
ECO scenario than in the LC scenario. As a
result of the changes to transport fuel
availability and costs, the ECO scenario
retains higher levels of fossil fuels (petrol
and diesel) than the LC scenario. This
causes emissions from the transport sector
to be significantly higher than the LC
scenario. To balance out these transport
emissions, there are significant emission
reductions in the service, industry and
electricity sectors in the ECO scenario.
NIMBY Scenario
In the final scenario variant, NIMBY, while
the primary energy demand drops by about
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Figure 5.13: Changes in the electricity
generating mix 2000-2050 in the ECO
scenario variant
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consumer and producer surplus as a
measure of societal welfare, the ECO
scenario shows a significantly greater
decline in welfare from 2015 onwards than
in the LC, DREAD or NIMBY scenarios (see
Figure 5.14b).
Although the marginal cost of CO2 in 2050
is highest in the ECO scenario, the
marginal cost of CO2 in the DREAD
scenario is the highest in the middle period
(2015-2030). In all three of the scenarios
costs are higher than in the LC scenario.
This illustrates that public acceptance of
energy technologies can have a substantial
impact not only on the make-up of the
energy system but on the cost of
decarbonisation. When the public rejects
certain technologies for any of the various
reasons explored in this report,
decarbonisation becomes more costly and
more challenging. 
Yet this consideration seems to be widely
neglected in discussions of
decarbonisation; there is even less public
discussion about how the carbon reduction
intermittency. As a consequence of
expanding wind power, the final total
installed capacity in NIMBY is greater than
in the LC (~160 GW as opposed to 120
GW).
Transport fuel use in the NIMBY variant
shows very similar trends to the LC, with
both dominant fossil fuels (petrol and
diesel) showing declines at equivalent
rates. In LC, diesel declines slightly more
in the last decade (2040 to 2050) and is
balanced by an increase in bioethanol and
biomethanol. In NIMBY, there is less biofuel
available than in the LC because crops are
restricted to landscapes where they are
already established. Interestingly, despite
crop limitations, aviation does take up bio-
kerosene in the NIMBY variant.
Overall Impact of Public Acceptance of
Energy Technologies
The ECO scenario has the highest cost
implications for society. By 2050 the
marginal cost of CO2 is the highest in ECO
as seen in Figure 5.14a. Further, using
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targets should be met than there is of the
targets themselves. If public attitudes
towards UK decarbonisation strategies
continue to be neglected then there may
be some unexpected and unpleasant
surprises in the quest to reach 80%
decarbonisation, including failure to
achieve the target. This is not to suggest
that public attitudes should be overridden
in order to reach 80% decarbonisation;
rather, these socio-environmental attitudes
must be understood and considered when
planning the transition to a decarbonised
economy.
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■ Social and lifestyle change has the
potential to reduce national energy
use, energy system cost and carbon
emissions by 35% and 30% below
baseline levels
■ In an energy system constrained to
80% carbon emissions reduction, the
main effect of social and lifestyle
change is to reduce the costs of
delivering a low-carbon energy system,
by up to £70 billion
The Lifestyle Scenario
There is considerable interest in the
possibility of a cultural shift affecting
people’s lifestyles. This chapter speculates
about the nature, extent and implications
of this shift. Lifestyles are more than just
attitudes but are reflected in the meaning
attached to consumption as well as
consumption patterns, societal values,
acceptance and use of time and space. 
All scenarios necessarily include lifestyle
assumptions even if these are unstated
and implicit. For example in the Core
scenarios of chapters 2 and 3 the
assumption is explicit – that preferences do
not change significantly over the period to
2050. This implies that lifestyles continue
to change along the same lines as the
recent past and are driven by price and
reflected in elasticities of demand for
energy services.
Of course, in practice lifestyles will change
in other ways and for other reasons. If
Government is pursuing ambitious carbon
emissions, this is likely to be consistent
with social acceptance, and therefore it is
probable that attitudes and personal
behaviour will change. Also, what is judged
Key Messages
■ Society and human behaviour change
over time, sometimes in unpredictable
directions, and therefore there is a
wide variety of possible future levels of
energy service demand and end use
technology choice
■ We have explored a scenario in which
social change is strongly influenced by
concerns about energy use and its
environmental implications, and
therefore energy service demand is at
a significantly lower level by 2050 than
in the ‘business as usual’ assumptions
of other scenarios
■ Social and lifestyle change principally
affects energy use in the residential
and transport sectors, but has wider
implications
■ In the residential sector, the main
drivers of energy service demand are
internal temperature, consumption of
hot water and use of lighting and
appliances. In the transport sector, the
main factors are mobility itself, the
choice of mode and the uptake of more
efficient vehicles. The efficiency of
energy use is important in both
buildings and vehicles
■ In these sectors a combination of
energy service demand change and
efficiency improvement could reduce
energy demand by more than 50%
from baseline levels by 2050
■ In both sectors, lifestyle change alone
will increase the share of electricity in
final demand, but reduce the need for
massive electrification to meet tough
carbon targets
6. Energy Lifestyles
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complete social agreement, nor widespread
frugality, but majority support geared to
improving quality of life without increased
material consumption in rich countries.
Starting with some key opinion leaders,
social norms emphasise ‘green housing’;
and ‘community living’ and ‘accessibility’
replace ‘mobility’ as aspirations.
Lifestyle Change at Home
A combination of increasing energy
awareness, higher prices and improved real
time information increasingly allows
attitudes to be reflected in behaviour. The
key changes in behaviour that affect
residential energy use are those that affect
the major uses of energy in the home. In
the Lifestyle scenario energy using
practices change as follows: 
■ Insulation of the building stock to a
high standard becomes a social
expectation. Refurbishment to passive-
house standard is adopted
progressively, initially through low-
income focused programmes in cities
and then to rural solid-walled
properties
■ Over-heating of buildings becomes
socially unacceptable, so that the long-
term trend in rising internal
temperatures ends and they decline
modestly. Hot water use also declines,
but only to the levels found in many
other European countries. New low-
carbon heating systems enter the
market after 2010 and take a large
market share around 2020, allowing
building regulations to prevent the use
of current inefficient heating
technologies after 2030
to be acceptable or desirable changes with
technical possibility. The ‘lifestyle’ scenario
describes a world in which personal action
and socio-political goals within society are
consistent. Carbon emissions reduction is
delivered not merely through public policy,
prices and technical change, but also
through socially led change, i.e. through
individuals and communities choosing to
live in a way that has lower environmental
impact. 
Social values and public attitudes do not
change overnight (except under conditions
of external shock which we do not seek to
describe). However, over a 40-year period,
history shows that some social norms do
change. So the scenario is designed to be
distinct from other scenarios, but to remain
within the realms of what is plausible. We
judge plausibility with reference to
historical rates of changes and current
differences across OECD countries. The aim
is not to set a utopian vision for future
buildings and travel patterns, but to look at
what might be reasonable changes to
expect in the future. The primary focus of
the scenario is household energy use and
personal transport – i.e. the forms of
energy most directly controlled by the
individual. In both cases we examine
changes to both choice of energy using
technology and use of that capital stock.
The basic storyline of the scenario is of
steadily changing social attitudes to the
environment, with increasing
understanding leading to a widely held
belief that human activity is having a
serious impact on the global climate. This
is followed by a broad social consensus
that personal consumption is a key driver
and needs to change. We do not assume
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significant growth in markets for new
high energy devices such as patio
heaters, hot tubs and large plasma
screens, initially through peer pressure
and then by regulation
■ Initial market growth in micro-
renewables is highly dependent on the
core of committed green energy
innovators. Starting with some key
influential groups and influenced by
zero carbon new-home trends,
microgeneration becomes increasingly
popular – first solar water heating,
then photovoltaics and micro wind
■ Consumption patterns also change in
food. Increased concerns about health,
animal welfare and climate lead to
meat consumption halving by 2050
Lifestyle Change and Mobility 
Transport energy demand is a function of
mode, technology and fuel choice, total
distance travelled, driving style and vehicle
occupancy. Distance travelled is itself a
function of land use patterns, destination
and route choice and trip frequency. The
‘lifestyle’ consumer is more aware of the
cost of travel and the energy and
emissions implications of travel choices and
is sensitive to the rapid normative shifts
which alter the bounds of socially
acceptable behaviour. Consequently, the
following changes take hold:
■ The focus shifts to the quality of the
journey experience rather than the
quantity and speed of travel. Social
norms elevate active modes and low-
carbon vehicles in status and demote
large cars, single-occupancy car travel,
speeding and air travel
■ The phase out of incandescent lighting
in 2011 is successful, with a wide
range of solid-state lighting systems
rapidly gaining mass consumer markets
■ Cold appliance labels and standards
prevent markets for US size appliances
developing. Typical appliance
efficiencies continue to improve up to
2050, especially in cold appliances and
consumer electronics. Every home is
internet connected, as part of changes
to mobility, but growth in electricity use
for home computing ends, as remote
processing of data with low-power
clients for home access is introduced.
The 1 Watt initiative for standby is
widely implemented. With increased
use of ‘all off’ switching for unoccupied
property and automatic low-power
modes, standby electricity use
decreases
■ Smart meters are universally deployed
after 2010 with rapid improvements in
future generations of technology to
provide information on information on
energy use by individual devices, in
real time.  These provide comparisons
with historical data for the houses and
similar households accessed in a
variety of ways to suit consumer
preferences, including dedicated
displays, TV, SMS and internet, as well
as with warnings of non-standard use
patterns
■ The use of air conditioning in housing
remains very limited and is increasingly
unacceptable as alternative passive
cooling techniques become the norm.
Social reaction to conspicuous
consumption also prevents any
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and energy use transparent to users
and changes everything from
destination choice, car choice, driving
style and paying for travel, including in
the freight sector
■ A more radical change takes place
through changes in work patterns and
business travel. The impacts of
teleworking and video conferencing are
known to be complex, but potentially
important (Gross et al., 2009).
Teleworking particularly affects the
longer commute trips and thus has a
disproportionately large impact on
average trip lengths. Combined with
the shifts towards active modes and
different models of car ownership, this
amounts to significant lifestyle shift. It
also becomes socially unacceptable to
drive children to school
■ The novelty of air travel wanes as not
only does it become socially
unacceptable to fly short distances,
airport capacity constraints mean it
becomes less convenient. Weekends
abroad are replaced by more domestic
leisure travel but this is increasingly
carried out by low-carbon hired
vehicles, rail and luxury coach and
walking and cycling trips closer to
home
■ There is increasing acceptance of
restrictive policies in the context of
more choice for local travel as the
alternatives are improved. These
restrictions include the general phasing
out of petrol/diesel vehicles in
town/city centres through low emission
zones, increased parking charges and
strict speed enforcement.  Generally,
■ Efficient, low-energy and zero energy
(non-motorised) transport systems will
replace current petrol and diesel car-
based systems. The increased uptake
of slower, active modes reduces
average distances travelled as distance
horizons change. Localism means
people work, shop and relax closer to
home and long-distance travel will
move from fast modes (primarily air
and the car) to slow-speed modes
covering shorter distances overall (local
rail and walking and cycling). However,
capacity constraints limit the pace of
change so that mode shift to buses and
rail will be moderated
■ The new modes will result in a new
spatial order towards compact cities,
mixed land uses and self contained
cities and regions. There are no large-
scale shifts in the spatial distribution of
the population between urban and
rural. Some services return to rural
areas, but it becomes more common to
carry out personal business by internet
■ New models of car ownership are
embraced. This includes car clubs and
the tendency to own smaller vehicles
for every day family use and to hire
vehicles for longer distance travel.
These are niche markets in which new
technology is fostered. Lower car
ownership is correlated with lower car
use
■ Small-scale technology facilitates
relatively rapid behavioural change.
Information and Communication
Technology (ICT: telematics, in-car
instrumentation, video conferencing,
smartcards, e-commerce ) makes cost
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2009). This is a highly disaggregated,
bottom-up model of transport energy
use in the UK.  It allows us to model
the energy service demands of
different assumptions about transport
service demand, modal choice and
vehicle choice
■ The MARKAL energy system model.
This allows us to model the impacts of
system wide changes in energy and
carbon prices on users’ decisions, e.g.
choice of fuel in homes and vehicles, as
well as the effects of demand changes
on the wider energy system
We have modelled two additional ‘lifestyle
scenarios’ (LS REF and LS LC) as variants
of the Core scenarios REF and LC, as
shown in the Table 6.1.  Both LS REF and
LS LC include similar lifestyle changes; the
difference is the inclusion of a (price
driven) 80% carbon constraint in LS LC.
The commentary below largely focuses on
the difference between REF and LS REF;
and between LC and LS LC.
Modelling Household Energy
The lifestyle changes described above were
modelled as follows in the LS REF and LS
LC scenarios.  The assumptions reflect
analysis undertaken previously in a low-
carbon scenario for the Royal Commission
on Environmental Pollution (Palmer et al,
however, the policy environment is one
of ‘push and pull’ as fiscal and
regulatory sticks are combined with the
carrot of infrastructure investment
(e.g. in car clubs, public transport,
cycle infrastructure, railway capacity)
■ Increased internet shopping and
restrictions on heavy goods vehicles,
particularly in town centres, increases
the use of vans. There is some shift
towards rail freight
Modelling the Lifestyle Scenario
Modelling the energy implications of
lifestyle change is challenging.  It involves
detailed assumptions about both the
demand for energy services, as well as
technology choice, and how these interact
with other decisions with the energy
system.  We have addressed this challenge
using three models with different
capabilities, as follows:
■ The UK Domestic Carbon Model
(UKDCM).  This is a heat balance
model of the UK housing stock.  It
allows us to model the detailed energy
service demands as a function of house
type, as well as the implications of
different scenarios for installation of
insulation and microgeneration
■ The UK Transport Carbon Model
(UKTCM) (Brand et al, 2002; Brand,
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System wide carbon constraint in 2050
None - 80%
Social/lifestyle assumption Business as usual REF LC
‘Lifestyle’ LS REF LS LC
Table 6.1: The Lifestyle scenarios related to the Core scenarios
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■ District CHP take up reaches between
10% and 25% by 2050
■ Single-dwelling CHP reaches between
10% and 60% by 2050
■ Heat pump take-up reaches between
10% and 60% by 2050
■ Single-dwelling biomass take-up is
limited to a maximum of 20%
■ Solar thermal on 50% of dwellings
providing 25% of domestic hot water
by 2050
■ Solar PV panels are installed on 15 %
of dwellings by 2050
■ Microwind turbines are installed on 5 %
of dwellings by 2050
Modelling Transport Energy
The lifestyle changes described above were
modelled as follows in the LS REF and LS
LC scenarios.
The first set of assumptions related to
distance travelled and mode shift. In terms
of mode shift, the major reductions in
energy demand from the transport sector
(see below) are a result of a 74%
reduction in distance travelled by car by
2050 as a driver and a passenger. The use
of all other surface transport modes
increases, apart from a 12% fall in
distance travelled by Heavy goods vehicles
(HGVs). The reduction in car travel comes
about as a result of significant mode shifts,
particularly to bus travel towards the latter
half of the period (184% increase in
vehicle kilometres) and cycling and
walking. Mode shift is combined with
destination shifting as trips are either
2006), except that the specific assumptions
of the lifestyle scenario imply some
differences (e.g. for low internal
temperature and hot-water use, less
building demolition), and more recent
information implies a higher realistic
potential for heat pumps and lower for
district heating and microwind turbines.
■ Internal demand temperature peaks at
20C in 2010, then falls back at
0.2C/year to 17C in 2025 and stabilises
there. Temperatures are the same in
old and new dwellings
■ Demolition rate remains at a low rate
of 17,000 per year, reflecting a desire
to reuse, whilst new build reaches a
peak of 255,000 per year in 2016 and
stabilises at 120,000 per year
■ Energy demand for air conditioning
remains negligible (in homes)
■ Hot-water use falls linearly by 1.25%
annually from 2010 to 2050
■ Electricity for lights and appliances
increases until 2014 and then
decreases to 58% of this value in 2050
■ There is full penetration of cavity wall
insulation by 2020 and loft top up by
2040. Increased use of external wall
insulation both for solid wall insulation
(35%) and cladding walls (37%). Wall
insulation delivers U-values of 0.25,
windows 0.8, implying performance
broadly equivalent to current best
available
■ Purchase of conventional heating
systems, i.e. solid-fuel, gas and oil
boilers and direct electric heating
constrained out after 2030
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restricting cars from urban centres and
increasing the cost of motoring, which this
lifestyle scenario assumes. If cycling and
walking are added together, ‘slow modes’
account for 28% of travel in 2050. Implicit
in the assumptions made here is the fact
that cars are increasingly banned or priced
out of city/ town centres.  
Specific load factors also increase relative
to the reference case for cars, LGV and
HGV, see Figure 6.2. By 2050, car load
factors will have increased by about 23%
from the 2007 situation. Similarly, load
factors increase for HGV (higher rate than
cars) and LGV (lower rate).
There is also an effect of lifestyle change
on driving style. Changes to on-road fuel
efficiency as a result of speed limit
compliance and eco-driving was modelled
by assuming that in any given year a
certain proportion of car and LGV drivers
(includes new drivers) are practicing eco-
driving with an average 8% improvement
in fuel efficiency for each mile affected
(Figure 6.3). However, not all drivers are
practicing eco-driving, and even for those
who are, not every mile they drive is
totally abstracted from the system through
virtual travel or shorter as a result of
localisation.
Figure 6.1 shows how people become
progressively more ‘multi-modal’ by the
end of the period in the LS REF scenario.
In 2020, the car is still used for the
majority of distance travelled as a driver or
passenger (67%), but this drops to 28%
by 2050. However, ‘other private’, (which
includes taxis, hire cars and car club cars)
increases from 2.4% of distance in 2007,
to 7.5% so that, combined with being a car
passenger, 36% of all distance is still
undertaken by car in 2050. At the same
time, cycling goes from accounting for less
than 1% to almost 13% of distance
travelled. This surpasses levels seen today
in countries regarded as demonstrating
best practice in this area: in 2006 an
average Dutch person cycled 850km per
year, corresponding to around 8% of total
distance travelled (SWOV, 2006). We have
chosen to push this further over 40 years
on the basis that the Dutch have achieved
this level so far without comprehensively
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that, at equal annualised costs, consumers
show equal preference for conventional and
EV/HEV/PHEV vehicles and, in some cases,
prefer the latter by a ratio of 2-to-1. Note
that equal preference implies equality in
perceived market potentials (availability of
infrastructure), perceived risk (fuel type,
‘proven’ vs. ‘new’ technology) and
performance (range, speed, acceleration,
etc.).
In addition, no changes in investment and
operation and maintenance costs were
assumed, as consumers of tomorrow
choose to buy greener vehicles not on the
basis of reduced purchase prices but on the
basis of changed preferences for and
perceived risk of a low-carbon vehicle. Car
buyers – whether private, fleet or business
– choose smaller cars instead of larger
ones. This is simulated in UKTCM by
phasing out the sale of new large cars
(engine size >2.0 litres) by 2020 – starting
in 2010, with linear interpolation between
2010 and 2020. This general shift in
consumer preference was further modelled
in MARKAL MED by assuming lower ‘hurdle
rates’ (discount rate for capital
expenditure) for energy-efficient and low-
carbon vehicles such as PHEV cars (12.5%
instead of 15%, from 2020) and BEV
motorcycles (15% instead of 25%, from
2015).
Implications for UK Energy
Energy use in the residential sector
The combined effects of substantial
improvements in building fabric (insulation
and glazing) coupled with modestly lower
internal temperatures have a significant
effect on the demand for space heating,
affected. Speed limit enforcement and in-
car instrumentation is assumed to be
introduced to augment the behaviour
change from about 2015. There are
incentives to practice eco-driving as the
cost of motoring increases and
enforcement penalties are steep. Speeding
becomes socially unacceptable as it is seen
as wasteful. Penetration through the HGV
fleet is the same as for LGVs but the
savings per mile are lower (4%) as these
vehicles are already speed limited and fuel
efficiency training has already taken place
in some industry sectors.
With respect to car choice, the higher
uptake of lower and zero carbon vehicles
has been modelled in UKTCM by assuming
more favourable preference and
performance parameters (but keeping
purchase prices and other cost factors the
same) for Battery Electric Vehicles (BEV),
Hybrid Electric (HEV) and Plug-in Hybrid
Electric (PHEV). The scale and timing of
these changes have been modelled on the
high to extreme technology scenarios of
the recent scoping exercise commissioned
by BERR and DfT (2008). The scenarios
were reproduced in UKTCM by assuming
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scenarios, providing 50% of water heating
demand by 2050.
The decline of traditional incandescent
lighting accelerates in the period of the
voluntary phase-out. They are initially
replaced by compact fluorescent lamps
(CFLs), but low-cost Light Emitting Diodes
(LEDs) rapidly enter the market after 2010
in LS scenarios and become the norm by
2020. With modestly increased levels of
illumination, lighting energy use falls by
90% by 2030.
Trends in appliance electricity use prove
more difficult to reverse. However, by
2020, continuing improvements in energy
efficiency, the saturation of the most
intensive uses and the absence of
important new sources of demand combine
to reverse the trend of increasing use. In
LS scenarios, demand then falls by about
1% annually to 2050.
Electricity-generating micro-renewables
remain expensive in the early part of the
period under consideration. Markets grow,
see Figure 6.4. The recent (post-2004)
trend of a decline in energy use continues,
so that energy demand falls by
approximately 50% in LS REF compared to
REF (and current use).  The demand for
hot water follows a broadly similar pattern.
The dominant heating technologies also
change radically, see Figure 6.5. The
predominance of the gas boiler is
challenged by several alternatives –
biomass, CHP at various scales and heat
pumps. Heat pumps (ground source and air
source) take a significant share, but gas-
fired-technologies (district heating, in
urban centres and mixed use
developments, and fuel cell micro-CHP in
smaller suburban properties) develop and
retain a bigger share. This remains the
case even in LS LC when national CO2
emissions are reduced by 80%, although
heat pumps and wood have bigger markets
in this case.  The much larger role of heat
pumps in the LS scenario leads to the
lower final energy demand, even with less
behavioural change than in LS LC.  Solar
water heating becomes an accepted part of
the built environment after 2010 in LS
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total, HEV, BEV and PHEV cars have a 77%
market share in 2050 albeit of a
significantly smaller market overall (car use
is 74% less than in the REF case). Diesel
PHEVs, Hydrogen cars and methanol do not
appear in any of the scenarios.
Vehicle end-use efficiencies increase
moderately as a result of downsizing of
cars and the on-road fuel efficiency
programme. The entire petrol and diesel
car fleet uses 5-6% and 11-12% less
energy per km driven in 2020 and 2050
respectively. Similarly, the LGV and HGV
fleets use 2% and 3% less in 2020 and
2050 respectively.
As a result of demand reduction, fuel
switching and efficiency gains, the demand
for conventional transport fuels (petrol and
diesel) decreases by 57% in the
unconstrained lifestyle scenario (LS REF).
By comparison, electricity demand grows
steeply, up by 67% compared to the REF
case, particularly in the second half of the
period, accounting for 18% of total fuel
demand in the unconstrained lifestyle
scenarios by 2050 (Figure 6.8). Bio-fuels
but only slowly until 2020 (see Figure 6.6),
by which time the costs have fallen, a
viable installation industry has developed
and the technical potential is better
understood. In LS scenarios, market
penetration reaches five million homes for
PV and two million homes for wind by
2050. Microgeneration possibilities are
discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.
Energy use in the transport sector
The higher uptake of lower and zero
carbon vehicles combined with mode shifts
and significant alterations to work,
shopping and leisure travel patterns result
in final energy demand being halved from
this sector by 2050 compared to the
unconstrained reference case (REF). 
In the lifestyle reference (LS REF) case, by
2020 market shares (in terms of vehicle
km, not energy use) for hybrid electric
(HEV) cars and battery electric (BEV) reach
21% and 9% respectively, compared to
zero penetration in the REF and carbon
ambition (LC) cases (Figure 6.7). From
2020 petrol plug-in hybrid electric (PHEV)
cars become more popular, reaching
market shares in 2050 of nearly 50%. In
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demand is at approximately the same level
as in the LC scenario without any system
wide carbon constraint being applied.
Carbon emissions are reduced by 30% in
LS REF compared to REF. This in turn
makes the achievement of radical carbon
reductions such as 80% easier, with fewer
changes required to the energy system.
This is apparent in Figure 6.9 from the
much smaller changes between LS REF and
LS LC in 2050, than between REF and LC.
Final demand for electricity is reduced by
less than other fuels, only 14% (LS REF
compared to REF), as lifestyle change
includes some fuel switching to electric
technologies, notably plug-in hybrid
vehicles and heat pumps. In carbon-
constrained scenarios, the reduction is
bigger (25% reduction from LC to LS LC)
as the LC includes more electrification
driven by carbon prices. This leads to a
lower rate of growth in construction of
centralised zero carbon electricity
technologies – CCS, nuclear and wind – in
LS LC than in LC, see Figure 6.10.
and hydrogen play a major role only in the
carbon-constrained cases. For bio-fuels,
this is a result of the availability of
unlimited blending of second-generation
bio-diesel, while in the unconstrained REF
and lifestyle scenarios, demands decrease
in line with petrol and diesel demands. A
high-level blend of bio-ethanol and petrol
(E85) used in flex-fuel road vehicles only
appears in the Core constrained case (LC)
where it accounts for 26% of total fuel
demand.  In the related lifestyle scenario,
lower demand and greater preference for
efficient vehicles means that bio-diesel
hybrids are preferred.
Implications for the Wider Energy
System
The most significant impact of lifestyle
change on the wider energy system,
compared to the Core scenarios, is due to
reductions in demand, particularly for gas
in households and oil derived fuels in
transport (see Figure 6.9). In LS REF
scenario, gas use is 34% lower and oil use
54% lower than in REF. Total energy
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prevents any significant increase in
demand in LS LC from year 2000 levels.
This compares to a 170% rise in electricity
demand from households plus light vehicles
in LC, with potentially serious implications
and/or investment requirements for the
low voltage grid.
The electricity from increased use of PHEV
cars and vans is assumed to come mainly
from night charging. This allows the PHEV
fleet to act as effective electricity storage,
enabling base load centralised generation
plants to run better (and more cheaply).
The implications of transport fuel
differences between REF and LS scenarios
is also huge for reliance on biofuels, with
lifestyle change leading to far lower use of
biofuel (see Figure 6.11).
Economic Implications
It is not meaningful to do a welfare
comparison between the Core (REF and LC)
and LS scenarios (LS REF and LS LC) as
the underlying consumer preferences differ.
Total energy supply system costs fall by
more than 25% as lower investment is
required in a smaller energy system.  In
both LS (compared to REF) and LS LC
compared to LC REF, the energy supply
The much reduced dependence on oil is
due to a combination of reduced demand,
modal switch, improved efficiency and
increased use of electricity. In LS LC this
also results in a halving of use of biofuels
(principally wheat-derived ethanol)
compared to LC. A significant hydrogen
sector develops to meet HGV demand in LS
LC as in LC, whereas in REF and LS REF,
hydrogen only plays a minor role later in
the period to power rail transport.
The increased use of electricity in heat
pumps in households in the LS scenarios is
more than offset by reductions in demand
by lights and appliances and by much
increased electricity output from
microgeneration (see Figure 6.6).
Implications for the low voltage grid are
also affected by the market for electric
vehicles if these are charged at home.
Power demand on the grid is broadly
unchanged from year 2000 levels in 2050
in LS REF compared to a rise of over 50%
in REF. The effect is more significant in the
LC scenarios, where lifestyle change
114 Making the transition to a secure and low-carbon energy system     UKERC ENERGY 2050 PROJECT
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
2
0
0
0
2
0
2
0
 R
E
F
2
0
2
0
 L
S
 R
E
F
2
0
2
0
 L
C
2
0
2
0
 L
S
 L
C
2
0
5
0
 R
E
F
2
0
5
0
 L
S
 R
E
F
2
0
5
0
 L
C
2
0
5
0
 L
S
 L
C
P
J
Storage
Solar PV
Marine
Imports
Biowaste &
Wind
Hydro
Oil
Nuclear
Gas CCS
Gas
Coal CCS
Coal
  others
Figure 6.10: Electricity generation mix in
different scenarios for different years
-
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
2
0
0
0
2
0
2
0
 R
E
F
2
0
2
0
 L
S
 R
E
F
2
0
2
0
 L
C
2
0
2
0
 L
S
 L
C
2
0
5
0
 R
E
F
2
0
5
0
 L
S
 R
E
F
2
0
5
0
 L
C
2
0
5
0
 L
S
 L
C
P
J
Residential Service Transport
Figure 6.11: Demand for bioenergy in
different scenarios for different years 
6134_20-50 Report:S3097_inner  20/04/2009  11:45  Page 114
The greater use of social change implies a
broadening of the focus of energy policy. In
particular, there is greater scope for
housing and transport policy to facilitate
changes to technology in these sectors. In
turn, this implies that more energy policy
objectives are delivered at sub-national
level (devolved, regional and local) than in
other scenarios. Education and training
also change to reflect attitudinal shifts and
high requirement for new skills and training
in the building and transport sectors.
There is a significant investment shift to
the demand side – particularly the
buildings, vehicles and public transport
infrastructure required for systemic
change. This has implications for the type
of low-carbon investment required from the
finance sector, i.e. a greater emphasis on
mass market and decentralised technology
(including the microgeneration technologies
described in Chapter 7). This implies a
bigger role for District Network Operators
(DNOs) (to deliver metering,
microgeneration and real time demand
response), Passenger Transport Executives
(PTEs) (to increase mass transit capacity)
and social housing providers in energy
policy. New business models, e.g. for
energy service and car clubs, and new
ways of paying for fuel (e.g. using smart
cards and differentiated tariffs) will play a
larger role. In contrast, the very strong
reliance on energy suppliers to deliver low-
carbon goals, e.g. through upstream
emissions trading, the Renewables
Obligation and CERT, declines.
The greater role of individual citizens and
communities in energy policy is a scenario
assumption. It also has policy implications
investment costs to 2050 are reduced by
£90 billion.  The additional costs of
demand side investment in households are
£20 billion.  The difference in transport
sector costs is difficult to estimate, but
almost certainly lower in the LS scenarios
due to reduced travel.  We therefore
estimate the lifestyle scenario costs are at
least £70 billion lower than the reference
comparators. 
The marginal cost of carbon abatement in
2050 in the carbon-constrained scenarios
falls, but only modestly from £169/tCO2 to
£163/tCO2. 
There are also implications for public
finances, largely from reduced demand for
transport fuels. If tax rates were to remain
unchanged, annual revenues in 2050 would
fall from £27 billion in REF to £11 billion in
LS REF.  This is likely to be offset by
greater acceptance of environmental
taxation in general, including increases in
carbon tax (or permit auction) revenues,
income from road user charging and
parking charges.
Policy Implications
As in the carbon reduction scenarios
described in Chapter 2, the key focus of
energy policy in the LS scenarios is carbon
emissions reduction. However, in the LS
scenarios some of the policy pressures are
eased. In particular, increased social
acceptance of the need for change makes a
high carbon price (or alternative carbon
control policies) politically sustainable
earlier, reducing the marginal cost of
carbon emissions abatement in 2050 and
particularly the scale of energy supply
sector investment.
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Market-based instruments will continue to
have a strong role, not only to price
carbon, but also to support innovation. This
will probably be through fixed-price or
consistent capital subsidy mechanisms,
designed to reduce risk for citizen and
community involvement in innovation. This
applies most obviously to small-scale
renewable generation, but probably more
importantly to building insulation and
vehicles.
Similar principles will be applied to support
for social innovation, recognising the
importance of social entrepreneurs and
community projects. As with technology
support this will require a portfolio
approach, but with support for ‘roll out’
where success is evident. There will be
significantly higher levels of engagement of
local government in area-based initiatives,
driven by a combination of community
pressure and central Government
incentives.
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that are unlikely to perform well. These
issues and regulatory/institutional
factors surrounding appropriate
balancing and settlement of micro-
generated electricity means that
achievement of a level playing field
with centralised generation is still a
long way off
■ The interface between demand-side
technology, policy and behaviour could
be a key element in the success of
future energy policy. Existing
underlying incumbent structures of
energy production and delivery could
be altered from a consumption-based
model towards deeper engagement
from individuals and corresponding
knock-on behavioural changes. It could
help to bring about the lifestyle change
required for a resilient low-carbon
energy system
Introducing Microgeneration
The current UK electricity system is based
on relatively few large-scale power plants
and a transmission and distribution grid to
carry their power across the country to
consumers. Decentralised energy
production, which contrasts with
centralised approaches, involves
deployment of a large number of energy
generators at or closer to the point of final
demand, with associated benefits including
efficiency advantages where combined heat
and power can be employed, the possibility
of reduced transmission and distribution
losses for electricity, and a reduced
requirement for centralised infrastructure
investment, to name a few. One important
category of decentralised energy
Key Messages
■ Microgeneration offers a unique set of
opportunities along with a
commensurate set of challenges for its
further introduction into the energy
system. These relate to the scale and
demand-side nature of these
generation technologies, and their
potential to be disruptive to the
incumbent energy system
■ Capital costs are a key barrier for all of
the main microgeneration systems,
resulting in a high implied cost of the
CO2 reduction they provide.
Furthermore, technical performance
and durability of some of the systems
needs to be improved before significant
market entry will become viable and
aid in meeting energy policy aims 
■ Choice of reference system against
which microgeneration is compared is
crucial for accurate performance
assessment. Given the possibility of
radical energy system change in some
UKERC scenarios, research is required
to investigate the nature of the
‘marginal’ energy system and
subsequently demonstrate if/how
interventions may ensure emissions
reductions. Without a convincing base
of evidence, credible mitigation
technologies may be ignored by
industry or denied government support
■ Policy has developed rapidly in the UK
to support microgeneration, but until
recently has focused on uptake rather
than appropriate application of
systems. Additionally, some policy
instruments could support technologies
7. Microgeneration
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progress can be attributed to the reduced
potential to switch away from solid fuels
such as coal to natural gas for dwelling
heating, and a stall in a broad downward
trend of GHGs embodied in grid electricity,
rather than changes to the rate of
improvement of energy efficiency.
Microgeneration may aid in restoring the
decarbonisation trend for the residential
sector, and thus enable it to assist energy
efficiency in contributing to long-term GHG
reduction targets.
In 2004 there were approximately 82,000
microgeneration installations in the UK
according to DTI (2006). The technology
type by far dominating this installed base
was solar thermal systems, accounting for
more than 95% of the total. However,
projections of future uptake of
microgeneration published by the
government in Element Energy (2008)
suggest that under a baseline scenario 3
million installations could be in place by
2030, rising to more than 9 million under a
more favourable policy scenario. They
found that preferred technology types in
future scenarios varied according to the
prevailing policy mix; fuel cell based micro-
combined heat and power (micro-CHP) was
important in all scenarios, and various
combinations of solar photovoltaics (PV),
heat pumps and biomass boilers could also
be strongly represented. Whilst these
overall figures seem optimistic, they may
be defensible on the basis that further
decarbonisation of residential heat supply
is problematic without some kind of
microgeneration, with the only alternatives
being direct electric heating using low-
carbon electricity or district heating
schemes, each of which faces its own
technologies is microgeneration, which for
the purposes of this chapter is defined as
electricity and/or heat generation systems
suitable for installation and use in
residential dwellings.
Microgeneration is a class of technologies
of the smallest scale in stationary energy
supply, installed on the customer side of
the meter in residential dwellings, and
hitherto typically owned and operated by
the dwelling owner/occupier. These key
features distinguish microgeneration from
other methods of energy supply and
provide a unique and challenging set of
circumstances for their wider introduction.
This chapter explores the status and
prospects of the main microgeneration
technologies, investigates aspects of
appropriate performance assessment, and
discusses the interface of policy, behaviour
and demand-side technology in terms of its
potential to bring about fundamental
change to the way energy is produced and
consumed.
Microgeneration has recently benefited
from the attention of a broad range of
energy system stakeholders, from
technology developers through to policy
makers. The primary overarching driver of
this attention is a perceived ability to
contribute to greenhouse gas (GHG)
reduction in the residential sector. In the
UK the residential sector is responsible for
more than a quarter of national
greenhouse gas emissions, making it a
focus of mitigation-related attention, and
whilst its contribution has broadly been
diminishing since the 1970s, trends
beginning in the mid 1990s were less
encouraging, as per Figure 7.1. This lack of
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Further to the climate-related, market size,
and technology availability drivers, a key
element of the interest in microgeneration
revolves around the potential the
technologies offer to alter the fundamental
structures that underlie conventional
energy production and consumption. They
present opportunities for the lifestyle
changes in energy use in the home that
may be required to achieve a resilient low-
carbon future via engagement of the
general population with their energy
system, as explored in Chapter 6. However,
the prospect of every dwelling becoming an
energy producer as well as a consumer
creates a tension with the traditionally
centralised, structures in place in the
incumbent energy system. This tension
between centralised and decentralised
approaches is a key question for
stakeholders, and a deeper understanding
of synergies and conflicts between
approaches will be crucial for informing
future energy policy. 
The precise definition of microgeneration
varies through the literature, with some
studies suggesting that systems up to
50kWe or 100kWe should be included. Here
the following definition is adopted;
microgeneration is any type of generation
(i.e. electricity and/or heat) that is suitable
for installation and application in a single
residential dwelling. In the UK this typically
limits the capacity of microgeneration
systems to just under 4kWe electrical (due
to provisions in modification G83/1 in ENA
(2003) where connection current is limited
to 16 Amps per phase), or around 30kWth
thermal.
distinct and comparable challenges.
Overall, these market size projections
indicate that microgeneration could play an
important part in the future low-carbon
energy system, with some studies
suggesting they could contribute between
15% and 40% of UK electricity supply in
20501 (Energy Saving Trust et al. (2005)).
This is one of the main reasons for the
increased commercial and policy attention
for microgeneration.
Another broad foundation of the increased
interest in microgeneration is the relatively
recent availability of small-scale generation
technologies at a cost that is becoming
competitive with their large-scale
counterparts. These cost reductions serve
to bolster the economic case for
microgeneration, bringing a variety of
established and new technology developers
and integrators to the sector. 
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1Assuming 2050 electricity demand is equal to that of 2005.
Figure 7.1: Trends in energy consumption,
fuel mix, and CO2 emissions for the UK
residential sector adapted from BERR
(2008)
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(biomass boilers) and £320 (solar PV) per
tonne CO2. These relatively high public
costs of mitigation could be justifiable on
the basis that some of the supported
technologies, notably solar PV, have
excellent long-term potential if cost targets
are met. Consistent with Table 7.1,
Bergman et al. also found capital cost to
be a key barrier for microgeneration, with
estimated payback periods of the order of
several decades in some cases. Micro-CHP
is an exception to this (including fuel cell
micro-CHP as discussed in Hawkes et al.
(2009)), with paybacks as short as 5 years
with government support, assuming
aggressive near-term capital cost targets
can be met.
Importance of the Reference or
Baseline System
The nature of the reference or baseline
system – defined as the system that
microgeneration is replacing or displacing –
is vital in determining its performance.
Specifically, carbon dioxide reduction
afforded by mitigation actions (such as
microgeneration) in the UK is typically
measured via characterisation of the
conventional energy system and calculation
of impact by assuming that system will be
replaced by the alternative.  However, a
precise definition of this reference system
is problematic; interventions act on the
margin of the energy system, implying that
system-average statistics such as grid-
average CO2 rates are less relevant for
comparison. Furthermore, rapid changes in
the conventional system are expected in
coming decades. As such, appropriate
choice of reference system is a key
controversy relating to microgeneration,
Microgeneration Technologies: Status
and Prospects
Microgeneration technologies can be
broadly categorised as either low-carbon
heat, renewable energy generation, or
micro combined heat and power (micro-
CHP), although technologies frequently blur
the boundaries between these
classifications as described in Staffell et al.
(2009). Systems can produce electricity,
heat, or both. They are installed on the
customer side of the meter, and those that
generate electricity are usually (but not
universally) connected in parallel to the
electricity distribution network, enabling
interchange of electricity with the
incumbent system. A summary of typical
basic characteristics, status and issues
associated with examples of selected
technologies is displayed in Table 7.1.
Capital cost is a major barrier for all
microgeneration technologies. General
awareness of the existence of some system
types is also important, in addition to an
array of technical, location, and fuel-chain
concerns.
Another key discriminating factor between
microgeneration technologies is their ability
to provide cost-effective greenhouse gas
emissions reductions. Bergman et al.
(2009) reviewed policy and behaviour
related to microgeneration and reported
that a very wide range of CO2-related
outcomes exist across the technologies.
Using estimates of current capital costs
and assumptions regarding performance,
reference system and lifetime, it was
shown that the cost of existing government
support mechanisms for CO2 reduction via
microgeneration could be between £55
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where the dwelling consumes grid
electricity, and domestic hot water and
space heating needs are met via
combustion of natural gas in a condensing
boiler. In terms of CO2 reduction, the
and an important topic for ongoing
research.
For performance assessment of
microgeneration the reference system in
the UK is generally accepted to be the case
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Typical Current Current Market Main
Capacity Estimated Approx. Status Issues
Efficiency / Installed
Annual Yield Cost
Low-Carbon Heat Technologies
Biomass Heater <5kWth 70-80% £2,000-3,000 Small Cost,
Biomass Boiler 10-20kWth 80-90% £6,000-10,000 commercial Fuel supply
chain,
Awareness
Air Source HP 5-15kWth 3.0-3.7 £2,500-7,500 Large Awareness,
Ground Source HP 3.4-4.4 £10,000-15,000 commercial Cost
(small in UK)
Micro-CHP Technologies
Stirling Engine 1kWel 4-8% el £3,000 (with Late Electrical
(High HPR) 5-13kWth 75-80% overall subsidy) Demonstration efficiency,
Cost
Internal 1kWel 20% el £3,500 in Small Cost, Few
Combustion Engine 3kWth 80-85% overall Japan commercial developers for
(Intermediate HPR) household scale
Fuel Cell 0.7-1kWel 25-45% el £15,000+ Demonstration Cost,
(Low HPR) 0.5-3kWth 80-85% overall in Japan moving to Durability
commercial
Renewable Energy Generation Technologies
Solar PV 1-2kWel 650-900 £5,500/kW el Commercial Cost
kWh/kW
Solar Thermal 1.5-3kWth 500-600 £3,200, with Large Cost
kWh / kW wide variation commercial
Micro-Wind 0.6-1.2kWel 50-500 £2,000+ Small Lack of
kWh/kW urban commercial appropriate
500-1000 locations
kWh/kW rural (i.e. energy
output),
planning
permission
Table 7.1: Comparison of metrics for micro-generation technologies. adapted from Staffell
et al. (2009). Abbreviations: el – electrical, th – thermal, HP – heat pump, HPR – heat-to-
power ratio.
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questions regarding the accuracy of any
projection of the build margin described
above, where conclusions are inevitably
uncertain. This issue applies equally to the
heating reference system, where choice of
the condensing boiler as the marginal
conventional technology is debatable where
rapid decarbonisation may promote large-
scale adoption of technologies such as heat
pumps, district heating, and biomass
boilers. Where the reference system
presents such a moving target, fair
evaluation of alternative technologies will
pose challenges, obscuring identification of
optimal pathways towards a low-carbon
residential sector, and necessitating risk-
aware assessment methods.
An example of the impact of definition of
reference system on performance
assessment is clear for the case of gas-
fuelled micro-CHP. Figure 7.2 displays this
dependency through a plot of modelled
CO2 reduction against the fair credit rate
for displaced grid electricity. Micro-CHP
does not provide emissions reduction when
the fair CO2 credit rate falls below
approximately 0.3 kg CO2/kWh. Given that
low-carbon scenarios such as those in
Chapter 2, consistent with long-term
climate related targets, require rapid
decarbonisation of the electricity grid, this
result seems to cast doubt on gas-fuelled
micro-CHP in a future low-carbon energy
technology mix. For example, the average
carbon intensity of the Low-Carbon Core
(CAM) scenario described in Chapter 2 is
0.06 kg CO2/kWh by 2035, and 0.037 kg
CO2/kWh by 2050 (see Figure 3.1), which
is well below the 0.3 kg CO2/kWh threshold
figure given above.
heating reference system in this case is
reasonably straight-forward; combustion of
natural gas in the boiler produces
approximately 0.19kgCO2/kWh of gas used.
Conversely, the CO2 emissions avoided due
to reduced use of the reference electricity
system is much more complicated. Using
grid-average emissions rates, which have
been hovering above 0.5kgCO2/kWh in the
UK for the past few years, to estimate the
fair credit to give to an intervention may
not be the best estimate of the influence of
an intervention. The actual CO2 reduction
afforded by an intervention is arguably a
combination of:
1. The instantaneous response of
generators on the reference system to
a change in demand (e.g. which
generator ramps down in response to a
load reduction).
2. The near to medium term energy
trading impact of a systematic change
in demand caused by presence of a
demand-side intervention.
3. The longer-term build margin, where
the construction of the next generation
of system capacity (e.g. new power
stations) may be accelerated or
deferred due to a set of interventions.
Further complicating matters is the
questionability of the existing conventional
or a specific future system as an
appropriate reference in a time of energy
system upheaval. For example, if long-term
government targets are to be met, rapid
decarbonisation of centralised electricity
generation will be required over coming
decades, as exemplified in the low-carbon
scenarios of Chapter 2. This poses
124 Making the transition to a secure and low-carbon energy system     UKERC ENERGY 2050 PROJECT
6134_20-50 Report:S3097_inner  20/04/2009  11:45  Page 124
the reference system for performance
assessment of demand side mitigation
interventions. Such definition is required to
ensure credible mitigation actions are not
ignored by industry and denied access to
government support.
Policy Development for
Microgeneration
In recent years substantial effort has been
directed towards development of policy
instruments and regulation to support
microgeneration in the UK. At the highest
level these include broad indications of
support such as provision in legislation to
set microgeneration targets as per HM
Government (2006), publication of a
Microgeneration Strategy via DTI (2006),
and numerous reports detailing the
potential of technologies and impact of
proposed incentives. An attempt has been
made to underpin this overarching support
by specific financial incentives, changes to
regulation to remove technical barriers and
streamline bureaucracy, and changes to
fundamental instruments such as the
building regulations to permit credit to be
given for inclusion of microgeneration in
dwellings as outlined in Bergman et al.
(2009). The influence of these specific
instruments on microgeneration has yet to
be observed on any significant scale, and
many are the subject of ongoing debate. 
The existing financial policy instruments,
which are dominated by the Low-Carbon
Buildings Programme (LCBP), the Carbon
Emissions Reduction Target (CERT), and
Value Added Tax (VAT) reduction on
energy-saving items, can provide
significant economic support for
However, to draw such conclusions would
be premature given uncertainty regarding
the reference system (i.e. uncertainty
regarding the true fair CO2 credit rate for
onsite generation), and the potential for
micro-CHP control strategies that ensure
systems displace fossil fuelled centralised
generation. The LS scenarios in Chapter 6
demonstrate the potential for a significant
gas CHP potential to be consistent with
80% CO2 reduction in some scenarios.
Furthermore, potential exists for micro-CHP
to employ alternative fuels, which would
significantly alter the CO2 reduction
predictions of Figure 7.2. These
considerations could have major
implications for the relative quantity of CHP
and heat pump installations.
Overall it is clear that further research is
required to tackle the issue of definition of
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Figure 7.2: Sensitivity of annual CO2
emissions reduction (kg CO2/year) to
emissions credit rate granted for onsite
generation (kg CO2/kWh) for 1kWe micro-
CHP systems in an average UK dwelling
demand scenario. Abbreviations: ICE =
internal combustion engine, PEMFC =
polymer electrolyte fuel cell, SOFC = solid
oxide fuel cell, Stirling = stirling engine.
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commercial sectors to provide the means
to reach zero carbon status at a reasonable
cost. In response to this issue, the
government has recently consulted on the
definition of zero carbon, suggesting that
some sources of CO2 may not be included
in the implemented approach.
There are also a number of further policy
and regulatory issues, many of which
relate to the simplicity and logistics of
microgenerator installation and operation.
Many of these concern data flows within
the Balancing and Settlement Code
(OFGEM (2001)), in order to allow
microgeneration export to participate in
electricity system balancing effectively and
to be fairly settled. Data flow issues should
be resolvable, albeit at some expense.
Arguably, metering etc. will cost more than
the value of export for some
microgenerators, although metering issues
are also an important behavioural concern.
Perhaps the most challenging issue
regarding balancing and settlement is that
of creating standardised profile classes for
dwellings with microgenerators (and for
microgeneration export). Standard profile
classes are a tool used in balancing and
settlement where half-hourly metered data
is not available. They are expensive to
create and, for microgeneration, may be
inaccurate as generation profiles can vary
significantly, even between technologies of
the same type. This not only creates
difficulty regarding fair settlement for each
generator, but also has implications
regarding effective low-cost balancing of
the system in real time. In the future,
microgeneration2, but focus on uptake of
technologies rather than their appropriate
application. A new method of support – a
feed-in tariff for microgeneration – has
been put forward in the recent Energy Act
(HM Government (2008)), and this could
better incentivise utilisation of
microgeneration of electricity in a way that
can help to achieve the broader aims of
energy policy. However, unconsidered
application of instruments such as feed-in
tariffs can also have negative impacts, and
could even create perverse incentives as in
the case of gas-fuelled micro-CHP:for
example it has been shown (Hawkes and
Leach (2008)) that where micro-CHP is
incentivised via a feed-in tariff for
electricity, gratuitous operation of the
device3 to benefit from the feed-in tariff
can result in higher CO2 emissions than the
case where no support is offered. Examples
like this show that care must be taken with
the structure of such instruments to ensure
they help to meet policy aims.
Debatably the most important policy
instrument in relation to microgeneration in
the UK is the proposal to mandate high
levels of the Code for Sustainable Homes
(CLG (2006)), notably to require all new
dwellings to be zero carbon from 2016. The
most practical way to achieve this at
present is via high levels of energy
efficiency and installation of multiple
microgeneration measures in each
dwelling, which would undoubtedly provide
a strong boost to the industry. However, a
serious doubt exists regarding the
readiness of the construction and
126 Making the transition to a secure and low-carbon energy system     UKERC ENERGY 2050 PROJECT
2These three policy instruments, and particularly the LCBP, can provide several thousands of pounds of support for individual
microgeneration installations. However, even with support, capital cost is an important barrier for system uptake.
3Via overheating of the dwelling to higher temperatures than would normally be required, deferral of insulation upgrade, etc.
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domestic energy use. As discussed above,
much of existing policy focuses on uptake
only, which may not encourage appropriate
behavioural changes. However,
microgeneration can be considered in the
context of energy related behaviour and
the broader social and infrastructural
measures which could shift domestic
energy use to more sustainable patterns,
as set out in Chapter 6. Consideration of
these issues in policy instrument
formulation and technology development
could enable policy aims to be achieved
more effectively.
Energy-related behaviour is often thought
of simply as consumption. However,
consumption is not just about satisfying
needs, but is connected to identity and
meaning creation; material goods play
symbolic roles in our lives beyond their
functional uses. Specifically,
environmentally significant (consumer)
behaviour is culturally embedded and
includes social, moral and normative
considerations (Jackson (2004)). For
example, people see the government (and
industry) as responsible for addressing
environmental problems, and see
themselves as having little effect. Indeed
evidence exists that there is a lack of
understanding of the influence of individual
behaviour on energy use and related
climate change. Stemming from these
observations, there appears to be an
opportunity to use microgeneration as a
part of broader social change, greater use
of demand-side technologies, and
behaviour change (Watson et al. (2006)).
This can be discussed in terms of the
distinction between ‘energy consumer’ and
‘energy citizen’ as per Table 7.2. Judicious
these standard profile classes may be
replaced by smart metering and IT
solutions. If the amount of microgeneration
increases significantly, it may become
necessary for it to be controllable in order
to maintain a stable electricity system. The
roles of system balancing, local voltage
control and phase balancing are
particularly important. For these reasons,
smart metering and two-way
communication with the supplier could be
necessary to enable microgeneration to
meet the needs of the grid, and for
householders to be financially rewarded for
controlling microgeneration appropriately.
Overall the policy framework to support
microgeneration has recently benefited
from attention, but significantly more effort
is required to ensure a level playing field
between decentralised and centralised
energy generation. Much of existing policy
focuses on the uptake of measures, rather
than performance after adoption, which
could be a key element in unlocking further
benefits of consumer engagement with
their energy system. Indeed links between
the behaviour, technology (e.g. smart
metering, microgeneration), and the
structure of policy and regulation could
create opportunities for inducing the
lifestyle change required for an enduring
low-carbon society.
The Interface of Policy, Behaviour, and
Demand-Side Technology
According to Bergman et al. (2009),
maximising the energy and emissions
savings from microgeneration requires both
significant uptake of the technology among
consumers and behavioural changes in
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set of challenges for further introduction
into the energy system. On one hand, as
shown in Chapter 6, it could form an
integral part of a low-carbon energy supply
in the UK in coming decades, and indeed it
is virtually indispensable for further
decarbonisation of residential heat. On the
other hand it faces a demanding set of
technical, economic, and institutional
obstacles.
Capital costs are a key barrier for all of the
main microgeneration options, and
technology R&D, learning-by-doing, and
market scale-up is required to reduce
these. Furthermore, some of the relevant
technologies are immature, and technical
performance must be improved before
market entry will become realistic.
Numerous additional barriers exist,
including the structure of the incumbent
energy system, lack of awareness or the
existence or potential of technology
options, and a broader techno-centric view
that ignores possibilities to affect energy
and climate-related attitudinal changes.
In terms of performance assessment of the
technologies, it is apparent that choice of
reference system against which to compare
microgeneration is very important and not
well understood. This is because any
individual mitigation intervention is
marginal in nature, and therefore average
formulation of policy instruments combined
with development of appropriately aligned
technology and business strategy could
result in actors adopting the
microgeneration/citizen mentality. This is
opposed to the existing model applied by
the incumbent energy system where
customers are seen as consumers,
resulting in the focus on technology uptake
rather than on context-setting for
environmentally-aware behaviour, and
leading to the microgeneration/consumer
combination of Table 7.2.
Overall, the social and behavioural issues
pertinent to microgeneration are a potent
factor in dictating uptake and use. It is
clear that research is required that
considers the policy/behaviour/technology
interface for successful uptake and
application, in order to formulate a
complete policy framework for accelerating
the penetration of microgeneration into the
energy generation mix. Successful uptake
of the most appropriate installations with
good information provision can maximise
emission savings as well as increase citizen
awareness of their energy usage and
potential savings.
Conclusions
Microgeneration offers a unique set of
opportunities along with a commensurate
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Consumer Citizen
Business as Usual Economic rights Political rights
(& social opportunities) • voting, earning, responsibilities
• more is better
Microgeneration Scenario Buy more microgeneration Wise use & sufficiency
=> smart houses, passive => smart houses, smart users
users
Table 7.2: Qualities of consumption and citizenship, present and possible future scenarios.
Adapted from Janda (2007)
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BERR (Department for Business and
Regulatory Reform) (2008). Digest of
United Kingdom Energy Statistics (DUKES),
URN No: 08/87. A National Statistics
Publication, TSO, London, UK.
CLG (Department for Communities and
Local Government) (2006). Code for
Sustainable Homes:  A step-change in
sustainable home building practice. Code:
06 BD 04224, Communities and Local
Government Publications, Wetherby, UK. 
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry)
(2006), Microgeneration Strategy, DTI/Pub
8243/ik/03/06/NP, London, UK.
Element Energy (2008). The growth
potential for Microgeneration in England,
Wales and Scotland, URN 08/912,
Commissioned by consortium led by BERR.
London, UK.
ENA (Energy Networks Association)(2003).
ER G83/1: Recommendations for the
Connection of Small-Scale Embedded
Generators (up to 16 A per phase) in
Parallel with Public Low-Voltage Distribution
Networks, London, UK.
Energy Saving Trust, Element Energy and
EConnect (2005). Potential for
Microgeneration Study and Analysis Final
Report, Report for the Department for
Trade and Industry, London, UK.
Hawkes, A. D. and Leach, M. A. (2008).
Utilisation-Based Policy Instruments to
Support Residential Micro-CHP, 7th British
Institute of Energy Economists (BIEE)
Academic Conference, September 24-25.
Oxford, UK. 
Hawkes, A. D et al. (2009). Fuel Cells for
Micro-Combined Heat and Power
energy system statistics are unlikely to be
appropriate in determining (for example)
its greenhouse gas emissions reduction
contribution. Moreover, in a period of
energy system upheaval as is predicted
over coming decades, the definition of
which future generation plant to compare
microgeneration against is problematic and
requires research attention.
Despite these challenges, policy has
developed rapidly in the UK to support
microgeneration. Numerous mechanisms of
upfront capital support exist, and a new
feed-in tariff has been proposed. However,
some of these developments have been ill-
considered, and co-ordination between and
within instruments is haphazard. As such,
achievement of a level playing field with
centralised generation is still a long way
off.
Finally, it is suggested that the interface of
technology, policy and behaviour is critical
to the success of future energy policy.
Existing modes of policy delivery and
stakeholder business models in the
residential sector favour passive energy
consumption, but a shift of focus may
motivate a more engaged response with
ensuing knock-on benefits. Microgeneration
is one technology that can help better
engage individuals and the public as a
whole, providing opportunities to leverage
lifestyle change towards a resilient low-
carbon energy system.
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transformational investments in supply
and transmission infrastructures
■ Lifestyle changes that reduce energy
demand would enhance energy system
resilience and reduce the costs of CO2
reduction. Further work is needed to
assess how such changes might be
induced and the role that policy could
play
■ If public concern about specific
technologies prevents their
deployment, the cost of meeting CO2
targets will significantly increase, and a
greater burden will be imposed on
demand side responses 
■ Reducing CO2 will broadly lead to
improvements in other environmental
areas, but regulatory attention may be
needed in some areas (air quality,
water stress) where there are
potentially adverse effects
Overview
The overall purpose of the Energy 2050
project was to provide insights into the
policy choices, institutional structures,
market regulation, and implications for
consumers, energy companies and others,
of the determined implementation of
measures to achieve a low-carbon resilient
energy system. It has sought to answer
the question: How can the transition to a
secure and low-carbon UK energy system
be achieved over time, and how can
opportunities over short and long
timescales, and between different parts of
the system (production and consumption,
technology and behaviour) be brought
together and barriers overcome? 
Key Messages
■ Achieving a resilient low-carbon energy
system in the UK is technically and
economically feasible at an affordable
cost
■ There are multiple potential pathways
to a low-carbon economy. A key trade-
off across the energy system is the
speed of reduction in energy demand
versus de-carbonisation of energy
supply
■ There are also a large number of more
specific trade-offs and uncertainties
such as the degree to which biomass,
as opposed to electricity and perhaps
hydrogen, is used in transport and
other sectors
■ Deploying new and improved
technologies on the supply side will
require a substantially increased long-
term commitment to RD&D, the
strengthening of financial incentives
and the dismantling of regulatory and
market barriers
■ Reducing energy demand is the key to
a resilient energy system. This will
reduce the UK’s exposure to energy
price shocks and could help us to ride
out major disruptions to infrastructure
■ A step change is needed in the rate of
improvement of energy efficiency. This
will reduce the welfare costs associated
with demand reduction
■ Changes will be needed to the design
and regulation of energy markets to
facilitate the move to a resilient low-
carbon energy system, with, for
example, much stronger incentives for
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The degree of dissimilarity between two
scenarios is measured by the distance from
left to right before their two branches
meet. If two scenarios are closely
correlated, i.e. they are similar in terms of
the key indicators, they will be close to
each on the diagram and their branches in
the tree diagram will meet after a short
distance. The LC Acctech and LC Renew
scenarios are examples of these. The
branches of dissimilar scenarios converge
further to the right of the diagram, for
example LCR and LC.
Two scenarios - lifestyles (LS LC) and low-
carbon resilient (LCR) – are quite distinct
from the others. Both have much lower
levels of final energy demand, and much
higher CO2 intensity of grid electricity, than
the others. Although they are driven by
different ‘storylines’ – reducing energy
dependence in the case of LCR and a
cultural shift in attitudes to energy usage
in LS LC – the similarities in terms of
outcome are striking. 
The key characteristic of the closely linked
NIMBY and DREAD scenarios is that
restrictions on electricity generating
technologies have forced a reduced market
share for electricity, and hence a
continuing reliance on natural gas. Gas
accounts for a significant share (above
40% in DREAD) of the primary energy mix.
CCSP, which has a least-cost carbon
pathway based on a social discount rate, is
also distinct, being characterised by early
carbon reductions leading to both lowered
final energy demand and decarbonised
electricity. 
The Energy 2050 project has shown that
the technical and economic potential for
the UK to move systematically towards a
resilient and low-carbon energy system is
there and the prospects are encouraging.
On the supply side there is a wide range of
low-carbon options potentially available to
deliver both the carbon reductions required
by the UK Climate Change Act, and the
diversity required for energy system
resilience.
Achieving the 80% Target
A range of scenarios, all of which achieve
the 80% CO2 reduction goal, is
summarised in Table 8.1. Although they
have this in common, the mixture of
technologies varies widely demonstrating
that there is no one pathway to a low
carbon economy. The route to 2050
depends on how we respond to options
that are either opened up through
technological development or behaviour
changes, or closed down because of social
choices or events beyond our control. 
Figure 8.1 shows how the scenarios
reported in Table 8.1 are clustered in
relation to each other. The tree diagram
has been created by analysing the degree
of correlation between the scenarios in
terms of a set of key indicators for 2035,
roughly the mid-point of the projection
period. The indicators are: level of final
energy demand; carbon intensity of grid
electricity; and maximum fuel share in the
primary energy mix. These three indicators
were selected because they capture the
principal differences in system responses to
decarbonisation and resilience imperatives
across the different scenarios. 
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carbon LC scenario and the least-cost path
CCP scenario. The ECO scenario, which is
particularly restrictive in terms of electricity
generating options and bio-energy
development is mid-way between the CCSP
The two scenarios which involve technology
acceleration (LC Renew and LC Acctech)
are similar in that they both address
mainly the decarbonisation of electricity.
They are also quite similar to the core low-
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Table 8.1  Summary of UKERC energy 2050 scenarios meeting 80% target
Group Scenario Notes
Carbon reduction LC 80% reductions by 2050, 26% by 2020
scenarios CCP Least-cost path, 80% CO2 reduction post 2050.
2010-50 carbon budget from CEA
CCSP Least-cost path, 80% CO2 reduction post 2050.
2010-50 carbon budget from CEA. Social discount rate
A resilient energy LCR Low-Carbon Resilient
system 
Technology acceleration LC Acctech All seven supply technologies accelerated
LC Renew All four renewable supply technologies accelerated
ACCTECH All seven supply technologies accelerated (except Fuel 
no FC Cells)
Energy lifestyles LS LC Lower-carbon lifestyle changes in households and
personal transport
Environmental sensitivities DREAD No CCS, new nuclear or hydrogen
ECO Constraints on wind, marine, nuclear, CCS and the
availability of rape seed oil, straw and wheat.  Energy
crops disallowed
NIMBY Constraints on wind, marine and domestic bio-energy
resources 
RENEW
ACCTECH no FC
DREAD
NIMBY
CCP
ACCTECH
LC
ECO
LCR
LS-LC
CCSP
0.00 0.87
Figure 8.1: Clustering of scenarios in 2035 
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carbon reduction, has to achieve 89%
decarbonisation by 2050 in order to
achieve this
■ In respect of energy demand (column
5) all the 80% or more reduction
scenarios (LC, LCR, CSAM, CEA,CCP, LC
Renew, LC Acctech, DREAD, ECO,
NIMBY, LS LC) reduce primary energy
demand by 2050 by 31-45% below the
REF level, and final energy demand by
29-39%. These reductions occur
through the joint application of the
carbon price, efficiency and
conservation measures and, in LS LC,
non-price related behaviour change. At
present, policies do not exist either to
establish the necessary carbon price
across the economy, nor to stimulate
the necessary uptake of efficiency and
conservation measures
■ Achieving the 80% target is also
associated with considerable increases
in electricity consumption (typically
50% over REF), or reductions in
residential energy demand (typically
around 50% below REF), or both
(column 6). LCR, DREAD and LS LC
have the smallest increases in
electricity demand, for different
reasons. LCR decarbonises more by
reducing energy demand, because of
the energy intensity constraint. DREAD
uses less electricity in transport. LS LC
has among the highest reductions in
residential energy demand (57%), also
uses less transport fuel and, like
DREAD, uses more bio-fuels. CSAM, LC
Acctech, and ECO all have increases in
electricity above 70%: CSAM because
of the high level of decarbonisation
required (it has the lowest cumulative
scenario and the technology acceleration
cluster. 
The electricity sector has to be effectively
decarbonised to meet the 80% target by
2050 in all the scenarios. In most of the
scenarios we have looked at, electricity is
well on the way to decarbonisation by
2030. However, in the LCR and LS LC
scenarios decarbonisation runs about a
decade behind the others.
Scenario Comparison
Looking out to 2050, the end of the
projection period, Tables 8.2 and 8.3
compare the major scenarios reported in
earlier chapters. Table 8.2 compares
energy and carbon outcomes. Table 8.3
focuses on economic variables.
With regard to Table 8.2:
■ In respect of carbon reduction (column
3), REF (which contains UK
Government carbon reduction policies
up to 2007) produces only 2%
reduction from the 1990 level by 2050.
Of the other carbon-unconstrained
scenarios, LS REF and R produce 31%
and 52% reductions respectively,
indicating the carbon-reducing power of
lifestyle change and a policy priority of
energy system resilience. However, this
is still well short of the 80% reduction
target.  Stringent additional carbon-
reducing policies are clearly necessary
if this target is to be achieved
■ In respect of cumulative emissions
(column 4), CCP and CCSP show that
the same cumulative emissions (19
GtCO2) can be achieved over different
time-paths, although CCP, which delays
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scenario does the UK come anywhere
near the 15% of renewables in final
energy demand by 2020, which is its
mandatory EU target. The maximum
achieved is just 6%. In the second
column, it can be seen that the
maximum reduction in primary energy
demand by 2020 is 11% in the early-
action CCSP scenario, and 10-11% in
the two Core resilience scenarios,
compared to the EU aspiration to
reduce EU primary energy demand by
20% below the ‘business-as-usual’
level by that date. There is further
discussion of these two policy positions
below.
With regard to Table 8.3:
■ Broadly the highest carbon prices occur
in those scenarios that have the
highest carbon reduction targets
(CSAM), delay carbon reduction (CCP),
or rely for decarbonisation on both high
levels of power generation and demand
reduction (ECO). For the rest, meeting
the 80% carbon reduction target can
be achieved with a carbon price of
below £208/tCO2 For comparison, if all
the current rate of fuel duty in the UK
(about 50p/litre) were considered to
reflect a carbon price, this would be
about £208/tCO2.
■ With regard to energy system costs, as
discussed in Chapter 2, in MARKAL
there are two opposing tendencies
when a carbon or resilience constraint
is applied. The use of more expensive
low-carbon or other technologies tends
to increase the energy system cost,
while reductions in energy demand
(from the higher energy price) tend to
CO2 emissions of all the major carbon
reduction scenarios); LC Acctech
because the technology acceleration
has left low-carbon electricity
technologies relatively cheap; and ECO
because there are no limits on nuclear
and coal CCS
■ Of the diversity indicators (column 7)
only LS REF and CCSP breach the 40%
maximum share of any primary fuel,
with both of them using too much coal
for power generation. The breach does
not occur in REF because the primary
energy demand is much larger. Far
more scenarios breach the 40%
maximum share in generation, with
REF and LS REF outstanding as having
too much coal-fired generation, and
DREAD too much wind (see Figure
5.11), because of social concerns about
the other major low-carbon electricity
sources, nuclear and CCS
■ Column 8 shows the extent of
decarbonisation of the electricity
system by 2050. The CO2 intensity of
the least decarbonised of the major
carbon reduction scenarios (CCSP) is
still only 7% that of REF by 2050.
DREAD and CSAM are almost
completely decarbonised. Most of those
with relatively little power sector
decarbonisation tend to use more
biofuels (CEA, CCP, LS LC), allowing
the power sector to take more of the
carbon budget. CCSP uniquely goes for
a mixture of demand reduction and
hydrogen in transport
■ The final two columns relate to EU
targets for 2020. In the first column, it
can be seen that by 2050 in no
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■ Constraining MARKAL always reduces
social welfare because its
unconstrained run is defined as
optimal. The reductions in social
welfare in the 80% decarbonisation
scenarios (excluding CCSP and LS LC,
which change the discount rate or
preferences) amount to £28-53 billion.
The losses of social welfare due to
gaining resilience or low-carbon
resilience are higher at £49 or 59
billion. As noted in the text, this is an
upper bound, because of the very
pessimistic assumption that energy
price increases cause reductions in
demand rather than an increase in
uptake of relatively low-cost
conservation measures. There is no
obvious comparator to this welfare
cost. UK GDP is about £1.5 trillion. A
£50 billion welfare loss as a proportion
of UK current GDP is about 3%, but
would be less than half that in 2050 if
UK GDP were to grow at 2% pa, as is
often considered likely
In the light of these results, some
comments now follow on particular themes
from the previous chapters.
reduce it. It can seen that only in the
resilient and lifestyle scenarios is the
demand effect greater than the effect
from more expensive technology, so
that the energy system cost in R falls
by £11 billion. In all other scenarios it
increases, in the high-carbon reduction
scenarios by £18-30 billion. For
comparison, in 2050 the total energy
system cost across the scenarios is
£250-300 billion. The increase in
energy system costs due to
decarbonisation is therefore around
10% in most cases
■ The energy system cost calculation in
the lifestyle scenarios is not strictly
comparable with that in the other
scenarios, because of modelling
differences. However, the intuition
behind the result seems sound: people
demand less energy because their
preferences have changed, rather than
because energy prices have been
increased through the deployment of
more expensive technologies. The
energy system is therefore smaller, and
cheaper. The reduced size (about 30%)
is in line with the reduced energy
demand
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privatisation, but the consequence of having
large volumes of intermittent renewable
energy on the system and the loss of
indigenous natural gas supplies needs
consideration. It is not at all clear that the
current market arrangements will induce
sufficient investment in back-up capacity to
ensure system reliability. Options such as
capacity payments or allowing grid
operators to earn a regulated return on
back-up capacity need to be considered.
Our analysis has shown that investment in
gas storage, new interconnectors and LNG
import facilities has taken and will take
place on the basis of market incentives.
However, the level of market investment
could still leave us vulnerable in the event
of catastrophic loss of infrastructure for
days or weeks. There is a policy choice to
be made about investment in ‘strategic’
storage or other facilities which could
probably only be justified if developers
could earn a risk-free regulated rate of
return on the assets. Nevertheless, the
cost of strategic investment is relatively
modest compared to aggressive energy
efficiency measures or back-up capacity for
renewables. 
The degree to which strategic storage is
justified is also dependent on the level of
effort in bringing down final energy demand,
especially in the residential sector. Our
analysis suggests that the gas/electricity
system could ride out all but the worst
infrastructure outages if demand levels fall.
Energy Demand
With regard to demand side issues, it is
clear that a reduction in the demand for
energy could play an important role both in
Building in Resilience 
The key elements of building in resilience
are promoting reductions in energy
demand and import dependence through
efficiency; encouraging diversity of supply;
and ensuring adequate investment in
capacity and infrastructure.  
It is imperative that reductions in energy
demand are promoted, either through the
take-up of cost-effective energy
conservation measures or through lifestyle
changes that reduce demand for energy
services. If supply side measures that
decarbonise electricity supply are not
available, because of delays in
commercialising (CCS) or deploying
(renewable) technology, then greater levels
of energy demand reduction will be
required to stay on the trajectory towards
an 80% reduction in CO2. Seeking out cost
effective efficiency is vital because there
could be major welfare losses associated
with forcing down energy demand through
the price mechanism. A step change in
policy delivery is required and the
residential sector will be critical. Measures
such as a new Supplier Obligation beyond
2012 and a careful look at the business
models for delivering energy efficiency,
particularly the role of the utilities vis-à-vis
local authorities and others, are needed. 
In general, our low-carbon resilient (LCR)
scenario did not need to be constrained to
obtain high levels of diversity in terms of
either primary energy or electricity
generation.
Ensuring adequate capacity and
infrastructure is largely down to market
design and regulation. The current system
has achieved this since electricity
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Although many energy efficiency measures
are cost effective, achieving a 3.2% pa
reduction would be challenging, and any
number of devils will lurk in the policy
details.
Delivering improvements in energy
intensity at rates that are economically
attractive at prevailing prices has not often
been achieved. Partly this has been
because governments have been unwilling
to increase energy prices above market
rates to the extent that would be required.
It has also been because of now well
documented barriers to the take up of
energy efficiency measures. People are
unaware of the prices they pay for energy,
the scale of their energy consumption and
size or their energy bills; even with recent
energy price increases (and certainly
before them), energy bills are a low
proportion of most people’s expenditure;
energy efficiency technologies have a low
profile and are of little interest to energy
consumers; people (both consumers and
many installers) are unaware or sceptical
of the technologies that would help save
energy; consumers do not trust the
expertise of the installers of energy
efficiency technology or energy suppliers;
the installation of some energy efficiency
technologies is perceived to cause
disruption to the household (see Sorrell et
al. 2004 for a more detailed exposition). 
Given this situation it is well established
that a range of policy instruments is
needed, including market-based
instruments, information and advice and
regulation.  Governments in the UK have
traditionally not favoured raising energy
prices for fear of exacerbating fuel poverty,
which adds to the priority of raising energy
efficiency in existing housing to address
achieving a more resilient energy system
and in reducing the costs of carbon
reduction, in terms of both welfare costs
and the cost savings implied by needing a
smaller energy system. In the Reference
scenario, primary energy demand in 2025
is 7% below that in 2000, and, in the
Resilient scenario, because of the imposed
3.2% pa reduction in energy intensity, is
14% below the Reference case. The
objective of the EU Energy Efficiency Action
Plan (CEC 2006) is to control and reduce
energy demand and to take targeted action
on consumption and supply in order to
save 20% of annual consumption of
primary energy by 2020 (compared to the
energy consumption forecasts for 2020).
The Resilient scenario is compatible with
the EU energy efficiency objective, whereas
the Reference scenario is not. Moreover,
the resilience scenarios (R, LCR) achieve
greater percentage reductions in primary
energy than any of the decarbonisation
scenarios (see Table 8.2, final column),
with the exception of the lifestyles
scenarios, and the CCSP scenario, which
reduces demand early in order to avoid
low-discounted heavy capital investment
later on. It is clear that strategies for
decarbonisation need to promote behaviour
change as well as the uptake of low-carbon
technologies if the UK is to be in line with
EU energy efficiency aspirations.
In principle, the means of reducing the
economy’s energy intensity seem clear: a
combination of rising energy prices and
measures to enhance the development and
deployment of energy efficiency measures
in the various end-use sectors of industrial
processes, electric motors, buildings,
vehicles and appliances, and to induce
more energy-conserving behaviours.
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Lifestyles
The Lifestyles scenarios in Chapter 6 have
laid out clearly the kinds of energy lifestyle
changes that would both enhance energy
system resilience and reduce the costs of
meeting the carbon reduction targets. More
carbon-aware lifestyles can increase the
propensity to invest in energy efficiency
and microgeneration, but also reduce the
demand for energy services in households
and personal transport.  
Historically there has been little emphasis
in energy policy on how lifestyles might be
induced to change in these directions, or
even whether this is something that policy
can have influence on, except through
prices.  Making high-energy lifestyles more
expensive is likely to be strongly resisted
unless such lifestyles are perceived to be
less attractive.  Addressing this issue
effectively points to extending the
conception of energy policy: to include the
infrastructures and institutions within which
such choices are made, notably in housing
and transport; and to education, both to
ensure citizens have a clear understanding
of climate and energy challenges and to re-
skill the huge numbers of professionals and
trades-people who will be employed.  This
in turn points to a greater emphasis in
energy policy on the role of local
government, where many of the relevant
decisions are made.
Policy makers could perhaps start by
making high-energy lifestyles less
necessary, for example by focusing more
systematically, especially in towns and
cities, on ensuring ready and safe access
to basic services and amenities to everyone
without the use of private vehicles, i.e. by
walking, cycling or public transport. It is
this policy tension.  A combination of
advice, product regulation and increasingly
large energy efficiency programmes
(mandated via CERT) have been successful
in raising the uptake of low-cost measures
(e.g. insulation, condensing boilers and
efficient lights and appliances).  
The UK Government’s Consultation on a
Heat and Energy Saving Strategy (DECC
2009) recognises that continuation of the
current policy framework will be insufficient
to deliver long-term goals.  Deployment of
higher cost energy efficiency and
microgeneration measures to further reduce
demand will face all the familiar barriers as
well as larger financing constraints.  The
need for a major shift in energy sector
investment towards efficiency to address
carbon goals is international, as recognised
by the IEA and the UN Climate Change
Convention, but because of the age and
condition of the housing stock, the issue is
particularly acute in the UK.
The policies required are therefore likely to
have to be stronger than historically, and
different from those for low-carbon energy
supply, because households are less
responsive to energy price incentives than
energy businesses.  DECC 2009 goes
considerably further in seeking to address
them than previous Government policy on
household energy efficiency. Measures such
as a new Supplier Obligation beyond 2012
and a careful look at the business models
for delivering energy efficiency, particularly
the role of the utilities vis-à-vis local
authorities and others, are needed. It
remains to be seen whether the concrete
policies that emerge from the Consultation
manage to achieve the very considerable
and sustained increase in energy efficiency
that is being sought. 
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commitment to RD&D for these
technologies, as part of expanded
wider international efforts, is of
primary importance here
■ Putting in place the necessary financial
incentives to cause the private sector
to start making the investments in
deployment at the necessary scale,
including ensuring that the banding of
the ROCs really is going to bring
forward important low-carbon
technologies that the Renewables
Obligation has so far marginalised.
Longer-term investments to develop
more emergent options will require a
greater share of public investment,
alongside some private investment
■ Removing the non-financial barriers to
large-scale deployment of the
technologies. These seem particularly
problematic in the UK context. In BERR
2008a some of the relevant issues are
identified as the effectiveness of
financial incentives, planning issues, grid
issues, supply chain issues, information
issues, network issues, and market
structure (for example, the
appropriateness of the wholesale
electricity market for smaller
generators). Having identified these
issues, it is far from clear whether the
proposals being made will in fact lead to
the step change in the deployment of
renewables of different kinds as required
for them to achieve the 15% share in
final energy demand by 2020 mandated
by the EU Renewable Energy Directive
Renewables
Broadly, for renewables it is clear that time
is running out if the 15% renewable energy
possible then that the social norms would
develop that would increasingly allow
private vehicle access to be restricted, so
that the low-carbon modes could be
expanded and used even more effectively.
There is already evidence of this beginning
to happen in some cities, notably London
where car ownership is relatively low.
However, the policy priority that has been
so long given to car ownership and use is
still prevalent.  Its abandonment would
make a low-carbon energy system much
easier and less expensive to achieve.
Decarbonising Electricity
A major theme that emerges from nearly
all the scenarios is the importance of
decarbonising electricity. The three big
centralised electricity options that are most
important are large-scale renewables
(mainly wind, but also biomass and marine
renewables in the longer-term), new
nuclear and fossil fuels with CCS. The
modelling indicates that, provided good
levels of technological development are
achieved over time, the costs entailed in
the large-scale deployment of these
technologies, while still uncertain, are likely
to be affordable. 
Policy in this area must therefore focus on:
■ Resolving outstanding technical
uncertainties and developing the
potential of those technologies which
are close to deployment (large-scale
wind, new nuclear and CCS) and those
which are currently further away on
technical or cost grounds (e.g. marine
renewables, photovoltaics, hydrogen
fuel cells) but which could have an
important role to play in the longer-
term. Substantially increasing UK
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carbon emissions and security of supply
benefits” (DTI 2007a, p.191), although
there is a presumption that new nuclear
build would neither need nor get public
subsidy  (DTI 2007a, p.17).  “The Treasury
and HMRC are, however, exploring the
possibility that the timing of nuclear
decommissioning could create a potential
tax disadvantage for nuclear operators
and, if so, whether it may be appropriate
to take action to ensure a level fiscal
playing field between nuclear power and
other forms of electricity generation.”
(BERR 2008c (p.154). This may open the
door to some public subsidy of
decommissioning costs at least.
The issue is important, because if nuclear
power is an important contributor to UK
energy system resilience and
decarbonisation – as is suggested in some
of the scenarios presented here – and if
private companies decide that it is not in
fact financially viable without public
subsidy (as has been the case in the past),
then without public subsidy new nuclear
stations will not be built and energy
system resilience and/or decarbonisation
will not be delivered.
Conclusions on the supply side
On the supply side it is therefore clear
that, despite abundant technical potential
at seemingly affordable cost renewables
are not being introduced at anything like
the required rate to meet the EU’s 2020
target; the economics of new nuclear are
still uncertain; CCS is still commercially
unproven at the requisite scale; the next
generation of renewable technologies are,
as far as the UK is concerned, being
developed and deployed very slowly; and
non-financial barriers of all kinds to new
share in final energy demand is to be
achieved by 2020. For example, BERR
(2008a, p.57) estimated that this could
require around 3,000 extra offshore
turbines of 5MW, a deployment rate of
about five per week, from a base of 0.8GW
at the end of 2008. The rate for extra
onshore wind turbines is around seven
3MW machines per week, when at the end
of 2008 the total operational capacity was
only 1.7GW (BWEA 2008). The realisation
of these numbers strains credibility in the
absence of a completely transformed policy
landscape that clearly addresses all the
issues relating to both financial incentives
and non-financial constraints. Much hangs
on the Government’s Renewable Energy
Strategy due in summer 2009.
Nuclear
Looking further into the future, the
Government is keen to ensure that there is
a favourable policy framework for a new
generation of nuclear power stations, with
a view to new nuclear plant coming on
stream by 2020 at the latest (DECC 2008,
BERR 2008c). The issues set out in the
White Paper (BERR 2008c) as needing to
be addressed include planning, site
assessment, assessment of potential health
impacts, design assessment and licensing,
and review of the regulatory regime in
general. 
On the economics of nuclear, and therefore
the potential need for public subsidy of
new nuclear build, the Government has
had a remarkable change of mind over the
past five years, from thinking in 2003 that
it was “an unattractive option” (DTI 2003,
p.61), to believing in 2007 “that nuclear
power stations would yield economic
benefits to the UK in terms of reduced
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that this issue will only become clear once
much higher levels of microgeneration start
to be deployed, but the danger then is that
structural issues will impede the growth in
and destroy the momentum of
microgeneration that may have been
created by the recently proposed feed-in
tariff. Whether the feed-in tariff will in fact
generate such growth and momentum will
obviously depend on the level at which it is
set, and level of public awareness about
and commitment to the technological
opportunities that are offered. There are
very likely to be comparable non-economic
barriers to household microgeneration
technologies as those that hinder the
uptake of household energy efficiency
technologies and these will need to be
addressed far more quickly than has been
the case with energy efficiency if
microgeneration is not to continue as a
marginal contributor to energy supply for
the foreseeable future. 
The prospects for micro-generation/CHP in
the medium-term depend on the speed
with which centralised electricity generation
is de-carbonised. The slower
decarbonisation scenarios such as LCR and
LS LC will leave the window for cost-
effective deployment open for a much
longer period.
Environmental Sensitivities
Somewhere between lifestyle change and
non-financial barriers to energy system
change lie people’s environmental
sensitivities. A somewhat paradoxical
message to emerge from Chapters 6 and 7
is that people need to become more
environmentally aware in terms of climate
change and the need for the reduction in
carbon emissions (Chapter 6), but
energy technologies of all kinds still seem
to be pervasive and are difficult to remove.
Despite the rather optimistic outcomes of
the Energy 2050 modelling on the supply
side, there are therefore serious causes for
concern that neither carbon reduction
targets nor the necessary diversity in the
energy system for resilience will be
achieved.
Microgeneration
Microgeneration is another set of possible
options, but the way forward here is
complicated. The Government adopted a
Microgeneration Strategy in 2006 (DTI
2006) which identified 25 actions to
remove barriers to microgeneration, and by
June 2008 was claiming (BERR 2008b, p.1)
that 21 of these had been successfully
completed, and the only action that
remained outstanding (3 having been
overtaken by other events) would be
completed by the end of the year. Yet it is
still not at all clear that microgeneration is
on track to become more than an
absolutely marginal contributor to UK
energy supply (in the three years from 
the end of 2004 the number of
microgenerators increased from 82,000 
to only around 100,000, BERR 2008b, 
p.2).
The Microgeneration Strategy has therefore
so far failed to deliver the uptake of
microgeneration technologies that was
hoped for. There is still also little clarity
about the changes to the electricity grid
and network structure that will be required
for it to accommodate a large-scale take-
up of microgeneration technologies, or who
will have the responsibility (and will
therefore require the incentive and access
to the finance) to deliver this. It may be
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potential into real changes, and for policy
and societal responses of a scale to
instigate required change over short and
long timescales.
The question posed at the beginning of this
chapter was: how can the transition to a
secure and low-carbon UK energy system
be achieved over time, and how can
opportunities over short and long
timescales, and between different parts of
the system (production and consumption,
technology and behaviour) be best brought
together and barriers overcome? The
UKERC Energy 2050 project has confirmed
the key messages from the Stern Review
(Stern 2007, p.349): carbon pricing,
technology policy, and removal of the
barriers to behaviour change are needed.
It has also identified the scope for action in
each of these areas and indicated what
needs to be done in the shorter-term to
make progress. What is clear is that as yet
in the UK (and much of the rest of the
world) none of these three elements of the
framework are being implemented with the
rigour required to achieve the objectives
and targets that the policy makers have
set themselves. For both the UK’s own
targets, and the wider issue of large-scale
reductions in carbon emissions to avert
dangerous anthropogenic climate change,
time is not on the policy makers’ side.
While this project has been primarily
concerned with energy systems and
policies from a UK perspective, the
challenges facing energy production and
use are global. UK ambitions to deliver
resilience and especially decarbonisation
can best, and perhaps only, be realised as
part of international commitments and
agreements. Achieving an international
consensus on energy and climate issues is
heightened environmental awareness
related to other issues (e.g. visual or
ecological impacts) could make it more
difficult and expensive, and at the limit
impossible, to meet the carbon reduction
targets that have been proposed (Chapter
7). This emphasises again the importance
of the demand reduction message: the less
energy of any kind that people use, the
easier it will be to reach the carbon targets
without having the other kinds of
environmental impacts to which significant
numbers of people are opposed.
Broadly speaking, policies to reduce CO2
emissions will also help to reduce
environmental impacts associated with
other types of emissions and
environmental pressures. However, there
are one or two areas where, without
compensating action, environmental
consequences could be exacerbated.
Specific examples include increases in PM10
emissions in the event of the high
deployment of biomass and pressure on
water resources. This is not an argument
against a vigorous climate policy, but areas
of tension that call for compensating
regulatory action.
In Conclusion
The scenarios outlined here have allowed
for a structured and system-wide
exploration of the main opportunities and
barriers involved in energy system
transformation from now to 2050. The
basic message from this study is positive,
in that multiple possible pathways have
been identified for an affordable transition
to a resilient and low-carbon energy
system. In practice, there are perhaps
fewer grounds for optimism, and there is
an increasingly urgent need for translating
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a formidable challenge, but shared efforts
on, for example, low-carbon technology
development and deployment, promise rich
dividends. Policy responses to these
challenges are already significant. For
example, the UK Climate Change Act would
have been an unlikely prospect just a few
years ago. Much more is needed, and
needed now, both in the UK and
internationally. Among the many
opportunities, uncertainties and risks
involved, this research is intended to help
guide the way ahead. 
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